SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES  IN  RECENT  STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE 

REORGANIZATION 


BY 

WILLIAM  CORNELL  CASEY 

A.  B.  The  James  Millikin  University,  1916 


THESIS 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  MASTER  OF  ARTS  IN  POLITICAL 
SCIENCE  IN  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 
OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS, 

1922 


URBANA,  ILLINOIS 


CL 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 

THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 


1 HEREBY  RECOMMEND  THAT  THE  THESIS  PREPARED  UNDER  MY 


BE  ACCEPTED  AS  FULFILLING  THIS  PART  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR 


Recommendation  concurred  in* 


Committee 


on 

Final  Examination* 

\ 

•Required  for  doctor’s  degree  but  not  for  master's 


/ ' -!  o O.  O 1 
4 • i>'o  «./* 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/significanttendeOOcase 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

I-Introduction 

II-Messages  of  the  Governors 

III-fteports  of  the  Efficiency 
and  Economy  Commissions 

IV-Seseion  Laws 

V-Conclusions 


1 


JF  INTRODUCTION 

To  one  who  has  elected  to  examine  the  almost  interminable  bibliogra- 
phy of  state  administrative  reorganization  in  the  United  States,  there  comes 
a conviction  that  any  additional  pages  of  his  must  carry  their  own  justifica- 
tion in  a distinct  and  novel  purpose.  On  the  other  hand  the  voluminous  char- 
acter of  these  sources  carries  its  own  opportunity.  From  the  numerous  propos- 
sals  and  counter  proposals  representing  divergent  views,  and  for  the  most 
part  confirmed  by  a variety  of  legislative  acts  as  various  as  the  common- 
wealths which  formulated  them,  there  comes  the  inevitable  question:  Is  this 

administrative  readjustment  a random  experimentation,  or  are  fundamental  prin- 
ciples at  work  beneath  it  all— and  if  so,  whither  are  they  leading? 

I have  three  convictions  as  to  the  chief  purposes  in  any  study  of  ad- 
ministrative reorganization: 

(1)  That  it  should  endeavor  to  determine  either 
the  presence  or  absence,  or  the  force  or  neg- 
ligible qualities  of  certain  discoverable 
causes.  Such  a study  would  be  valuable,  even 
though  it  should  disclose  no  such  causes;  for 
the  variations,  themselves,  arising  out  of 
random  experimenting  in  some  thirty-eight 
commonwealths  should  serve  the  purpose  in  the 
science  of  politics  they  serve  in  any  science 
in  which  the  workable  and  desirable  variations 
are  selected  and  propagated. 

(2)  That  it  should  endeavor  to  determine  with 


* 


. 


reasonable  preciseness  these  causes. 

(3)  That  these  causes  are  to  be  determined  pri- 
marily by  a comparative  study  of  a wide 
range  of  specific  particulars  in  accordance 
with  a few  basic  standards  of  appraisement. 


I am  aware  of  the  healthy  pessimism  about  such  orderly  processes  which 
these  convictions  imply  in  things  political.  Herbert  Spencer's  deduction 
that  a large  proportion  of  th6  acts  of  Parliament  have  results,  different 
from  those  intended,  has  force  to-day  as  when  he  wrote  it.  Even  Thomas's 
conviction  that  social  and  political  evolution,  rather  than  proceeding  from 
events  designed,  has  been  but  a series  of  adjustments  to  crises  as  they 
have  arisen  may  be  said  to  hold  true  in  the  political  field  more  certainly 
and  for  a longer  time  than  in  any  other.  But  the  circumstances  surrounding 
state  administrative  reorganization  in  the  commonwealths,  on  the  whole,  are 
novel  in  this  respect:  they  represent  a larger  degree  of  expert  investiga- 

tion, analysis,  classification,  and  application  of  findings  by  specialists 
than  that  which  generally  characterizes  readjustments  •*>  augmented  in  the 
American  commonwealths  by  the  tangible,  technical  character  of  the  results 
which  can  be  observed  in  the  several  commonwealths,  and  the  opportunity  for 
a friendly  exchange  of  findings  by  interested  agencies  in  easy  proximity. 

In  a word,  I think  it  can  be  reasonably  determined  whether  administra- 
tive reorganization  in  the  United  States  is  distinctly  cumulative,  whether 
the  best  features  worthy  of  survival  are  to  be  found  in  the  piecemeal  re- 
organization acts  of  1921  in  purer  form  than  in  the  administrative  codes, 
say,  enacted  in  the  first  flush  of  wholesale  reorganization.  Even  were  this 


. 


, 


. 

« • * 

1 


t 

. 


3 


not  true,  a study  of  tendencies  in  this  field  would  be  valuable  though  it 
did  nothing  more  than  point  out  in  what  particulars  the  findings  of  special- 
ists were  disregarded  in  recent  reorganization  measures,  to  what  extent, and 
why* 

The  method  back  of  this  paper  is  purely  inductive.  I began  with  the 
particulars  of  reorganization  as  found  in  the  three  chief  sources:  governors' 
messages,  investigations  and  reports  of  efficiency  and  economy  commissions, 
and  the  statutes  themselves.  My  conclusions  followed  rather  than  preceded 
this  study.  I should  confess,  however,  to  a leaning  toward  a policy  of 
piecemeal,  gradual  reorganization.  But  I should  point  cut  also  that  such 
a bias  on  my  part  tended  to  be  offset  by  an  opposite  one  in  those  advocates 
of  a more  complete  reorganization  who  often  passed  over  very  excellent  fea- 
tures and  significant  tendencies  in  piecemeal  acts  with  some  such  criticism 
as  this  of  recent  California  legislation.  "What  was  done  in  California  in 
1921  amounted  to  little  more  than  a somewhat  elaborate  attempt  to  seem  to 
do  something  without  doing  it.  So  far  as  they  go,  the  changes  are  in  the 
right  direction,  but  they  cover  only  a few  services  and  make  no  drastic 
changes  as  to  these.  A situation  which  demanded  a radical  operation  has 
been  treated  with  a poultice."*  To  go  behind  such  a criticism  and  others 
like  it  in  an  endeavor  to  discover  tendencies  which  when  viewed  in  the 
light  of  a general  movement  become  extremely  significant,  represents  the 
method  of  this  paper.  It  is,  in  other  words,  a search  for  those  signif- 
icant tendencies  in  recent  state  administrative  reorganization  which  may 
reveal  certain  fundamental  principles  or  standards  for  the  purpose  of  ap- 
praisement. 

1 Thomas  H.  Reed,  "Administrative  Consolidation  in  California,"  The 

American  Political  Science  Review,  November,  1921. 


. 


. 


- 

* 


' 


* 


4 


Take  the  writings  of  those  executive  agents  themselves,  the  governors  of 
the  commonwealths.  It  seems  there  is  no  one  message  nor  group  of  them  for  any 
single  year  which  taken  by  itself  could  be  said  adequately  to  indicate  these 
fundamental  principles  or  standards.  Certainly  Governor  Brown  of  New  Hamp- 
shire in  his  message  of  1921  gave  little  indication  of  such  principles  when 
he  said:  MThe  departments  are  efficient  and  the  institutions  well  managed. 

I do  not  for  the  moment  recommend  any  changes  in  their  organization."  Nor 
was  there  any  evidence  of  these  principles  in  the  action  of  Governor  Miller 
of  New  York  who  vetoed  in  1921  a seemingly  admirable  consolidation  plan.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  do  seem  to  be  evidences  of  certain  principles  at  work 
in  the  examples  of  those  intrepid  executives  of  Ohio,  and  Washington,  who, 
in  the  same  year  following  the  precedent  set  by  the  governors  of  Illinois, 
Idaho,  and  Nebraska,  belied  any  charge  of  executive  complancy  toward  exist- 
ing arrangements  by  the  relatively  sweeping  administrative  reorganization 
acts  they  forced  through.  To  a less  emphatic  degree,  though  not  to  be 
underestimated,  there  is  the  example,  finally,  of  those  more  conservative 
governors  of  California,  Pennsylvania,  Missouri,  Michigan,  and  Minnesota 
whose  piecemeal  recommendations  are  even  more  comprehensive  and  effective 
in  the  conspicuous  features  of  reorganizations  they  bring  about. 

Take  the  recommendations  of  those  expert  commissions  on  efficiency  and 
economy  in  more  than  half  the  commonwealths  who  are  utilizing  them.  What  do 
they  show?  What  considerations  shaped  their  proposals  which  the  surface 
variations  do  not  reveal?  If  order  and  direction  in  administrative  reorgani- 
zation are  to  be  found  at  all,  is  it  reasonable  to  expect  in  these  a consist- 
ency of  findings  which  will  point  the  way? 


And  what  of  the  legislative  acts  themselves?  Varying  as  they  do  in 


. 


. 


' 


• V • 


5 

the  score  or  more  commonwealths  where  administrative  systems  have  been  mod- 
ified in  whole  or  in  part,  are  there  here,  too,  common  principles  at  work 
molding  the  course  of  events?  In  other  words,  is  current  administrative  re- 
organization in  the  American  commonwealths  a piecemeal,  haphazard  process, 
or  is  it  orderly,  consistent,  progressive— a movement  which  can  be  gauged, 
whose  causes  can  be  discovered,  whose  bearings  determined,  and  whose  general 
direction  with  reasonable  certainty  predicted? 

following  these  general  considerations,  the  paper  fails  into  four  parts: 
Recent  tendencies  as  revealed  in 

I- Mes sages  of  the  Governors 

II- Inveatigations  and  Reports  of  Efficiency  and 
Economy  Commissions 

III-  Session  Laws  of  the  Commonwealths 

IV- Conclusions 

Since  the  search  for  tendencies  called  for  a comparative  method  in  point 
of  time  as  well  as  in  the  nature  of  the  proposals  themselves,  I classified  as 
recent,  those  sources:  governors'  messages,  reports  of  commissions,  and  ses- 

sion laws  issued  since  1917.  I endeavored  to  consult  every  such  source  as  it 
related  to  the  general  subjeot  of  administrative  reorganization*  In  those 
sources  appearing  before  1917,  I felt  that  a study  of  a limited  number  of 
type  sources  would  serve  the  purpose  of  setting  up  a comparative  basis*  In 
a series  of  exhibits  or  tabulations  at  the  end,  I am  including  detailed  sur- 
veys of  findings. 


• • 'r  1 


• ■ " 


. 


4| 


6 


II-MESSAGES  OF  THE  GOVERNORS 

1. 

1.  When  Governor  Cox  in  hie  message  of  1921  to  the  General  Court  of  Massa- 
chusetts recalled  that  twenty  years  before  one  of  his  predecessors  had  pre- 
dicted a state  tax  of  $2,000,000  unless  strictest  economy  were  practiced, 
and  then  contrasted  with  that  prediction  the  budget  of  $38,760,000  in  the 
first  year  of  his  own  term,**  he  put  his  finger  on  an  emergency  which  a decade 
before  had  set  in  motion  the  first  agencies  for  reorganization  of  the  admin- 
istrative departments  of  the  American  commonwealths.  In  other  words,  the 
problem  confronting  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  in  1921  was 

(1)  A phenomenal  increase  in  state  expenditures 

(2)  A program  of  gradual  assumption  of  new  func- 
tions which  had  definitely  committed  the 
commonwealth  to  this  unparalleled  increase* 

(3)  The  necessity  of  adjusting  a relatively  sta- 
tionary income  to  the  increased  outgo* 

(4)  A correlation  and  effective  supervision  over 

all  departments  of  spending  agencies  before 

2 

such  adjustment  would  be  possible. 

What  was  true  of  Massachusetts  in  1921  the  messages  of  that  year  would 
indicate  to  be  true  of  the  commonwealths  quite  generally,  in  that  the  same 

1 pp.  5,6. 

2 Governor  Groesbeck  of  Michigan,  1921,  reports  that  the  taxes  for 
1919  and  1920  were  almost  double  the  highest  amount  ever  previous- 
ly collected  for  state  purposes  and  yet  a deficit  of  approximately 
six  million  dollars  remained  at  the  close  of  the  year  1920*  He 
points  out  that  the  capital  outlay  requests  for  1922  alone  (includ- 
ing purchase  of  lands,  new  buildings,  and  equipment)  will  exceed 
the  total  state  tax  for  the  year  1920.  pp.  5,  6. 


, 

. 


■ 


. 


stress  on  fiscal  arrangements  appeared  in  the  executive  messages  of  thirty- 

five  of  them. ^ It  became  the  governors'  problem  of  the  first  instance.  Or 

as  Walter  *’•  Dodd,  writing  in  the  August,  1921,  number  of  the  Journal  of  the 

American  Bar  Association  states  it:  "The  problems  of  state  administrative 

reorganisation  are  the  most  pressing  ones  in  the  field  of  state  government, 

for  the  administrative  organization  is  the  permanent  machinery  for  doing  the 

state's  work,  and  through  the  executive  department  the  bulk  of  state  expendi- 
4 

turee  is  made." 

be  it  to  the  credit  of  the  governors,  that  although  working  under  the 
classic  limitations  of  state  executive  departments:  short  terms,  a disin- 

tegrated and  decentralized  administrative  personnel,  and  relatively  negative 
relations  with  the  legislative  department,  they  have  quite  generally  recog- 
nized the  problem  and  risen  to  it.  During  the  legislative  sessions  of  1919 
and  1921,  governors  in  all  but  four  of  the  commonwealths  had  attacked  the 
problem  of  reorganization.  ^ General  recommendations  in  this  direction  were 
made  by  the  governors  of  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Iowa,  Maine,  Michigan, 
and  Texas.  In  each  of  these  states  an  efficiency  and  economy  commission  re- 
port had  previously  been  submitted.  The  governors  of  Maryland,  Minnesota, 
Nebraska,  Ohio,  and  Washington  in  1921  recommended  administrative  codes.  Effi- 
ciency and  economy  commissions  were  suggested  in  Connecticut,  Florida,  South 
Dakota,  and  Virginia  in  the  same  year,  while  the  governors  of  Delaware,  Mas- 

Governor  Lake  of  Connecticut,  1921,  submitted  the  following  table 
summarising  the  finances  of  the  state  for  each  year  since  1917: 


Expenditures 

Receipts 

Net  Debt 

1918 

112,603,034.23 

$15,189,326.87 

$593,572.29 

1919 

10,179,605.47 

8,014, 463. 55 

798,959.71 

1920 

19,374,856.66 

15,090,167.85 

4,627,742.52 

1921 

Est . 

6,500,000.00 

« 


„ 

. 


. 


, 

. 


. •' 


, 


. 


. 


- 

* 

. 


8 


sachusetts,  and  South  Carolina  transmitted  reports  of  similar  commissions 
with  recommendations  for  immediate  adoption.  The  increasing  concern  of  the 
governors  is  indicated  further  in  the  message  of  the  off  year  of  1922,  which 
call  attention  to  the  problem  of  reorganization  in  Maryland,  New  York,  South 
Carolina,  and  Virginia.6  From  this  brief  survey  two  facts  stand  out: 

(1)  The  governors*  efforts  in  the  direction  of 
reorganization  in  one  form  or  another  have 
extended  to  all  but  four  of  the  commonwealths. 

(2)  The  movement  as  evidenced  in  the  recommenda- 
tions  was  not  confined  to  any  one  section: 
witness  the  proposals  for  complete  reorganiza- 
tion in  Maryland,  Minnesota,  Ohio,  and  Washing- 
ton in  1921. 

2,  Another  significant  fact  about  the  governors'  messages  in  general  seems 
to  be  more  and  more  a tendency  on  the  part  of  the  governor  to  assume  the 
positive  role  in  suggesting  changes.  "Far  more  urgent  than  any  other  step 
which  might  be  taken  towards  economy  and  efficiency**  said  Governor  Mabey  in 
1921  to  the  Utah  legislature,  **is  the  reorganization  of  your  state  adminis- 
trative system.  Zn  the  beginning  the  basic  principle  upon  which  the  repub- 
lic was  founded  was  the  preservation  of  order  and  the  liberties  of  the  peo- 
ple through  a balance  between  the  executive,  the  legislative,  and  the  judi- 


3 Alabama,  Arizona,  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado,  Connecticut, 
Delaware,  Florida,  Georgia,  Idaho,  Indiana,  Kansas,  Mains,  Mary- 
land, Massachussetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Montana, 
Nebraska,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  North 
Carolina,  North  Dakota,  Oklahoma,  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina, 
South  Dakota,  Texas,  Vermont,  Washington,  West  Virginia,  Wyoming. 

4 pp. 406, 407. 

5 Kentucky,  Louisiana,  New  Mexico,  Tennessee. 


. 


. 


. 


9 


ci&l  departments.  As  the  country  developed  and  life  became  more  complex, 
through  discovery  and  invention,  new  burdens  were  cast  upon  the  state.  To 
discharge  these  burdens,  boards,  bureaus,  and  commissions  were  created. 

Since  these  bodies  came  into  existence  to  suit  certain  definite  needs, there 
was  little  likelihood  of  any  coordination  of  effort  or  unity  of  purpose.  The 
result  was  confusion,  absurdity,  chaos,  duplication,  overlapping  of  duties, 
and  division  of  responsibility.  Utah  is  no  exception  to  this  rule.  In  the 
twenty-four  years  since  statehood,  administrative  agencies  have  multiplied 
in  bewildering  confusion,  until  to-day  there  are  more  than  forty  of  them. 

They  have  been  ushered  into  existence  for  every  conceivable  purpose,  with 
little  thought  as  to  the  effect  of  their  individual  operation  might  have  up- 
on the  state  government  as  a whole.  The  evils  following  such  a loose  system 
are  apparent.  Where  there  should  be  harmony,  there  is  discord;  where  there 
should  be  efficiency,  there  is  incapacity  and  a slowing  down  of  the  machin- 
ery of  government.  *rom  the  standpoint  of  economy,  the  situation  is  still 
more  vicious.  Duplication  is  always  expensive.  It  becomes  more  so  when  its 
ramifications  extend  into  every  form  of  etate  endeavor.  What  would  seem 
childish  in  a corporate  body,  through  long  practice  has  become  a fixed  and 
almost  uncriticised  habit  with  ue.  The  sending  of  one  man  into  a town  to 
visit  a barber  shop,  while  another  may  visit  the  same  place  the  very  same 
day  to  look  into  the  sanitary  conditions  of  a hotel,  is  a case  in  point*  A 
solution  of  our  difficulties  can  be  found  without  radical  changes  in  our  pres- 
ent administrative  form.  We  have  the  machinery,  what  we  need  is  a rearrange- 
ment of  it.  Thia  can  be  done  by  three  simple  operations.  In  the  first  place, 


6 See  Chart  A of  the  Appendix 


, 


. 


10 


those  boards  and  commissions  that  are  similar  in  function  should  be  consol- 
idated; secondly,  there  should  be  a definite  fixed  responsibility  upon  those 
who  preside  over  departments;  and  thirdly,  the  chief  executive  should  be  em- 

n 

powered  to  exercise  a more  direct  supervisory  control.  Governor  Groesbeck 
in  1921  addressed  the  Michigan  legislature  in  this  wise:  "One  of  the  first 
things  we  should  undertake  is  the  correction  of  existing  defects  in  our 
state  government.  This  can  be  accomplished  only  through  revision  of  some  of 
our  present  laws.  Experience  has  demonstrated  that  there  are  many  inherent 
weaknesses  in  our  governmental  system.  As  you  are  aware,  there  is  a strong 
public  sentiment  in  favor  of  such  changes  as  will  guarantee  an  efficient, 
economical,  and  well  organized  plan  for  handling  state  business,  with  direct 
responsibility  to  the  people.  We  have  been  committed  to  this  reform  both 
individually  and  by  party  declarations.  The  best  service  we  can  render  the 
state  is  to  place  its  business  and  financial  affairs  upon  a basis  that  will 
insure  the  accomplishment  of  the  end  so  much  desired.  It  is  with  a view  of 
aiding  in  this  work  that  the  following  changes  are  suggested.  . • .M  Here 
follows  detailed  plans  for  the  reorganization  of  the  agriculture,  conserva- 
tion, business,  and  labor  agencies  in  their  respective  departments. 

Reference  to  party  platform  obligations  in  Governor  Groesbeck’s  message 
suggests  something  of  the  pronouncement  of  one  who  holds  a mandate  from  the 
people.  In  the  same  vein,  Governor  McRae  thus  addressed  the  Arkansas  legis- 
lature in  1921:  "This  brings  me  to  a consideration  of  your  obligations  and 

mine  to  the  demands  of  the  organized  democracy  of  Arkansas.  . • To  quote  the 
language  of  the  platform,  'We  favor  the  enactment  of  legislation  providing 


7 pp.  4-5 


, 

. 

. 

. 

t 

• 

* 

. ► . 


. 


' 


. 


11 


for  the  consolidation  of  offices,  boards,  and  commissions  where  the  duties 
of  the  same  are  not  inconsistent,  and  for  the  elimination  of  useless  of- 
fices, boards,  and  commissions.'  From  many  stumps  over  this  state  I de- 
clared for  a similar  reform,  making  this  the  paramount  issue  in  my  race  for 
governor,  and  I was  nominated.  Not  one  of  my  eight  opponents,  so  far  as  I 
know,  declared  himself  in  favor  of  retaining  any  of  these  useless  offices. 
Whenever  and  wherever  the  people  have  had  opportunity  to  register  their  op- 
position to  these  boards  and  commissions,  they  have  done  so.  By  every  rule 

8 

of  representative  government,  we  are  bound  to  adhere  to  these  demands." 

There  is  an  unmistakable  conservatism  on  the  other  hand,  which  the 
virility  and  grip  of  the  statements  of  more  aggressive  advocates  of  admin- 
istrative reform,  among  the  governors,  can  not  belie*  It  is  a significant 
fact  that  even  in  those  states  of  California,  Idaho,  Michigan,  Ohio,  and 
Washington,  in  which  extensive  reorganization  was  effected  in  1921,  there 
was  a notable  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  governors  concerned  to  caution 
an  evolutionary, rather  than  the  more  nearly  complete  consolidation  of  those 
earlier  codes  of  Idaho,  Illinois,  and  Nebraska.  In  Ohio,  where  the  most 
comprehensive  reorganization  of  1921  took  piece,  we  find  Governor  Cox  thus 
addressing  the  legislature  of  that  same  year:  "If  my  experience,  which  cov- 

ers a longer  period  of  service  than  that  rendered  by  any  executive  in  the 
history  of  the  commonwealth,  telle  me  any  one  conspicuous  thing,  it  is  the 
need  of  simplication  in  government.  It  is  never  possible  to  work  out  ob- 
viously necessary  reforms  in  government  with  the  same  facility  with  which 


8 pp.  6,7. 


12 


they  can  be  accomplished  in  business  for  the  very  simple  reason  that  it  would 
be  in  the  long  run  unwise  and  doubtless  unsafe  to  confer  an  authority  suffi- 
ciently arbitrary  for  the  purpose.  Therefore  the  processes  of  governmental 
improvement  in  a way  are  slow.  Many  changes  which  are  patently  practicable 
and  which  would  result  in  much  good  are  defeated  for  the  time  because  of  an 
opposition  which  is  more  partisan  than  sincere.  There  are  so  many  blessings, 
however,  from  a democracy  in  government  that  we  must  naturally  expect  at 
least  a small  average  of  accruing  advantages.  . . It  is  my  earnest  hope 
that  the  future  will  bring  a further  simplification  of  work  and  a centering 
of  responsibility.  This  would  make  for  efficiency  and  enable  the  people 
more  intelligently  to  fix  responsibility  to  say  nothing  of  the  facility  which 
would  be  afforded  to  apply  in  simple  fashion  the  needed  remedies.”9 

Expecially  significant  in  view  of  the  notable  domination  of  Governor 
Nathan  L.  Miller  over  the  1921  session  of  the  New  York  legislature  by  whose 
influence  a bill  to  reorganize  completely  the  state  administration  was  throt- 
tled in  the  lower  house,  are  his  own  statements  in  the  annual  message  of 
that  year  which  foreshadow  that  action:  "Reference  is  commonly  made  to  the 

187  state  departments  as  evidence  of  government  depravity,  but  the  state- 
ment is  grossly  misleading.  To  secure  that  number,  it  is  necessary  to  count 
every  institution  with  its  local  board,  every  park,  monument,  or  historical 
commission.  The  total  amount  of  appropriations  for  such  commissions  is  rel- 
atively insignificant.  No  practical  economy  would  result  from  such  consol- 
idation, but  the  state  would  sacrifice  the  interest  and  attention  of  those 


9 pp.  5,6. 


. 


13 


who  now  serve  on  such  commission  without  pay.  There  is  no  point  in  consol- 
idating merely  for  the  sake  of  reducing  numbers.  There  is,  however,  much 
overlapping  and  duplication  of  effort,  which  can  and  should  be  eliminated, 
greater  efficiency  and  economy  oan  be  eecured  by  uniting  and  properly  cor- 
relating certain  activities.  The  plan  of  organization  of  some  departments 
is  unsound.  That  can  be  corrected.  • . The  advantage  of  statutory  change 
is  that  we  ean  proceed  with  caution,  making  such  changes  as  experience  shall 
demonstrate  to  be  in  the  public  interest.*'1'® 

In  this  connection  it  should  be  noted  that  two  governors  in  1921  ad- 
dress their  legislatures  in  renouncement  of  the  formal  reorganization  move- 
ment. "Of  late  there  has  been  much  loose  talk  about  changes  in  the  admin- 
istration of  state  government,"  said  Governor  William  L.  Harding  to  the  Iowa 
legislature  in  1921.  "Agents,  with  a patent  cu real  1, appear  in  the  state  at 
least  biennially  with  a new  scheme,  or  schemes,  to  build  over  the  state  and 
practically  run  the  government  without  cost  or  friction.  The  only  thing 
lacking  usually  with  this  type  of  "doctor"  is  votes  enough  to  get  into  of- 
fice. It  would  be  idle  to  say  that  there  could  not  be  improvement  in  the 
condition  of  the  state's  business,  for  in  fact,  there  is  scarcely  an  admin- 
istration that  does  not  bring  about  improvement  somewhere.  • . If  in  due 
humility  a confession  can  be  made,  permit  me  to  say,  that  four  years  ago, 
when  I came  into  office,  I was  confident  that  great  saving  could  be  accom- 
plished by  changes  and  consolidations  in  departments,  and  1 purposed  then 
to  do  that  very  thing.  I have  been  in  close  contact  almost  daily  with  ev- 


10  pp.  28,29. 


. 

. 

. 

. 


■ 


14 


ery  department  in  and  for  the  state  government , and  I say  to  you  frankly  now 
many  changes  could  be  made;  much  re-arranging  can  be  done,  but  if  the  activi- 
ties that  are  being  carried  on  are  to  be  continued  and  as  efficient  as  now, 
you  will  find  that  the  savings  from  ail  the  changes  will  be  but  negiligiole. 
True,  there  are  some  overlappings  in  tne  activities,  but  when  the  real  facte 
are  understood,  you  will  do  as  your  predecessors,  continue  the  work.  . • The 
thing  I do  wish  to  emphasize,  is  that  this  government,  which  you  will  find 
here  and  the  various  agencies  thereof,  did  not  accidently  happen.  They  are 
the  product  of  brain,  and  character,  and  patriotism,  equal  with  that  which 
you  bring  to  the  service  of  the  state.  . • I grant  you  that  there  may  be  in 
some  of  our  sister  states,  need  for  change,  but  let  me  remind  you  that  when 
these  sister  states  have  made  all  their  changes,  they  will  not  have  reduced 
in  comparison  with  Iowa,  for  they  but  attempt  what  we  did  years  ago  when  the 
board  of  Control,  the  Executive  Council,  and  Board  of  Education  were  adopted. 
Through  these  three  departments,  most  of  the  state’s  taxes  are  expended,  and 
they  are  expended  in  an  economical  ana  businesslike  way.*’^  In  much  the  same 
vein  are  passages  from  the  executive  messages  of  Louisiana,  New  Mexico,  and 
Tennessee. 

Within  the  limits  of  recommendations  made  by  advanced  advocates  of  ad- 
ministrative reorganization  and  the  reactionary  position  of  the  few  obstruc- 
tionists, there  is  the  bulk  of  proposal  of  those  governors  whose  recommenda- 
tions for  one  reason  or  another  are  confined  to  changes  in  one  or  more  groups 
of  correlated  activities:  finance,  charities,  labor,  education,  agriculture, 

public  lands,  taxation,  and  banking.  In  some  instances,  there  is  an  evident 
intention  to  consummate  by  easy  steps  a complete  reorganization  along  the 


11  pp.  17,18. 


15 


lines  laid  down  by  efficiency  and  economy  commissions,  but  the  consideration 

of  which  the  governor  for  politic  reasons  does  not  advocate  in  its  entirety 

for  any  one  legislative  session.  In  most  instances,  like  that  of  Governor 

12 

Miller  of  New  York,  the  manifest  purpose  is  to  "proceed  with  caution."* 

3.  The  recommendations  of  this  majority  group  of  executives  have  a special 
significance  in  the  development  of  the  movement  toward  general  reorganization 
in  the  invariaole  additional  correlation  and  re-grouping  of  administrative 
activities  which  the  piecemeal  creation  of  new  so-called  departments  entails. 
Especially  is  this  true  in  the  field  of  fiscal  readjustments.  It  was  the 
Illinois  Efficiency  and  Economy  Committee  in  1915  which  observed  that  "One 
of  the  most  serious  defects  arising  from  the  lack  of  correlation  and  effect- 
ive supervision  over  the  subordinate  authorities  is  the  absence  of  any  satis- 
factory budget  of  estimates  as  a basis  for  appropriations.  The  need  for  im- 
provement in  this  respect  was  indicated  in  the  act  of  the  last  General  Assem- 
bly creating  the  Legislative  Reference  Bureau,  which  imposed  on  that  bureau 
the  duty  of  compiling  estimates  of  appropriations.  • • The  State  Constitu- 
tion, in  Article  v,  paragraph  7,  provides  that  the  governor  at  the  commence- 
ment of  each  regular  session  of  the  General  Assembly  shall  'present  estimates 
of  the  amount  of  money  required  to  be  raised  by  taxation  for  all  purposes.' 

So  far  as  your  committee  is  aware,  no  Governor  has  heretofore  ever  complied 
with  this  important  constitutional  duty."^^  It  is  in  explaining  this  seem- 
ing negligence  that  the  significant  bearing  which  fiscal  arrangements  have 
on  correlation  and  supervision  of  subordinates  is  observed:  "The  failure 

to  do  so  has  undoubtedly  been  due  in  the  main  to  the  fact  that  the  exec- 

12  Ibid.  pp.  29y  30. 

13  Report  of  the  Efficiency  and  Economy  Committee  (1915)  pp.  22. 


- 

16 

utive  authorities  as  organized  have  not  offered  the  Governor  the  facilities 
needed  to  perform  this  duty.  Just  as  the  number  of  minor  offices  and  boards 
under  his  nominal  supervision  prevents  any  effective  control  over  their  ac- 
tion; so  too  it  prevents  any  effective  control  over  their  actions;  so  too  it 
prevents  any  adequate  examination  of  their  requests  for  appropriations  on 
which  the  Governor  can  base  his  recommendations."^ 

The  same  situation  existing  in  Colorado  was  pointed  out  in  the  survey 
report  of  a similar  committee  the  following  year  in  their  finding  "The  pro- 
vision requiring  the  Governor  to  present  to  the  General  Assembly  estimates 
of  “money  required  to  be  raised  by  taxation  by  all  purposes  of  the  state"  is 
not  complied  with  by  the  governor. 

A survey  of  governors'  messages  since  1917  shows  that  recommendations 
looking  to  a reorganization  of  fiscal  agencies  were  invariably  followed  by 
recommendations  affecting  other  administrative  activities  in  the  order  of 
magnitude  of  their  demands  on  the  public  treasury.  In  other  words,  the  expe- 
rience of  the  governors  committed  to  but  a partial  reorganization  really  du- 
plicated that  of  the  Illinois  committee  already  referred  to.  Quoting  once 
more  from  its  report:  “The  resolution  creating  the  committee  (referring  here 

to  itself)  imposed  on  it  two  main  duties:  (1)  to  secure  a more  perfect  sys- 

tem of  accounting;  and  (2)  to  propose  a general  reorganization  and  consolida- 
tion of  state  offices,  boards,  and  commissions.  After  due  consideration  the 
committee  agreed  that  the  plan  of  administrative  reorganization  should  precede 
the  introduction  of  a comprehensive  system  of  accounting."^6 

14  Ibid.  22,  23. 

15  Report  on  a Survey  of  the  Office  of  Go  vernor  of  the  State  o f 
Colorado. 


. 


- 


17 


This  conclusion  of  the  Illinois  Efficiency  and  Economy  Committee  seems 
to  be  amply  borne  out  by  the  experience  of  other  commonwealths*  In  Alabama, 
the  governor's  message  of  1919  recommending  a reorganisation  of  the  fiscal 
agencies  was  followed  in  1921  by  a specific  plan  for  the  immediate  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  public  welfare  agencies,  and  the  formulation  of  plans  for  a gen- 
eral administrative  reorganisation.  In  Colorado,  proposals  for  rearrange- 
ments in  the  accounting  system  in  1919  carried  a recommendation  for  a state 
survey  of  executive  departments.  A fiscal  report  by  the  governor  of  Idaho, 
1919,  carried  with  it  a specific  plan  for  reorganising  the  labor  agencies  of 
the  state.  In  1921,  there  followed  the  administrative  code  itself.  In  Mich- 
igan, a fiscal  emergency  in  1921  was  recognised  by  the  governor  who  propos- 
ed along  with  the  plan  for  reorganizing  agencies  directly  involved,  plans 
effecting  correlation  of  conservation  and  public  welfare  agencies. *r  An  ad- 
ministrative code  was  adopted  by  the  Nebraska  legislature  in  1919,  on  the 
proposal  of  the  governor  that  a complete  reorganization  of  the  accounting 
system  be  made.  Finance  and  education  received  the  attention  of  the  New 
Hampshire  executive  in  1919,  and  a general  eurvey  of  all  administrative  a- 
gencies  was  recommended  by  him  in  1921.  Governor  Miller's  aggressive  attack 
on  the  financial  arrangements  of  New  York's  executive  department  in  his  mes- 
sage of  1921  was  accompanied  by  specific  proposale  for  reorganizing  the  de- 

16  The  direct  connection  between  a fiscal  emergency  and  adminis- 
trative reorganisation  is  pointed  out  by  Governor  Groesbeck  in 
hie  message  of  1921:  "Before  it  is  determined  that  more  taxes 

should  be  levied  in  the  face  of  this  stringent  financial  emer- 
gency confronting  the  state,  we  should  make  a studious  effort 
to  eliminate  the  last  vestige  of  wastefulness  in  connection  with 
the  administration.  One  of  the  first  things  we  should  undertake 
is  the  correction  of  existing  defects  in  our  state  government  • • 

As  you  are  aware,  there  is  a strong  public  sentiment  in  favor 


. 


5 


. 

. 


* 

• 

•- 

' 


18 


pertinents  of  agriculture  and  public  works— and  this  in  spite  of  his  opposi- 
tion  to  complete  reorganisation  that  same  year.  Fiscal  problems  received 
the  major  emphasis  in  the  governor's  message  to  the  North  Carolina  legisla- 
ture in  1919 , with  a proposal  in  1921  for  a rather  general  reorganisation. 

The  appointment  of  an  efficiency  and  economy  commission  in  South  Dakota  in 
1921  was  recommended  in  connection  with  a detailed  proposal  for  the  adoption 
of  an  executive  budget.  A budgetary  survey  in  Texas  in  1919  led  to  a gen- 
eral plan  of  reorganisation  of  ail  state  agencies  directly  affected  by  the 
new  budget  requirements.  After  a discussion  of  the  "heavy  burden  of  taxa- 
tion" in  his  message  of  1921,  the  governor  of  Utah  proposed  in  the  rather 
emphatic  terms  already  noted,  a program  of  early  reorganisation.  The  gov- 
ernor's message  to  the  Wyoming  legislature  in  1921  shows  the  same  close  par- 
allel between  an  economy  program,  budget  requirements,  and  the  perfecting  of 
a "closer  correlation  and  supervision  of  all  state  administrative  agencies." 
Indeed,  no  instance  of  an  exception  to  this  general  rule  could  be  found  in 
the  governors'  messages  of  1919  and  1921.*®  In  this  connection,  there  is  an- 
other fact  worth  noting:  namely,  the  character  of  those  functional  agencies 

for  which  a reorganisation  is  proposed  along  with  suggested  rearrangements 
in  the  accounting  systems.  In  Arisona,  the  governor's  budgetary  proposals 
included  a plan  for  reorganising  labor  and  education  agencies;  charities  in 
Arkansas,  1921;  charities  and  institutions  in  Georgia,  1919;  labor  in  Idaho, 
1919;  agriculture  in  Kansas,  1921;  labor  in  Mississippi,  1919;  fish  and  game 
in  Montana,  1921;  agriculture  in  Nebraska,  1921;  charities  in  Nevada,  1919 

of  such  changes  as  will  guarantee  an  efficient,  economical,  and  well 
organised  plan  for  handling  state  business."  Here  follows  detailed 
recommendations  for  reorganisation  and  consolidation  of  agricultural, 
conservation,  and  industrial  agencies  of  the  state,  pp.  8,  9. 

17  pp.  23,  24. 


, 

•?  • 

. 

t 


. 


’ ■ 


. 


19 


and  1921;  agriculture  and  public  works  in  New  York,  1921;  education  in  North 
Dakota,  1919,  and  in  Pennsylvania,  1921;  charities  in  Texas,  1919* 

The  inference  seems  to  be  that  not  only  considerations  of  economy  and 
the  requirements  of  the  budget  dictated  a correlation  and  reorganization  of 
administrative  agencies,  but  likewise  considerations  of  despatch  and  effect- 
iveness in  the  administration  of  education,  agriculture,  and  institutions  for 

19 

wnich  there  had  arisen  a sharp  public  need  and  demand. 

4.  while  the  major  object  in  a study  of  the  governors'  messages  as  they 
bear  on  administrative  reorganization  should  be  to  discover  the  governor's 
own  conception  of  his  place  in  the  state  administrative  system,  one  must  re- 
ally go  to  the  reports  of  the  several  efficiency  and  economy  commissions  on 
who se  findings  the  governors  in  the  main  rely.  Recommendations  of  governors 
as  they  might  relate  to  the  short  ballot,  executive  budget,  or  administra- 
tive staff  were  only  rarely  found  in  the  messages  of  1919  and  1921.  In  a 
number  of  instances,  however,  the  governor's  point  of  view  was  made  plain 
enough;  in  most  instances  it  must  be  inferred  from  chance  references  as  they 
touch  on  the  appointing  power,  overlapping  terms  of  commissions,  and  those 
other  elective  constitutional  officers  who  share  the  executive  power. 

In  other  words,  study  of  the  messages  yields  only  gleanings  as  they  re- 
late to  the  executive's  own  idea  of  a desirable  status  for  himself,  aut  ev6n 
these  gleanings  may  carry  broad  implications,  consider  this  excerpt  from  the 

*9The  following  excerpt  from  the  Michigan  executive's  message  1921 
indicates  the  general  nature  of  these  considerations:  "Agricul- 

ture has  in  recent  years  rapidly  developed  as  an  organized  in- 
dustry. with  this  development  new  problems  and  new  opportunities 


T 


.. 


* 

' 


r 


. 


. 

, 


20 


1921  message  of  the  Ohio  governor:  "There  is  absolutely  no  need  of  a state 

treasurer  as  such.  The  check  on  disbursements  is  made  by  the  auditor.  The 
responsibility  in  his  and  the  disbursement  of  funds  is  more  or  lees  a perfunc- 
tory detail*  This,  of  course,  could  easily  be  done  in  the  auditor's  office* 
The  attorney  general  is  the  legal  adviser  of  the  governor  and  of  the  state 
departments,  he  should  be  appointed  by  the  governor.  In  many  states  this 
practice  has  ootained  throughout  the  years.  Would  it  not  be  possible  to 
deduce  a fairly  accurate  principle  for  short  ballot  reform  as  it  affects  the 
customary  constitutionally  elective  officers  of  the  state  executive  depart- 
ment." Referring  in  another  part  of  the  same  message  to  the  subject  of  edu- 
cation he  notes:  "Under  the  old  order,  the  superintendent  of  public  instruc- 

tion was  scarcely  more  than  a statistical  office.  The  office  was  elective. 
Under  the  change,  this  was  made  an  executive  department.  The  state  commis- 
sioner of  common  schools  is  now  appointed  by  the  governor  and  he  has  been 
given  definite  administrative  authority. 

In  the  same  vein,  Governor  Goodrich  in  1919  recommended  that  "the  of- 
fice of  attorney  general  created  by  the  legislature  and  made  elective, should 
be  abolished  as  an  elective  office  and  tne  governor  authorized  to  appoint 
the  attorney  general."  His  reasons  are  significant:  "The  constitution  makes 

it  the  duty  of  the  governor  to  'take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  execut- 
ed* and  he  is  held  responsible  for  the  efficient  and  economical  conduct  of 
all  administrative  agencies  of  the  state  government.  His  power  ought  to  e- 
qual  his  responsibilities  in  this  respect.  Either  the  commissions  appointed 

for  co-operative  aid  by  national  and  state  governments  have  arisen. 

Any  system  of  state  government  which  does  not  include  a department 

organized  and  equipped  to  work  with  agricultural  organizations,  and 


* 

. 

* 

* 


* 


21 

by  the  governor  must  appoint  their  own  attorneys  at  considerable  additional 
expense  to  the  tax-payers,  or  they  must  depend  for  legal  assistance  and 
counsel  upon  the  attorney  general  whose  office  ae  now  constituted  in  an  in- 
dependent agency,  wholly  uncoordinated  with  these  commissions,  directly  or 
Indirectly.  This  would  not  result  in  a dangerous  centralization  of  power. 

It  ie  only  an  attempt  to  simplify  government  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  it 

22 

more  economical  and  efficient.**  Probably  the  most  outspoken  of  the  gov- 
ernor's opinions  on  the  subject  of  the  Short  Ballot  is  that  of  Governor  Chan- 
ning  H.  Gox  of  Massachusetts  in  his  message  of  1921.  "The  chief  interest 
centers  in  the  candidates  for  governor  and  for  lieutenant  governor,  and  pub- 
lic discussion  is  confined  largely  to  the  candidates  for  these  two  offices. 

In  a larger  way  the  people  have  come  to  look  upon  the  governor  as  the  head 
of  the  government,  and  there  ie  a tendency  to  hold  him  responsible  for  the 
conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the  departments  of  the  state  of ficials,— the  sec- 
retary, the  treasurer,  the  auditor,  and  the  attorney  general,— then  he  ought 
to  be  allowed  to  call  men  into  those  positions  who  will  work  in  harmony  with 
him  and  who  will  adopt  policies  which  bear  his  approval.  The  objection  may 
be  raised  that  the  attorney  general  is  not  alone  the  adviser  of  the  governor 
but  of  the  legislature  as  well,  and  that  sometimes  the  legislature  might 
desire  independent  advice,  and  that  it  ought  not  to  be  compelled  to  accept 
legal  opinions  from  the  governor's  appointee.  It  should  be  remembered,  how- 
ever, that  each  branch  of  the  legislature  has  authority  to  require  the  opin- 
ion of  the  justices  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  upon  important  questions 

with  other  states  and  the  national  government  for  the  benefit  of 
the  general  public  is  certainly  incomplete."  pp.  7^  8. 

20  pp.  28,  29. 

21  pp.  28  , 29. 


. 


♦ 


. 


, 

. 

t 


, 


. 


22 


of  lav,  and  upon  solemn  occasions.  To  the  end  that  the  direct  primary  sys- 
tem may  operate  to  the  best  advantage,  and  that  the  efficiency  of  the  state 
administration,  I recommend  that  the  constitution  be  amended  so  that  the  gov- 
ernor be  given  the  power  to  appoint  the  state  offices— the  secretary  of  the 

commonwealth,  the  treasurer  and  receiver  general,  the  auditor  and  the  attor- 

23 

ney  general— for  the  same  term  as  his  own.”  In  respect  to  the  appointment 
of  the  auditor,  Governor  McKelvie  of  Nebraska,  who  is  quoted  in  another  place, 
may  be  said  to  present  that  more  careful  discrimination  of  certain  governors 
who  would  see  vested  in  this  financial  agent  a sphere  of  activity  outside  the 
administration,  and  subject  directly  to  the  legislature  who  elects  him  or  to 
the  electorate  as  a whole,  as  an  effective  method  of  legislative  control  over 
the  administration.  An  example  of  this  also  is  Governor  Miller's  comment  on 
the  sphere  of  the  comptroller:  "The  comptroller  is  primarily  an  auditing  of- 

ficer, and  in  my  judgment,  an  auditing  office  should  not  be  converted  into  a 
great  administrative  office.  The  Comptroller  should  undoubtedly  audit  both 
revenues  and  expenditures.  I think  he  should  audit  the  books  of  all  depart- 
ment, and  should  be  given  broad  powers  of  examination  for  the  purpose  of  au- 

24 

dit.  But  I think  he  should  not  be  charged  with  administration." 

On  the  nature  of  the  appointing  power,  the  governor  of  North  Carolina  in 
his  message  of  1921  has  this  to  say:  "If  you  should  adopt  my  recommendations 

and  create  the  offices  of  Bank  Commissioner  and  Commissioner  of  Taxation  and 
Revenue,  and  follow  the  custom  of  allowing  the  governor  to  appoint,  I most 
earnestly  suggest  that  you  make  their  appointment  at  the  pleasure  of  tne  Gov- 
ernor. I think  it  unwise  to  give  officers  appointed  by  the  governor  any  fix- 
ed term.  They  certainly  ought  not  to  go  beyond  the  term  of  the  governor  ap- 


22  pp.  6,  7. 


„ 


23 


pointing  them,  and  X oelieve  it  would  make  for  strength  and  efficiency  in  the 
executive  branch  of  the  government  if  all  officers  who  are  not  elected  by  the 
people  were  suoject  to  removal  by  the  governor  at  will  and  without  cause.  Our 
institutions  are  all  in  the  hands  of  boards  that  are  almost  self-perpetuating. 
The  governor  appoints  a few  each  year,  and  if  he  desires  to  change  the  policy 
of  any  institution  it  would  be  most  difficult  for  him  to  do  so.  If  the  first 
two  or  three  members  he  appointed  were  not  pretty  firm  men  the  management 
would  likely  capture  them  against  the  governor’s  policies  before  he  could 
make,  in  the  next  two  or  three  years,  other  appointments  which  would  enable 
him  to  change  the  management  of  the  institution.  If  the  General  Assembly  sat 
all  the  time  it  could  exercise  the  executive  arm  of  the  government;  but  it 
does  not.  As  soon  as  it  adjourns  the  smallest  officer  in  this  state  appoint- 
ed by  the  governor  can  defy  him,  and  there  is  no  power  to  move  him  until  his 
term  expires.  The  constitution  of  the  state  places  the  supreme  executive  pow- 
er of  the  state  in  the  governor's  office.  I do  not  ask  for  any  greater  power 
than  the  General  Assembly  has  heretofore  in  recognition  of  the  constitution 
given  the  governor,  but  I do  most  earnestly  ask  that  the  power  given  the  gov- 
ernor shall  oe  given  in  a manner  that  will  enable  him  to  exercise  it  with  en- 
ergy and  efficiency.  The  governor  is  looked  upon  by  the  people  as  the  head 
of  the  administration  during  his  term,  and  the  public  hold  him  accountable 
for  the  conduct  of  the  officers  appointed  by  the  governor;  and  yet  by  the 
Chine se- puzzle  arrangement  through  which  these  boards  are  created  and  perpet- 
uated, it  is  impossible  for  the  governor  to  control  them.  During  my  term  of 
office  I cannot,  until  near  its  close,  under  the  present  law,  change  the  man- 


23  pp.  29.,  30. 

24  pp.  21,  22. 


. 


‘ 

* 

■ 


* 


24 


agement  or  policy,  except  through  moral  persuasion,  in  any  department  of  the 
state's  government,  or  at  any  of  ite  institutiom.  I think  it  would  be  most 
wise  to  enact  a general  statute  allowing  the  governor  to  call  for  the  resigna- 
tion and, if,  not  forthcoming,  to  remove  any  executive  officer  appointed  by  the 
governor;  and  in  the  future  no  term  should  be  fixed  for  appointive  executive 
officers.  • . If  the  governor,  the  supreme  head  of  the  executive  branch  of  the 
government,  ought  to  be  removed  every  four  years,  it  does  seem  to  me  that  suo- 
ordinate  executive  officers  ought  to  go  out  with  him  and  allow  the  governor's 
successor  the  privilege  of  selecting  his  own  helpers  in  administering  the  gov- 
ernment during  his  term,  and  not  confine  his  legal  power  to  tying  the  hands  of 
his  successor. ".  And  consistent  with  the  terrible  seriousness  with  which  the 
matter  weighs  on  him  he  concludes,  "These  are  my  recommendations,  and  may 

2* 

God's  will  about  them  be  done  in  your  honorable  body  as  it  is  done  in  Heaven!" 

This  is  the  general  burden  of  the  recommendations  concerning  the  appoint- 
ing power  of  the  governor  as  the  executives  of  California,  Idaho,  Kansas,  Mas- 
sachusetts, Nebraska,  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Vermont,  and  Wyoming  touch  upon 
it  in  their  messages  of  1919  and  1921  respectively. 

One  of  the  most  noticeable  tendencies  of  the  messages  of  1921  is  the  rath- 
er detailed  description , in  a number  of  instances, of  proposed  new  administra- 
tive departments.  Governors  in  other  years  in  most  instances  were  content  to 
suomit  the  proposals  of  efficiency  and  economy  commissions  working  under  their 
direction.  Typical  of  this  newer  development  are  those  recommendations  of  Gov- 
ernor Miller  of  New  York  and  Governor  Groesbeck  of  Michigan.  Proposing  a re- 


25  pp.  9,  10 


. 


- 


• • 

' 

. . . 

• . 


I 


1 


. * 

. 


, 


organization  of  the  agriculture  agencies , Governor  Miller  in  1921  writes: 


25 


MI  think  the  present  organization  of  the  Agricultural  Department  unsound  up* 

on  its  face.  The  council  of  farms  and  markets  may  serve  to  keep  the  depart* 

ment  out  of  politics,  end  for  that  reason  can  properly  be  continued,  but  it 

is  not  suited  to  discharge  and  should  not  be  clothed  with  any  administrative 

functions  whatever.  There  is  no  reason  that  I can  perceive  for  a divided  de* 

partment,  and  I believe  that  economy  and  efficiency  of  administration  will  be 

promoted  by  a single  head  to  be  appointed  by  the  council  of  farms  and  markets 

and  I recommend  that  those  changes  be  made."  Then  follows  a detailed  des* 

cription  of  suggested  correlation  of  existing  agencies  into  bureaus  and  divi* 
26 

sions.  Governor  Groesbeck  of  Michigan  in  his  plan  for  the  same  department 
proposes  a functional  organization  for  the  same  department  based  on  his  ob* 
servations  of  practices  in  other  states:  "When  organized,  it  should  include 
in  its  operations  the  department  of  animal  industry,  the  state  veterinary 
board,  state  apiary  inspector,  commissioner  of  immigration,  geological  sur* 
vey,  Michigan  agricultural  fair  commission,  inspection  of  nurseries  and  or* 
cnards,  agricultural  division  of  the  state  department,  and  the  inspection  of 
seeds,  and  fertilizers.M 

In  his  message  to  the  legislature  in  1919,  Governor  W.  D*  Davis  of  Idaho 
made  the  following  general  recommendation  relative  to  reorganization  of  the 
executive  departments:  "The  executive  and  administrative  departments  of  the 

state  should  be  divided  into  a small  number  of  departments,  the  heads  of 
which,  so  far  as  the  constitution  permits,  shall  be  directly  responsible  to 
the  governor.  The  functions  of  every  officer,  bureau,  board,  or  commissions 


26  pp.  25, 26. 


► 

* 1 • 1 

. 

. 


. 


. 


, 

, ti- . 


, . 


< 


, 


. 


26 


in  the  state  should  be  assigned  to  one  of  these  departments.  The  departments 
should  be  subdivided  where  necessary  into  bureaus,  the  heads  of  which  and  the 
subordinates  under  them  being  selected  with  view  to  their  expert  fitness  and 
qualifications  for  their  respective  positions.  I further  propose  that  the 
heads  of  the  several  departments,  including  the  constitutional  elective  of- 
ficers, shall  constitute  a governor's  cabinet  or  council,  thereby  furnishing 
a vehicle  through  which  all  the  departments  of  the  state  government  can  be 
coordinated  and  correlated  in  their  functions* " 

Careful  study  of  messages  for  1919  and  1921  finds  a practical  agreement 
in  the  main  among  the  executives  with  the  foregoing  recommendations  when  this 
factor  of  reorganization  is  touched  on.  There  is  a division  of  opinion  about 
the  efficacy  of  unpaid  boards.  Governor  McRae  of  Arkansas,  in  1921,  express- 
es one  point  of  view:  "The  claim  made  by  many  good  people  that  an  unpaid  board 
will  not  function  promptly  and  properly,  is  not  borne  out  by  the  history  of 
honorary  boards,  both  in  this  and  other  states.  The  truth  is,  salaried 
boards  or  commissions,  do  not  as  a rule,  function  harmoniously,  and  almost 
without  exception  they  are  controlled  or  influenced  by  politics  and  politi- 
cians. It  is  equally  true  that  a better  class  of  men  and  women  are  obtain- 

28 

able  for  service  upon  honorary  boards  than  upon  salaried  boards."  Governor 
Edward  I.  Edwards  in  his  message  of  1920  presents  the  opposite  point  of  view 
concurred  in  by  the  larger  proportion  of  governors  who  touch  upon  this  mat- 
ter. "It  must  be  understood  I make  no  criticism  of  the  unselfish,  patriotic 
service  furnished  by  many  of  the  men  and  women  serving  upon  some  of  the 


27  pp.  14,  15 


. 

t 

, 

. 

. 

> 

. 

. 


* 


. 


- 


27 


boards  in  question— for  they  are  not  all  compensated.  But  in  the  name  of 
real  efficiency  Z desire  to  record  my  protest  against  the  further  continuance 
of  such  a system.  . • The  matters  handled  by  them  (unpaid  boards)  are  of 
great  importance  and  involve  large  sums  of  money.  Their  proper  treatment 
should  not  depend  upon  the  uncertain  element  of  enthusiasm  or  patriotic  im- 
pulses of  the  state's  agents,  which  necessarily  leads,  it  seems  to  me,  to 
spasmodic  and  intermittent  attention,  contingent  upon  the  private  engagements 
of  the  members  of  such  boards.  The  discharge  of  the  state's  administrative 
affaire  should  be  in  the  hands  of  a reasonably  small  number  of  men,  paid  veil 
for  their  service  and  from  vhom  attention  to  its  business  may  be  demanded  by 
the  state  as  a matter  of  right,  under  the  pain  of  dismissal  for  neglect. Bills 
to  accomplish  part  of  that  program  have  been  introduced.  They  substitute  a 
paid  board  of  five  members  for  166  persons,  some  of  vhom  are  paid  and  some 
are  not."^  A unique  variation  from  both  of  these  positions  is  taken  by  Gov- 
ernor Hardee  of  Florida  in  his  message  of  1921.  Under  a caption  "Back  to  the 
constitution"  he  says,  "Like  may  of  the  other  states  of  the  union,  ve  are 
fast  becoming  a 'commission  ridden'  people.  I wish  to  call  upon  you  to  adopt 
the  policy  of  'back  to  constitution.'  In  the  creation  of  such  commissions  as 
you  may  deem  vise  and  expedient,  let  your  creations  be  carved  out  of  the  Cab- 
inet. Elected  by  the  people,  it  is  the  sworn  duty  of  a Cabinet  officer  to  de- 
vote all  of  his  time  and  thought  to  the  interest  of  the  state.  There  is  noth- 
ing in  the  argument,  so  often  advanced,  that  the  cabinet  officers  are  too 

28  pp.  7,  8. 

Governor  Bartlett  of  wew  Hampshire,  1919,  recommended  for  the  sever- 
al institutions  a board  of  visitors  and  advisers  to  bring  about  a 
personal  relation  between  the  governor  and  council  and  the  people 
and  to  give  a more  humane  touch  to  the  management  of  the  institu- 
tions. pp.  16*17. 


. 


' 


. 


. 


. 


28 

busy  to  give  attention  to  the  various  matters  that  are  placed  under  their 
charge.  They  are  at  the  seat  of  the  state  government  all  of  the  time,  ready 
and  accessible  for  frequent  meetings  and  conferences.  In  their  acceesibil- 
ity  and  their  constant  meetings  there  ie  the  greatest  advantage  of  being  able 
to  give  attention  to  departmental  matters  incident  to  the  various  state  activ- 
ities,  readily,  speedily,  and  without  delay."  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
point  out  that  this  executive  apparently  minimized  the  legal  relation  which 
exists  between  him  and  these  so-called  cabinet  officers.  There  is  no  ev- 
idence to  show  that  any  other  executive  in  recent  years  does  so  minimize  it 
by  making  a similar  recommendation. 

On  the  other  hand,  Governor  McKelvie  of  Nebraska  who  had  actually  work- 
ed with  such  a "cabinet"  resulting  from  the  unique  provision  of  the  Nebraska 
constitutent  law  forbidding  the  creation  of  executive  agencies  outside  the 
constitutional  elective  departments  therein  created,  was  the  successful  pro- 
moter of  a constitutional  revision  and  subsequent  administrative  code  which 
placed  large  appointing  power  in  the  hands  of  the  governor.  Here  are  six 
recommendations: 

(1)  The  executive  department  should  consist  of  a 
governor,  lieutenant-governor,  and  comptroller, 
to  be  elected. 

(2)  The  governor  to  be  elected  for  a term  of  four 
years,  and  not  subject  to  re-election. 

(3)  A comptroller  to  serve  as  auditor  and  treasurer, 
to  be  elected  for  a term  of  four  years,  and  not 

29  Journal  of  the  Seventy-Sixth  Senate  of  the  State  of  New  Jersey 
pp.  394-398. 


♦ 


. ■ 

. 

. 

. 


• ' 

. 


( 

. 

f • 


29 

subject  to  re-election.  He  could  either  be 
elected  by  a direct  vote  of  the  people  or  by 
the  house  of  representatives* 

(4)  All  appointments,  aside  from  those  having  to 
do  with  the  office  of  comptroller,  should  be 
made  by  the  governor,  with  major  appointments 
to  be  confirmed  by  the  Senate.  The  creation 
of  departments  and  the  grouping  of  activities 
with  them  to  be  left  to  the  legislature.  The 
selection  and  term  of  service  of  minor  employ- 
ees to  be  subject  to  a limited  civil  service, 
the  provisions  of  which  the  legislature  should 
determine. 

(5)  There  should  be  no  boards,  except  those  that 
are  quasi- judicial,  and  quasi-legislative,  or 
having  to  do  with  education* 

(6)  Provision  may  be  made  for  the  recall  of  any  of 
these  officers,  or  the  appointees  under  them, 
upon  the  petition  of  a given  percentage  of 
qualified  electors. ^ 

It  is  only  when  one  comes  to  look  into  the  detailed  provisions  of  the 
budgetary  proposals,  however,  that  the  increasingly  positive  role  assumed 
by  governors  is  so  clearly  evident.  Governor  Cornwell  of  West  Virginia,  in 
1921,  in  a commonwealth  heretofore  conspicuous  for  the  absence  of  any  move 


30  pp.  8,  9. 

31  Message  of  1919  pp.  24*  25. 


, 

, 

. 

. 


vn  \ i 


. 

. 


* 


30 


in  the  direction  of  either  a survey  of  state  agencies  or  proposals  for  con- 
solidations, urges  an  amendment  to  the  present  budget  law,  placing  the  ini- 
tial authority  for  the  budget  with  the  governor.  Governor  Carey,  in  1921, 
asks  that  the  budget  law  be  amended  to  provide  that  the  governor- elect  be 
present  at  all  budget  hearings  and  that  his  resolutions  rather  them  those  of 
the  retiring  governor  be  included*  Governor  Davis  of  Idaho  in  1921  recom- 
mends that  the  study  and  presentation  of  the  budget  be  made  one  of  the  con- 
tinuous duties  of  an  officer  directly  under  the  control  and  supervision  of 
the  governor.  Governor  Allen  in  the  same  year  goes  a step  further  than  any 
of  these  in  proposing  to  regulate  in  a way  the  relations  of  the  executive  to 
the  legislature  by  proposing  an  amendment  to  the  budget  law  not  only  to 
provide  for  the  centering  of  responsibility,  but  to  stipulate  the  procedure 
to  be  followed  by  the  legislature  in  acting  on  the  budgetary  recommendations. 
Governor  Groesbeck  of  Michigan  in  the  same  year  went  one  step  further  than 
this  and  specified  a significant  restriction  on  legislative  procedure  in  pro- 
posing "that  upward  revision  of  items  by  the  legislature  should  be  limited 
except  for  causes  shown  in  specific  cases."  Governor  Miller  recommended 
"the  creation  of  a permanent  organizationwith  ample  power  to  survey  the  work 
of  all  departments,  and  not  merely  to  compile  estimates,  but  to  revise  them  • 

. • It  should  appoint  a permanent  budget  staff,  specially  qualified  for  the 
work,  which,  with  ample  power  of  examination,  should,  as  directed  by  the 
board,  make  surveys  and  studies  of  all  the  state's  activities  with  a view  of 
introducing  improved  methods,  eliminating  waste  and  useless  duplication,  cor- 
relating effort,  standardizing  positions  of  like  grade  and  promoting  effi- 
ciency. Estimates  should  be  filed  with  the  budget  bureau  on  a specified  date, 


32  pp.  13,  14 


. 


. 


. 


1 

' 

' * 

. 


31 


and  under  the  direction  of  the  board  should  be  revised  and  tabulated  for  sub- 
mission  to  the  legislation."  It  should  be  noted  in  connection  with  this 
carefully  integrated  administrative  plan  for  budget  making  in  New  York  as  the 
governor  proposes  it,  that  the  question  of  a mixed  legislative-executive  a- 
gency  or  a purely  executive  one  to  direct  the  work  of  the  bureau  seems  immate- 
rial to  him.  In  this  one  respect  he  differs  from  the  trend  of  executive  pro- 
posals for  1919  and  1921  in  that  the  larger  proportion  of  them  emphatically 
propose  the  executive  budget,  and  as  noted  in  one  instance  there  is  even  the 
proposal  to  restrict  the  upward  legislative  revision  of  this  budget  as  sub- 
mitted by  the  executive. 

Finally,  one  lays  aside  thislatest  governor’s  message  with  a two- fold 
impression: 

(1)  The  uniformly  emphatic  quality  of  the  gov- 
ernors’ proposals* 

(2)  The  striking  identity  of  methods  by  which 

the  governors  purpose  to  attain  these  objects* 

But  the  most  significant  fact  is  the  actual  role  of  the  governor  him- 
self, which  vitalizes  those  proposals.  This  observation  leads  me  to  raise 
the  question  as  to  whether  the  real  trend  of  the  reorganization  movement  is 
not  to  be  most  precisely  determined  through  a study  of  the  governors*  activ- 
ities themselves,  rather  than  of  the  administrative  codes  and  enactments. 

Their  record  as  evidenced  by  the  following  accounts  would  seem  to  be  convinc- 
ing* 

As  early  as  1910,  Governor  Hughes  in  his  annual  message  to  the  legis- 
lature recommended  administrative  reorganization  and  consolidation  which 


33  pp.  14,  15. 


. 

. 


1 


t -0 ' t i 


: '■  • •*  i . 


r 

’ 

* 

■ 

• ’ 

* 


■ 

• * • 

. 


. 


32 


he  said  would  "tend  to  promote  efficiency  in  public  office  by  increasing  the 
effectiveness  of  the  voter  and  by  diminishing  the  opportunities  of  the  pol- 
itical manipulators  who  take  advantage  of  the  multiplicity  of  elective  of- 

34 

fices  to  perfect  their  scheme  at  the  public  expense." 

furthermore,  he  believed  that  responsibility  should  be  "centered  in  the 
governor  who  should  appoint  a cabinet  of  administrative  heads,  accountable  to 
him  and  charged  with  the  duties  now  devolved  upon  elective  state  offices*"  A 
rapid  sequence  of  developments  began:  A resolution  to  amend  the  constitution 

was  introduced  in  the  assembly  of  1910  providing  for  the  appointment  of  all 
state  officers  except  the  governor  and  the  lieutenant-governor.  Although 
the  resolution  failed  to  pass,  the  campaign  toward  consolidation  was  again 
revived  in  1921*  In  1913,  the  legislature  passed  a bill  establishing  a de- 
partment of  efficiency  and  economy  under  a commission  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor and  confirmed  by  the  senate  for  a term  of  five  years.  In  1915,  this 
commission  issued  a notable  report  of  more  than  seven  hundred  pages.  In 
1914,  both  great  political  parties  of  the  state  took  up  the  issue.  "The 
time  has  come  to  give  the  people  control  of  the  executive  government,"  an- 
nounced the  democratic  program  of  that  year.  "The  responsibility  should  be 
centered  in  the  governor.  He  should  have  the  absolute  power  of  removal.  The 
various  boards  and  commissions  should  be  made  subject  to  the  control  of  the 
governor."  In  1915,  a comprehensive  scheme  of  reorganization  was  laid  before 
the  constitutional  convention  of  that  year.  Although  the  constitution  was 
defeated  at  the  polls,  the  movement  went  steadily  on,  culminating  in  the  plan 
for  complete  reorganization  of  administrative  departments  in  1921. 35  Governor 

34  pp.  18.,  19. 

35  This  measure,  it  has  already  been  noted,  was  defeated  in  the  lower 
house  through  the  influence  of  the  governor. 


m 

, 


’ 

„ 

.»  ' 

. 

> , i3* 

♦ - 

! 

, 

, 

, 

- 

. 


33 


Deneen  in  his  farewell  message  to  the  General  Assembly  of  Illinois  in  1913 
suggested  the  creation  of  a commission  for  conducting  an  "investigation  of 
plans  for  the  coordination  of  existing  boards  and  commissions  whose  duties 
overlap  or  are  so  similar  as  to  permit  of  unification  and  reduction  in  num- 
ber while  improving  their  methods  and  the  economy  of  their  administration."^ 

This  was  followed  by  a joint  resolution  of  1913  providing  for  a joint 
commission  of  senators  and  representatives  to  "investigate  all  departments 
of  state  government!  including  all  boards,  bureaus,  and  commissions."  The 
committee  made  a report  in  1914  and  it  was  published  in  1915.  In  hie  cam- 
paign for  election  the  following  year,  Governor  Frank  0.  Lowden  made  the  re- 
organization of  the  business  of  the  state  the  chief  plank  in  his  platform, 
nis  election  followed.  His  own  words  best  give  the  description  of  the  so- 
called  new  role  of  the  governor  in  recent  state  administrative  reorganiza- 
tion. "When  the  legislature  met  I undertook  a complete  reorganization  of 
the  state  wnich  came  under  the  duties  of  governor.  Of  course  there  was  much 
opposition  by  some  of  my  political  friends.  They  did  not  like  to  see  these 
attractive  places  given  up.  . . I appeared  before  the  committees  of  the  gen- 
eral assembly  and  discussed  with  them  at  length  the  questions  involved,  and 
before  long  there  was  complete  cooperation  between  the  general  assembly  and 
myself,  and  to  the  credit  of  the  legislature  the  result  was  the  administra- 
tive  code."  Incidentally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Illinois  law  provid- 
ed for  the  most  comprehensive  reorganization  up  to  that  time.  Indeed,  it 
was  the  first  instance  of  a general  reorganisation  of  state  administrative 

36  pp.  24,  25. 

37  Lowden:  "Business  Government,"  Saturday  Evening  Post,  juarch  13, 

1920,  pp.  56. 


. . 


. 

, 


. 


. . . 

( 


' 


' 


. 


.•  - 

, . , ■ ■ i * 


1 


34 


departments  after  a well  worked  out  plan* 

before  1916,  Governor  Morehead  of  Nebraska  had  asserted  "that  divided 
authority  and  divided  responsibility  produce  waste  and  inefficiency*"  and 
Governor  Neville, his  successor,  held  that  "it  is  impossible  to  handle  the 
state's  affairs  in  the  efficient  manner  that  would  be  demanded  by  any  bus* 
iness  man  in  the  conduct  of  his  private  transactions*"  In  1913,  the  repub- 
lican party  wrote  in  its  platform  "We  favor  the  enactment  of  a civil  admin* 
istrative  code  in  this  state?  and  Governor  Samuel  T*  McKelvie,  who  was  elec* 
ted  on  this  platform  was  enabled  to  approve  a comprehensive  administrative 
code  modelled  after  the  Illinois  plan,  April  19,  1919* 

Governor  harry  L*  Davis  made  his  campaign  for  nomination  and  election 
in  1920  largely  on  a platform  for  state  administrative  reorganization.  When 
Governor  Davis  came  into  office,  no  specific  work  had  been  done  upon  a com* 
prehensive  single  plan,  and  no  details  of  a bill  had  been  worked  out.  Yet 
an  act  to  establish  an  administrative  code  was  approved  by  the  governor 
April  26,  1921. 

Governor  Hyde  in  Missouri  made  the  consolidation  of  state  administration 
one  of  the  foremost  features  of  his  legislative  program.  Seven  distinct  meas- 
ures were  introduced,  of  which  all,  except  the  one  providing  for  a consolida- 
tion of  the  boards  governing  the  state  teachers'  colleges^ were  passed. 

In  his  message  to  the  legislature  in  1919,  Governor  W.  D.  Davis  of  Idaho 
made  a comprehensive  set  of  recommendations  for  the  reorganization  of  admin- 
istrative agencies,  and  with  no  preliminary  survey,  save  for  that  made  by 
governor  himself,  the  legislature  passed  as  an  emergency  measure  under  the 


* 

„ 

« 

. 

, 


1 

. 


1 

. 


, 


< 


* 


35 


constitution,  the  " administrative  consolidation  actH  which  went  into  effect 
March  31  of  that  same  year. 

To  Governor  Louis  F.  Hart  of  Washington  belongs  the  chief  credit  for  the 
enactment  of  a code  on  the  main  lines  of  those  of  Illinois  and  Nebraska.  Upon 
Governor  Hart's  suggestion  the  special  session  of  the  legislature  of  1920  au- 
thorized  him  to  have  such  a code  drawn  to  be  presented  to  the  regular  session 
of  1921.  This  code  was  enacted  into  law  in  1921  with  slight  change. 

In  1921,  the  governor- elect  of  Michigan,  Mr.  Alex  J.  Groesbeck,  came  to 
the  office  with  a reorganization  program  of  his  own.  In  spite  of  strong  pol- 
itical opposition,  the  first  several  provisions  of  a thorough  reorganization 
plan  were  enacted  by  a resisting  legislature. 

Add  to  these  more  comprehensive  reorganization  codes  the  single  consol- 
idation chapters  of  the  1919  and  1921  session  laws  of  California,  Colorado, 
Indiana,  Iowa,  Massachusetts,  Minnesota,  Montana,  Hew  Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
South  Dakota,  Utah,  and  West  Virginia,  each  of  which  is  identical  in  time  and 
nature  with  the  messages  of  the  governors  for  the  same  years  respectively, the 
practical  effects  of  the  governors'  messages  seem  to  be  pretty  well  establish- 
ed.s8 


6.  A search  for  significant  tendencies  in  recent  state  administrative  re- 
organization seems  to  require,  therefore,  that  considerable  stress  be  laid  on 
those  tendencies  as  shown  in  the  governors'  messages.  In  other  words,  these 
messages  not  only  represent  the  executive  point  of  view  which  determines  so 
largely  what  findings  of  the  efficiency  and  economy  commissions  shall  come  to 


, 


' 


* 


1 

• 

* 

, 


. 

1 » 

, 

, 

. 1 ' 

. 


■ 


r:i  . a"  /in o f • 


36 

their  ultimate  enactment  in  state  laws,  but  also  express  that  executive  ini- 
tiative and  political  prowess  on  which  depends  more  and  more  the  ultimate 
character  the  administration  is  coming  to  assume* 

A survey  of  the  governors'  messages  of  1919  and  1921,  therefore,  seems 
to  disclose  the  following  more  recent  tendencies: 

(1)  The  practice  of  the  legislature  to  order  an  effi- 
ciency and  economy  survey  of  the  administrative 
agencies  as  the  fiscal  problems  of  the  states 
grow  acute* 

(2)  The  tendency  of  such  surveys  to  lead  to  varying 
degrees  of  reorganization  of  administrative  de- 
partments as  a necessary  first  step  in  fiscal 
retrenchment* 

(3)  The  increasing  practice  of  the  legislature  to 
make  the  governor  the  chief  repo3itary  of  respon- 
sibility for  the  budget,  with  the  resulting  sharp 
increase  in  the  governor's  prestige  when  fiscal 
matters  tend  to  transcend  most  others  in  the 
minds  of  the  electorate. 

(4)  The  marked  development  of  the  parliamentary  role 
of  the  governor  who  i3  coming  more  and  more  to 
follow  up  his  initial  proposals  for  reorganiza- 

For  a detailed  account  of  the  masterful  role  played  by  the  governors 
in  the  reorganization  legislation  of  1921  see  the  American  Political 
Review  for  August  and  November,  1921,  pages  380  and  558  respectively. 


4 

f 


, 


, *' 

, 


* 

‘ 

tion  and  integration  of  administration  with 
the  aggressive  leadership  of  one  who  carries 
a mandate  from  the  people* 

(5)  The  tendency  of  the  governor  to  rely  on  ex* 
pert  commissions  or  staffs  for  specific  plans 
of  administrative  reorganization,  with  a 
resulting  identity  in  the  several  proposals 
of  governors  relating  to  constitutional  of- 
ficers, the  appointment,  tenure,  and  correla- 
tion of  the  activities  of  subordinates,  and 
the  budget,  from  the  rather  casual  references 
of  the  governors  in  this  connection,  however, 
the  following  more  recent  and  significant  rec- 
ommendations in  the  messages  of  1919  and  1921 
stand  out: 

The  attorney-general  as  a primary 
agent  of  law  enforcement  and  the 
legal  adviser  of  the  governor  and 
of  the  state  departments  should  be 
appointed  by  the  governor. 

The  functions  of  fiscal  administra- 
tion and  audit  should  be  sharply 
distinguished.  The  chief  auditing 
officers  should  not  be  charged  with 


, 


. 

f 


.■  ' 


38 


purely  administrative  functions. 

The  terms  of  all  discretionary  admin- 
istrative officers,  both  elective  and 
appointive  should  coincide  with  that 
of  the  governor,  wnich  should  be  long 
enough  to  admit  of  a sufficient  degree 
of  continuity  of  executive  policy. 

Responsibility  for  the  budget  should  be 
fixed  directly  with  the  governor,  with 
all  this  implies  of  unhampered  executive 
discretion  in  revising  estimates. 

Since  a more  specific  understanding  of  the  proposals  for  integration  sug- 
gested in  Number  Five  of  the  foregoing  points  is  essential  to  any  precise  ap- 
praisement of  tendencies  in  recent  state  administrative  reorganization,  a study 
of  the  findings  of  theef ficiency  and  economy  commissions  should  logically  fol- 
low. Like  the  governors,  then,  let  us  turn  to  the  reports  of  those  other  but 
closely  allied  agencies  of  reorganization— the  efficiency  and  economy  commis- 
sions of  the  several  states. 


. 


. 


' 

, 


39 


III -REPORTS  OF  THE  EFFICIENCY  AND  ECONOMY  COMMISSIONS 

1.  In  the  invariable  utilization  of  the  so-called  efficiency  and  economy 
commissions  as  a necessary  first  step  in  state  administrative  reorganiza- 
tion, there  is,  perhaps,  the  one  most  conspicuous  feature  of  the  whole  re- 
organization movement.  Not  in  their  honorary  aspect  as  formal  joint  leg- 
islative committees,  but  in  their  actual  working  role  of  sub-committees 
of  expert  appraisers  of  administrative  agencies,  these  commissions  indeed 
stand  for  a unique  development  in  the  field  of  government.  In  other  words, 
while  the  idea  of  legislative  investigating  committee  is  as  old  as  rep- 
resentative government  itself,  the  practice  of  employing  specialists  to 
devise  needed  readjustments  in  government  structure  and  function  is  hard- 
ly less  recent  than  the  state  reorganization  movement  itself.  We  have 
already  noted  the  activity  of  the  governor  in  recommending  the  appoint- 
ment of  these  expert  commissions,  his  usual  concurrence  in  the  general 
nature  of  their  findings,  and  his  role  in  impressing  those  findings  on 
the  character  of  the  legislative  acts  themselves.  It  must  surely  fol- 
low, therefore,  that  any  study  of  significant  recent  tendencies  in  state 
administrative  reorganization  in  a search  for  underlying  principles  must 
give  special  consideration  to  the  work  of  these  efficiency  and  economy 
commissions. 

Of  legislative  investigating  committees  there  have  been  legion,  but 
the  practice  of  employing  these  sub- committees  of  experts  may  be  said  to 
have  had  its  inception  in  the  appointment  of  the  special  national  exec- 
utive staff  in  1910,  and  of  the  Efficiency  and  Economy  Commission  in  1911 


( 

. 

, 

• 

f 

t 

. 

C 

40 


by  President  Taft  of  the  national  government.1  Charged  with  the  task  of  in- 
vestigating the  federal  administrative  agencies  with  a view  to  recommending 
ways  of  "reducing  and  increasing  the  effectiveness"  of  the  departments  in- 
volved, this  committee  prepared  and  submitted  to  the  President  108  reports 
looking  to  that  end.  It  is  with  this  action  of  the  national  government  that 
the  state  movement  for  administrative  reorganization  may  be  said  to  have 
begun.  The  first  move  to  appraise  the  organization  and  functions  of  state 
government  looking  to  reorganization  was  made  in  Wisconsin,  1911,  when  an 

act  was  passed  authorizing  the  State  Board  of  Affairs  to  make  such  a prelim- 
2 

inary  study.  A few  months  later,  in  1912,  the  General  Court  of  Massachu- 
setts authorized  the  appointment  of  a commission  to  study  ways  and  means  of 
increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  administration.  Governor  Deneen  of  Illinois 
in  his  farewell  message  to  the  General  Assembly  in  1913  suggested  the  crea- 
tion of  a commission  for  conducting  an  "investigation  of  plans  for  the  co- 
ordination of  existing  boards  and  commissions  whose  duties  overlap  and  are 
so  similar  as  to  permit  of  unification  and  reduction  in  number  while  improv- 
ing their  methods  and  economy  of  administration."  Following  close  upon 
these  two  initial  moves  were  the  authorization  of  commissions  in  New  Jereey, 
1912,  Iowa,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Nebraska,  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and 
South  Dakota,  1913;  Louisiana,  1914;  Alabama,  Colorado,  Connecticut,  Indian- 
a,  Kansas,  Maryland,  Missouri,  1915;  Virginia,  1916;  California,  1918;  Del- 
aware, Georgia,  Montana,  1919;  Arkansas,  1921.  By  the  close  of  the  legis- 
lative sessions  of  1922,  thirty  of  the  states  had  authorized  commissions  in 
one  form  or  another,  while  in  most  of  the  states,  improvement  in  personnel 


A detailed  outline  of  the  national  administration  as  it  was  found  to 
exist,  then,  fills  the  major  part  of  two  large  volumes  in  connection 


* 

. 

. 

H 

. 

. 

. 

' 

- 

1 

. 

• ‘ 

, . • 


. ' 

. 

. 


, 


41 


and  enlargement  of  jurisdiction  were  provided  for  in  subsequent  acts  relat- 

3 

ing  to  commi88ions  in  twenty- four  of  the  states.  The  roost  recent  of  these 
are  to  be  found  in  the  creations  of  special  commissions  in  Massachusetts, 
South  Dakota,  and  Virginia,  in  1921.  before  this  year  improvement  in  the 
status  of  investigating  commissions  had  been  effected  in  New  York,  Minneso- 
ta, and  Ohio,  there  being  three  successive  steps  in  as  many  years  in  New 
York  and  Ohio,  and  two  in  Minnesota. 

To  Minnesota  and  Iowa,  probably  must  go  credit  for  the  first  comprehen- 
sive surveys  of  state  administrative  agencies  and  reports  in  1913.  Two  years 
later  the  new  York  bureau  of  Municipal  Research  made  an  exhaustive  study  of 
the  organization  of  the  New  York  state  government  with  a plan  for  consolida- 
tion, all  set  forth  in  a report  of  417  pages  exclusive  of  many  charts.  The 
most  comprehensive  and  voluminous  of  all  the  reports  was  that  of  the  Illinois 
Efficiency  and  Economy  Commission  in  1915  consisting  of  some  1050  pages. 

With  respect  to  personnel  the  commissions  fall  into  three  classes: 

(1)  The  purely  legislative  investigating  commit- 
tees of  Alabama,  Colorado,  Georgia,  Louisiana, 

Missouri,  Mississippi,  Nebraska,  South  Dakota, 
and  Texas. 

(2)  The  formal  joint  legislative  committees  who 
employed  experts  to  conduct  the  actual  work 

with  the  recommendations  of  the  Commission.  There  was  no  attempt  at 
description  and  analysis  which  so  uniformly  characterizes  the  reports 
of  the  later  state  commissions.  The  Commission  was  a temporary  body. 

It  performed  its  work  without  close  consultation  with  men  in  the  ac- 


. 

* 


, 


x 

. 

’ 

< ' 

■f 

. 

. 

. 


42 


of  investigating  and  preparing  reports  in 
Delaware,  Illinois,  Iowa,  Maryland,  Mas-* 
eachusetts,  Minnesota,  Montana,  Oregon. 

(2)  Commissions  of  specialists  authorized  by 
the  legislature  and  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor directly  in  California  and  Arkansas. 

Irrespective  of  constitution,  however,  all 
three  classes  of  commissions  had  recourse 
to  specialists  in  the  branches  of  adminis- 
tration affected.  The  purely  legislative 
investigating  committee  of  Colorado,  for 
example,  set  up  a staff  organized  under  a 
chief  to  care  for  the  routine  of  the  inves- 
tigation, while  in  special  assignments  and 
consultation  the  committee  had  recourse  to 
specialists,  classified  in  the  preliminary 
acknowledgment  of  the  report  as  certified 
public  accountants,  surgeons  and  physicians, 
political  economists,  and  engineers. 

The  method  of  formal  joint  legislative  committees  is  best  shown  in  the 
action  of  the  Illinois  Efficiency  and  Economy  Committee  which  employed  Dr. 


tual  service  of  the  government.  Partly  as  a result  of  this  body,  how- 
ever, there  was  established  in  connection  with  the  Civil  Service  Com- 
mission, a division  of  efficiency.  The  report  was  sent  to  Congress 
with  his  approval  on  June  27,  1912.  It  was  printed  as  House  Document 
No.  854  of  the  Sixty-second  Congress,  second  session  (568  pages). 


43 

John  A*  Fairlie,  Professor  of  Political  Science  in  the  University  of  Illinois 
to  direct  the  survey  and  authorized  him  to  employ  such  specialists  as  he 
might  need  from  time  to  time.  The  sub- commit tee  elected  by  Professor  Fairlie 
was  unique  among  all  such  committees  in  the  large  preponderance  of  full  pro- 
fessors from  the  state  university  on  the  investigating  and  consulting  staff. 

Of  the  twelve  divisions  of  functional  organization:  Revenue  and  finance, 

accounts,  charitable  and  correctional  institutions,  educational  administra- 
tion, labor  and  mining,  agriculture,  public  health,  corporations,  public 
works,  military  affairs,  ana  civil  service,  ten  were  in  charge  of  these  men 
from  the  state  university  staff.  The  two  exceptions  were  a former  secretary 
of  the  Chicago  commission  on  city  expenditures,  and  a member  of  the  Munic- 
ipal Reference  Bureau,  Cincinnati,  Ohio  in  charge  of  the  divisions  of  Account- 
ing administration  and  Public  works  respectively.  In  New  York,  Iowa,  Ohio, 
and  Maryland  the  specialists  employed  ranged  from  staff  members  of  the  Munic- 
ipal Reference  Bureaus  of  New  York  City  and  Akron,  Ohio,  respectively,  to 
private  firms  of  efficiency  engineers  like  that  of  Griffenhagen  and  Asso- 
ciates, Chicago,  employed  by  the  Maryland  commission. 

In  the  appointment  of  a commission  of  eleven  members  by  Governor  Steph- 
ens, 1918,  "to  survey  the  activities  of  state  government  and  report  upon  the 
practicability  of  introducing  economies  in  administration"  there  is  rep- 
resented the  third  type  of  investigating  commission,  comprising  either  a 

2 

Among  the  duties  assigned  to  this  Board  were  the  following:  "To  in- 
vestigate duplication  of  work  of  public  bodies  and  the  efficiency  of 
the  organization  and  administration  of  such  public  bodies;  formulate 
plans  for  the  greater  coordination  of  such  public  bodies  and  the 
improvement  of  the  state  administration  in  general.  To  prepare  a 
budget  report.  To  publish  reports  and  make  recommendations  to  the 


, 1 


. 


l 

’ 

. 


. 


44 


mixed  memoership  of  state  officials  and  specialists,  or  a commission  of  spe- 
cialists , or  a commission  of  specialists  exclusively.  Governor  Stephens 
chose  to  combine  the  official  point  of  view  with  that  of  specialists  from 
the  outside  by  appointing  on  the  commission,  in  addition  to  well  known  spe- 
cialists, the  state  comptroller,  attorney  general,  three  members  of  the  state 
board  of  control  and  six  citizens,  one  of  whom  was  president  of  the  Common- 
wealth olub  of  California  and  another  of  whom  was  a former  United  States 
senator. 

An  interesting  variation  from  the  main  details  of  the  foregoing  three 
methods  of  determining  the  personnel  of  commissions  is  that  of  Oregon.  In 
this  state  a concurrent  resolution  of  the  general  assembly  in  1917  provided 
for  a commission  of  seven  members,  composed  of  representative  business  men 
of  Oregon  "to  study  state  administration  with  a view  to  consolidation  and 

A 

elimination  of  offices,  boards,  and  commissions.**  Three  bankers,  two  law- 
yers, one  packer,  and  one  realty  broker  were  appointed  and  they  in  turn 
employed  or.  J.  W.  Mathews,  Professor  of  Political  Science  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Illinois,  as  expert  investigator.  Here  we  have  the  first  instance 
of  a substitution  of  the  business  men's  point  of  view  for  the  official 
judgment  of  formal  legislative  commissions.  A sharper  deviation  from  the 
general  rule  affecting  the  personnel  of  these  commissions  is  the  act  of 
Massachusetts  General  Court  which  in  1916  abolished  the  economy  and  effi- 

legislature.’* *  (Ch.  45,  1911). 

o 

* or  a detailed  account  of  "the  state  movement  for  efficiency  and 
economy"  see  a monograph  bearing  this  title  by  Raymond  Moley,  pub- 

lished by  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal  Research  as  "Bulletin 
No.  90"  (163  pages). 


45 


ciency  commission  and  transferred  its  powers  to  a supervisor  of  administration 
who  was  authorized  to  organize  a staff  with  the  consent  of  the  governor  and 
council*  functioning  not  only  as  an  investigating  officer,  the  supervisor  in 
a series  of  annual  reports  has  embodied  the  point  of  view  of  the  impartial 
investigator  from  the  outside  with  that  of  a critic  of  the  administration  on 
the  governor's  staff. 

In  a class  somewhat  apart  from  commissions  selected  solely  for  purposes 
of  investigation  and  recommendation,  is  the  character  of  a state  commission 
on  constitutional  amendment  and  revision  authorized  by  the  Pennsylvania  leg- 
islature  in  1919  to  prepare  a tentative  draft  of  a constitution  for  submis- 
sion to  a proposed  constitutional  convention.  Aside  from  its  interest  as 
the  first  instance  of  such  an  idea  applied  to  constitution  making  in  general, 
is  its  significance  as  a broader  application  of  the  mixed  type  of  investiga- 
ting commission.  As  appointed  by  the  governor  it  consisted  of  twenty-three 
men  and  two  women,  including  lawyers,  representatives  of  organized  labor,  a 
college  president,  representatives  of  the  agricultural  and  business  interests 
of  the  state,  and  representatives  of  large  financial  interests.  Another  in- 
teresting fact  in  tnis  connection  was  the  provision  for  the  personnel  of  the 
constitutional  convention  itself.  Under  it,  ninetj'-six  delegates  were  to  be 
elected  at  large,  and  twenty-five  delegates  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor who  in  turn  announced  that  insofar  as  they  would  serve  he  would  appoint 

c 

members  of  the  preliminary  commission. 

4 

A similar  commission  was  that  of  Minnesota  appointed  by  the  governor 
in  1913.  This  commission  was  composed  of  thirty  members  and  rep- 
resented the  political  and  industrial  interests  of  all  sections  of 
the  state.  It  appointed  a staff  consisting  of  a consulting  statis- 


' 


. 


. 


■ 


. 

. 


. 


46 


Of  an  entirely  different  status,  but  none  the  less  complete  and  effect- 
ive were  the  activities  of  the  California  Taxpayers'  Association  culminating 
in  an  unofficial  plan  for  the  "reorganization  of  the  state  government  of  Cal- 
ifornia" published  in  their  own  periodical.  For  a period  of  six  years  the 
association  had  devoted  itself  to  a study  of  the  problem  of  reorganization, 
devoting  much  in  their  publications  to  the  "analysis  of  existing  conditions 
and  systems,  on  the  financial  side  of  state  government."  While  no  official 
cognizance  seems  ever  to  have  been  taken  of  this  voluntary  association,  a 
committee  on  efficiency  and  economy  being  authorized  by  the  legislature  in 
the  same  year  the  report  appeared,  its  actual  influence  as  a very  detailed 
and  original  analysis  of  functional  organization  of  state  activities  is  one 
of  the  noteworthy  contributions  to  the  reorganization  movement,  its  unof- 
ficial character  notwithstanding.0 

Another  type  of  purely  voluntary  activity  on  the  part  of  expert  inve- 
tigations  is  that  of  the  National  Municipal  League,  New  York  City.  For  a 
number  of  years  this  organization  through  its  official  organ,  the  National 
Municipal  Review  and  a large  variety  of  supplementary  pamphlets  has  been  a 
pioneer  agency  in  the  field  of  municipal  reform.  State  administrative  re- 
organization from  its  inception  on  a broader  scalo  a decade  ago  has  had  a 
large  share  of  the  attention  of  this  body.  As  a fitting  method  of  summariz- 

tician,  Dr.  E.  Dana  Durand,  former  director  of  the  United  States  cen- 
sus, a secretary,  and  a clerk. 

5 For  a fuller  consideration  of  this  Commission  see  W.  F.  Dodd's  "Leg- 
islative Notes  and  Reviews"  in  the  American  Political  Science  Review 
for  November,  1921,  p.  558.  Particularly  significant  is  his  reference 
to  the  governor's  object  in  advocating  the  creating  of  the  commission: 

"Ho  (the  governor)  believed  that  if  the  constitution  was  to  be  revised, 


47 


ing  their  findings  during  tnis  time,  a committee  on  state  government  was 
authorised  to  draft  a progress  report  on  a model  state  constitution  for  the 
consideration  of  the  national  organization.  As  a result,  a "Model  State 
Constitution"  was  presented  by  the  committee,  November  18,  1921,  for  the 
consideration  of  the  national  meeting  of  the  League  held  in  Chicago  on  that 
date.  Although  "subject  to  further  amendment  and  improvement  in  draftman- 
ship,"  the  report  presents  a complete  state  constitution  in  thirteen  parts 
which  may  be  said  to  embody  the  most  desirable  features  of  the  reports  of 
expert  investigators  in  the  field  of  state  government.  While  it  is  yet  ear- 
ly to  estimate  the  influence  of  this  recent  and  novel  addition  to  the  reports 
of  the  efficiency  and  economy  commissions,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that 
no  study  of  these  agencies  would  be  complete  which  did  not  take  into  account 

7 

the  "Model  State  Constitution." 

i^'rom  this  brief  survey  o>f  legislative  acts  authorizing  efficiency  and 
economy  commissions  and  providing  for  tneir  membership,  three  general  prac- 
tices or  tendencies  stand  out  as  having  a bearing  on  the  exhaustiveness  of 
their  investigations,  the  adequateness  of  their  standards  of  appraisement 
of  administrative  agencies,  the  practicability  of  their  recommendations, and 
the  weight  these  recommendations  might  have  on  legislative  bodies: 

(1)  The  purely  legislative  investigating  commit- 
tees comprised  of  members  from  the  two  chambers 

the  convention  charged  with  that  duty,  no  matter  how  distinguished 
the  delegates,  to  do  good  work,  must  have  the  aid  of  the  results  of 
a prior  systematic  study  of  the  present  constitution  in  the  light 
of  modern  thought  and  conditions.  He  also  believed  that  the  question 
whether  there  should  be  a revision  of  the  constitution  was  so  impor- 
tant, that  before  it  was  finally  decided  by  the  people,  they  should 


. 


48 


for  conducting  inquiries,  holding  hearings, 
and  collecting  evidence  after  the  manner  of 
the  Texas  joint  committee  of  1917  give  way 
to  commissions  of  specialists  acting  jointly 
with  or  independently  of  official  representa- 
tives* Examples  of  this  tendency  are  the 
recent  authorization  of  new  specialist  com- 
missions in  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Maryland, 
Ohio,  South  Dakota,  and  Virginia* 


(2)  The  formal  legislative  committees  comprised 
of  official  members  who  delegate  the  actual 
work  of  investigating  and  recommendation  to 
specialist  suo-committees  give  way  to  the 
mixed  commissions  of  official  representatives 
acting  conjointly  with  specialists  from  the 
outside.  The  obvious  purpose  of  this  newer 
practice  is  to  secure  a combination  of  the 
official  point  of  view  with  that  of  special- 


have  the  advice  of  the  best  commission  which  it  was  in  his  power  to 
create. 

6See  "A  Plan  for  Reorganization  of  State  Government"  in  the  January, 
1919,  number  of  the  California  Taxpayers  * Journal  pp.  20  and  21. 

The  following  statement  of  explanation  is  significant:  "This  plan 

has  been  prepared  by  the  Taxpayers'  Association  of  California,  and 
is  offered  for  the  benefit  of  all  who  may  be  interested  in  a fun- 
damental reorganization  calcukted  to  promote  efficiency  and  economy.  . 
In  performing  this  work  the  Taxpayers'  Association  has  separated  all 
the  individual  functions  now  performed  by  each  of  the  existing 
agencies  of  state  government,  and  then  co-ordinated  them  in  accor- 


49 


ist8  from  the  outside  in  the  interest  of 
practicable  findings  with  the  added  weight 
of  those  representatives  from  the  legisla- 
tive body  on  the  committee  who  stand  spons- 
or for  committee  recommendations  in  the 
debates  over  their  enactment.  Conspicuous 
recent  examples  of  this  tendency  are  those 
commissions  of  California  and  Ohio.  In 
this  connection  the  certificate  of  trans- 
mittal on  the  Ohio  report  is  significant: 
"Submitted  (by  Akron  Bureau  of  Municipal 
Research)  to  the  Joint  Committee  on  Admin- 
istrative Reorganization  and  submitted  by 
the  Committee  to  State  officials  and  the 
public  for  comment,  suggestion,  and  crit- 
icism before  approval  and  adoption  by  the 
committee. 

(3)  The  acts  creating  joint  legislative  commit- 
tees give  way  to  broad  grants  authorizing 
the  governor  to  draw  up  such  reorganization 
plana  or  codes  in  any  manner  he  may  see  fit, 


dance  with  a definite  functional  classification.  So  far  as  the  Associa- 
tion is  aware,  no  plan  of  reorganization,  in  any  state,  has  heretofore 
been  worked  out  on  the  basis  of  the  functional  unit.  In  the  absence  of 
such  a base,  no  exact  and  thorough  co-ordination,  eliminating  all  con- 
flicts and  duplications,  is  possible. 


1 


‘ 


. 

■ 


. 


. 


« 


* 


. 


. , 


50 


and  submit  them  to  the  legislature.  The 
most  notable  examples  of  tnis  newer  tend- 
ency are  those  of  Minnesota,  Michigan, 

Missouri,  and  Washington,  1919  and  1921. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  Washington  ad- 
ministrative code  the  governor  had  the 
assistance  of  an  Attorney- General  known 
for  his  intimate  knowledge  of  state  govern- 
ment and  one  other,  an  expert  draftsman  and 
attorney  of  Seattle. 

In  other  words,  a comparative  study  of  the  reports  and  recommendations 
of  the  efficiency  and  economy  commissions  as  mixed  groups  of  practical  gov- 
ernment officials  and  specialists  from  the  outside  may  reasonably  be  expect- 
ed to  reveal  tendencies  and  principles  which  represent  (1)  Exhaustive  inves- 
tigation, analysis,  and  selection,  and  (2)  the  necessary  element  of  practic- 
ability. 

Z.  In  the  reports  of  methods  of  investigation  is  revealed  likewise  the 
true  expert  character  of  the  commission.  "The  members  of  the  Committee,  by 
reason  of  their  service  in  the  Forty-eight  and  preceding  General  Assemblies, 
and  particularly  by  reason  of  their  service  on  appropriation  committee, " 
read  the  preliminary  statement  of  the  Illinois  Efficiency  and  Economy  Commit- 
tee report,  "were  familiar  with  the  lack  of  systematic  organization  among 

n 

See  "Progress  Report  on  a Model  State  Constitution"  presented  by  the 
Committee  on  State  Government  for  the  approval  of  Members  of  the 
National  Municipal  League  at  Chicago,  November  18,  1921. 


t 


. 


‘ 


■ 


51 


numerous  state  oificers,  boards,  and  commissions,  and  were  aware  that  new 
authorities  might  have  been  more  effectively  organized  in  connection  with  the 
already  existing  departments.  They  were  also  acquainted  with  the  confusion 
resulting  from  this  defective  organization  and  with  the  difficulties  of  ex- 
ercising adequate  control  over  appropriations  and  expenditures.  The  Committee 
believed,  however,  that  it  should  have  as  a basis  for  its  work  a more  thor- 
ough and  exact  knowledge  than  was  possessed  by  its  members,  of  the  existing 
state  offices,  boards,  and  commissions,  of  the  laws  under  which  they  operated, 
and  of  their  internal  organization,  appropriations,  and  work  performed.  After 
making  some  preliminary  study  of  the  situation  the  Committee  employed  John  A. 
Fairlie,  Professor  of  Political  Science  in  the  University  of  Illinois,  as 
Director  of  its  investigational  work  ...  In  carrying  out  the  investigations 
expert  assistants  have  been  employed,  from  the  staff  of  the  University  of  111"* 
inois,  from  other  universities  and  from  those  with  practical  experience  in 
similar  investigations.  Each  division  of  the  work  has  been  in  charge  of  some 
one  with  special  knowledge  and  fitness  for  the  particular  problem.  In  making 
their  investigations,  the  Director  and  other  investigators  have  consulted  free 
ly  with  the  state  officers,  boards,  and  commissions,  and  with  other  persons 
and  organizations  affected  by  or  interested  in  the  working  of  such  services.  . 
Following  the  publication  of  this  preliminary  report,  a series  of  public  hear- 
ings was  held  by  the  committee  in  Chicago  and  Springfield,  for  the  further  con 
sideration  of  the  tentative  plans.  Notice  of  these  hearings  was  sent  to  the 
public  press;  and  special  notices  were  sent  to  the  state  officers,  and  to 
organizations  and  individuals  known  to  be  interested  in  the  work  of  particular 
groups  of  authorities."  The  committee  here  lists  eighty  representative  of- 


. 


, 


. . 

. 


52 


ficais  from  the  state  departments  called  in  from  time  to  time  for  conference. 
Concluding,  it  states:  "It  should  be  clearly  understood  that  the  work  of  the 

Committee  has  not  been  undertaken  with  a view  to  the  personal  criticism  ei- 
ther of  particular  officials  or  of  present  or  past  administration.  No  single 
official  or  administration  can  be  held  responsible  for  the  existing  condi- 
tions as  a whole.  The  fundamental  difficulty  lies  in  the  defective  organiza- 
tion provided  by  law.  So,  too,  the  findings  and  recommendations  of  the  com- 
mittee are  made  without  reference  to  any  personal  or  political  results;  but 
solely  with  reference  to  the  inherent  defects  in  the  existing  machinery  and 
plans  for  a permanent  reorganization  of  the  state  administration  on  a basis 
of  efficiency  and  economy."8  To  the  same  end  were  the  methods  of  the  Ohio 
commission  as  indicated  in  this  quotation  from  the  preliminary  statement: 
"Consideration  of  expedience  have  been  a negligible  factor  in  the  formula- 
tion of  the  following  recommendations.  The  controlling  thought  has  been  to 
devise  the  best  possible  plan  of  state  reorganization  after  careful  considera- 
tion of  all  the  available  facts  bearing  upon  the  problem.  Hundreds  of  let- 
ters were  written  to  former  state  officials,  present  state  officials,  civic, 
professional,  social,  and  business  organizations  and  interested  citizens  for 
the  purpose  of  securing  ideas  and  facts.  Conferences  were  held  with  individ- 
uals, state  officials,  and  a few  public  hearings  were  conducted  for  the  pur- 
pose of  securing  additional  information.  In  addition  to  the  ideas  and  sug- 
gestions which  were  received  from  citizens  in  Ohio,  a large  amount  of  valu- 
able information  was  obtained  from  persons  of  wide  experience  in  government- 
al affairs  in  other  states."  The  California  commission  writes:  "A  commu- 

O 

"Report  of  the  Efficiency  and  Economy  Committee  (Illinois)  p.  28. 


t K ' 


r 

. 

' 


* 


, ' ■ ■ k 

< 


nication  was  sent  to  every  state  department,  board,  and  commission,  request- 
ing that  the  committee  be  furnished  with  the  following  information: 

(1)  What  are  your  powers,  duties,  and  internal 
organization  as  provided  by  law,  and  in 
fact  exercised? 

(2)  To  what  extent  do  the  powers  and  duties 
of  your  department  overlap  and  duplicate 
those  of  another? 

(3)  What  changes,  if  any,  do  you  believe  could 
be  made  in  your  department  in  order  that 
the  work  might  be  carried  on  most  effective- 
ly and  in  the  most  efficient  and  economical 
manner? 

(4)  What  other  suggestions  have  you  in  mind 
relating  either  to  your  own  department  or 
to  the  state’s  business  as  a whole,  that 
will  make  for  a more  efficient  administra- 
tion of  the  affairs  of  the  state? 

The  various  agencies  of  the  state  answered  in  great  detail.  After  the 
receipt  by  the  committees  of  the  replies,  the  sub-committees  with  associate 
memoers  held  hearings  in  Sacramento,  San  Francisco, and  Los  Angeles,  to  which 
were  invited  the  representatives  of  the  various  boards,  commissions,  and 
departments,  together  with  those  citizens  who  had  expressed  interest  in  the 
subjects  under  discussion,  and  the  general  public.  At  the  hearings  the  full- 


' 


1 

■ 

. 

54 


est  and  freest  opportunity  was  given  for  the  expressions  of  ideas  and  views, 

9 

to  which  full  consideration  was  given  later  by  the  committee." 

In  the  utilization  of  specialists,  the  California  commission  on  the 
testimony  of  its  own  report  went  far  beyond  any  of  the  other  thirty  or  more 
commissions  which  followed  in  the  main  this  general  policy.  The  original 
commission  of  eleven  members  was  subdivided  into  five  chief  sub- commit tees: 
legal  service,  finance,  commerce  and  public  utilities,  public  works  and  pro- 
perties, thirty  in  agriculture  and  natux'al  resources,  twenty-two  in  labor, 
twenty-one  in  education,  thirty-one  in  public  health,  twenty-six  in  public 
welfare,  ten  in  civil  service,  and  twelve  in  state  defense,  or  a total  of 
221  professional  and  business  specialists  drawn  from  every  walk  of  life. 

From  this  brief  survey  of  the  methods  of  commissions  as  indicated  in 
preliminary  pages  of  their  reports,  the  following  significant  features  in 
their  methods  of  procedure  should  be  stressed  as  they  bear  also  on  the  ex- 
haustiveness, the  authoritive  character  of  the  findings,  and  the  practic- 
ability of  recommendations  for  legislative  enactments: 

(1)  The  direct  participation  of  public  officials 
in  the  investigations  of  the  commissions,  (ei- 
ther as  members  of  the  commission  in  Illinois, 

Ohio,  and  California,  or  as  conferees  and 
advisers  in  an  associate  capacity),  in  prac- 
tically all  the  commissions,  though  on  the 

q 

Report  of  the  Committee  on  Efficiency  and  Economy  of  California, 

March,  1919,  p.  7. 


55 


largest  scale  in  California  commission. 

(2)  The  utilization  of  specialists  from  the  state 
at  large  either  as  members  of  the  commission 
or  as  associate  members  of  sub- committees  in 
Illinois  and  ualifornia,  especially. 

(3)  The  securing  of  first  hand  information  about 
the  conditions  and  problems  of  the  administra- 
tive agencies  by  inviting  or  summoning  state 
officials  before  the  commission,  or  by  request- 
ing reports. 

(4)  The  emphasis  placed  on  public  hearings  in  which 
interested  parties  were  privileged  to  partic- 
ipate. 

3.  Jfrom  the  considerations  of  personnel  and  methods,  we  come  next  to  the 
analysis  of  conditions  as  the  commissions  found  them  in  state  administrative 
departments.  A striking  note  of  uniformity  runs  through  the  findings  as  set 
forth  in  the  several  reports.  "The  main  points  in  the  indictment  may  be  brief- 
ly summarized,"  writes  the  Illinois  commission.  "There  is  unnecessary  duplica- 
tion of  positions  and  salaries;  not  only  in  the  chief  officers  of  each  sep- 
arate bureau  or  board,  but  still  more  in  their  staffs  of  clerks  and  employees. 
But  this  is  the  smallest  part  of  the  loss.  The  work  that  is  undertaken  is  not 
well  done;  ana  costs  much  more  for  the  results  ootained  than  with  a more  ef- 
ficient organization.  Supplies  in  many  cases  are  purchased  in  small  quantities 
for  each  office  or  institution,  which  could  be  secured  at  lower  prices  if  pur- 


. 

. 

‘ 


. 


. 


* 


. 


. 

’ 


V i 


56 


chased  in  larger  quantities  on  contracts  based  on  competitive  bids,  as  is 
done  by  the  board  of  Administration  for  the  charitable  institutions.  The 
absence  of  definite  correlation  and  cooperation  between  the  most  closely  re- 
lated offices,  necessarily  leads  to  loss  and  inefficient  work.  The  only  su- 
pervision provided  by  law  over  most  of  the  executive  offices,  boards,  and 
commissions,  burdens  the  governor  with  a mass  of  unnecessary  details  which 
no  single  individual  can  effectively  handle,  and  at  the  same  time  does  not 
afford  him  either  the  time  or  the  facilities  for  the  proper  determination  of 
the  more  important  questions  of  administrative  and  legislative  policy.  The 
present  arrangements  fail  to  provide  the  General  Assembly  with  adequate  in- 
formation or  advice  to  enable  it  to  perform  its  work  wisely,  either  in  mak- 
ing appropriations  or  in  enacting  substantive  legislation.  And  while  reports 
are  made  and  published,  they  are  so  numerous  and  poorly  organized  that  the 
general  public  fails  to  receive  satisfactory  information  of  the  work  that  is 
done,  and  has  no  satisfactory  means  for  fixing  responsibility,  or  of  discrim- 
inating between  those  officials  who  perform  their  work  well  and  those  who  per- 
form is  poorly  or  not  at  all."10  Out  of  this  general  condition,  the  commis- 
sion points  out,  these  results:  overlapping  functions,  irregularity  of  re- 

ports, ineffective  correlation  and  supervision,  a lack  of  standards  of  com- 
pensation, imperfect  accounts,  and  inadequate  advice  on  legislation  from  the 
executive  departments. 

Using  these  several  '’counts"  as  a basis  of  comparison,  one  notes  that 

to 

whereas  in  emphasizing  the  lack  of  correlation,  the  Illinois  commission 
points  out  the  half-dozen  boards  dealing  with  agricultural  interests,  the 

10 


Illinois  report,  p.  24. 


. 


. 

r 


. 


«* 

. 


. . 


. . . . 


57 


score  of  separate  labor  agencies,  and  the  distribution  of  finance  administra- 
tion between  various  elective  and  appointive  officials,^  the  New  York  commis- 
sion reports  ten  agencies  for  carrying  on  agricultural  activities,  seven  for 
finance,  ten  for  charitable  institutions,  and  eight  local  boards  for  as  many 
normal  schools.  Thirty- five  agencies  handle  agriculture  in  Oregon,  according 
to  its  commission,  eight  labor,  forty-three  education,  and  twenty-one  carry 
on  the  activities  of  public  works.  The  New  Jersey  commission  found  tnat 
five  distinct  boards  and  bureaus  controlled  the  oyster  industry,  that  six 
important  commissions  were  engaged  in  conservation  and  developmental  work, 

and  the  control  of  one  state  prison  was  scattered  among  five  different  author- 
13 

ities.  The  California  commission  notes  that  nine  departments  acting  sep- 
arately carry  on  the  agricultural  activities  of  the  state  and  concludes  "that 
California  can  not  have  a consistent  agricultural  policy"  until  a coordina- 
tion is  effected,  continuing,  it  says,  "There  are  no  factors  which  are  great- 
er causes  of  inefficiency  than  decentralized  and  inadequate  supervision  and 
14 

review."  The  Illinois  commission  notes  that  the  "division  of  the  public 
service  in  some  fields  has  even  affected  the  authority  of  the  state  officials, 
provided  by  the  constitution,  where  in  some  cases  unrelated  functions  are 
placed  under  th6  same  official.  The  title  of  the  auditor  of  public  accounts 
indicates  that  he  should  control  the  auditing  of  all  public  accounts  in  the 
state;  but  his  authority  in  this  field  is  limited;  on  the  other  hand,  he  has 
supervision  over  banks  and  building  and  loan  associations,  a function  quite 

^Illinois  report  p.  29. 

~2Report  of  the  Reconstruction  Commission  on  Retrenchment  and  Reorganiza- 
.^tion  in  the  State  Government  (1919)  p.  6. 

"Second  Report  of  the  Commission  upon  the  Reorganization  and  Consolida- 
tion of  Different  Departments  of  the  State  Government  Whose  Junctions 
are  Interralted  (1914)  p.  24. 


s 

- 

, . • 

. 


. 


t 


' 


. 

. , 

. 

. 


LitSOKIfn 


58 

distinct  from  the  audit  of  public  accounts. The  Virginia  commission  found 
that  the  power  of  auditing  their  own  expense  accounts  was  vested  in  the  state 
board  of  education,  department  of  agriculture,  and  kindred  agencies. ^ Five 
commissi ons not e the  scattered  offices,  a type  finding  of  which  was  that  of 
Illinois,  where  thirty  state  officials  and  commissions  had  offices  in  Chicago 
at  a cost  for  rent  and  other  expenses  of  almost  one  hundred  thousand  dollars 
a year. 

No  less  vigorous  is  the  commissions ' general  attack  on  the  lack  of  any 
standards  of  compensation  in  state  administration.  The  Oregon  commission 
asks:  "Why  should  the  members  of  the  state  board  of  chiropractic  examiners 

receive  $10.00  per  day,  while  the  members  of  the  state  board  of  examiners 
receive  only  $5.00  per  day:  Why  should  the  secretary  of  the  state  fair  board 

receive  $3,000  per  annum,  while  the  state  dairy  and  food  commissioner  re- 
ceives  only  $2,000  per  annum?"  The  Virginia  commission  notes  that  the  sal- 
ary of  the  state  superintendent  who  supervises  the  expenditure  of  millions 
and  the  management  of  a very  important  government  agency  receives  $3,500  a 
year,  while  the  division  superintendent  of  the  city  of  Richmond  gets  $4,999 
a year.  In  the  same  vein  the  Illinois  commission  observes  that  the  state 
food  commissioner  of  Illinois  receives  $3,600  a year  while  the  more  important 
offices  of  the  secretary  of  the  state  board  of  health  receive  only  $3,500.“^ 
Overlapping  functions  of  the  several  departments  receive  special  attention 


^California  report  p.  16. 
15 

6 


.^Illinois  report  p.  23* 


17 

18 


Report  of  the  Commission  on  Economy  and  Efficiency  (1918)  p.  17. 
Report  of  tne  consolidation  Commission  (1918)  p.  43. 

Virginia  report  p.  34. 


^Illinois  report  p.  20. 


‘ 


. 


. 


' 


* 

. 


59 

at  the  hands  of  all  the  commissions,  particularly  the  departments  of  inspec- 
tion from  which  representatives  of  special  boards  or  commissions  may  each 
visit  th6  same  place  for  different  purposes,  and  generally  issue  conflict- 
ing  orders,  a condition  described  at  length  by  the  New  York  Commission.  wAn- 
other  source  of  confusion  in  the  operation  of  the  numerous  state  departments 
which  the  commissions  invariably  point  out,  is  the  complete  absence  of  uni- 
formity or  regularity  as  to  their  reports.  The  Colorado  commission  makes 
the  most  searching  analysis  of  executive  reports.  In  this  connection  it 
finds:  ’’Practically  every  state  department  makes  an  annual  or  biennial 

printed  report  to  the  governor.  These  reports  in  the  last  biennial  period 
varied  from  seven  pages  to  over  600  pages  in  size.  There  is  no  unformity 
in  contents.  . . The  contents  of  some  of  these  reports  are  open  to  crit- 
icism. The  annual  report  of  the  board  of  health,  for  example,  issued  in 
1916,  of  which  5,000  copies  were  printed,  cost  $878.00.  There  were  233 
pages  in  the  report,  120  pages  of  which  were  used  in  reprinting  a compila- 
tion of  laws  relating  to  the  promotion  of  sanitation  and  health.  These  laws 
have  no  place  in  an  annual  report.  It  is  a matter  of  common  knowledge  that 
department  reports  transmitted  by  the  governor  to  the  legislature  each  bien- 
nial period  are  rarely  utilized  or  read  by  the  members  of  the  house  and  sen- 
21 

ate."  A similar  analysis  of  each  of  twenty-two  other  department  reports 
follows  and  ends  with  the  recommendation  that  the  whole  matter  of  reports 
should  be  discretionary  with  the  governor.  The  Illinois  commission  finds 
"that  the  separate  publication  of  reports  for  each  minor  office  and  the  lack 
of  central  control  over  the  printing  of  such  reports  adds  much  to  the  expense 

20 

New  York  report  p.  115. 

^Report  on  a Survey  of  the  Office  of  Governor  (no.l)  (1916)  p.  18. 


. 


.■ 


' 

. 


. 


, 


60 


22 

of  printing,  whicn  now  amounts  to  over  $500.00  for  the  biennium.' 

The  prevailing  condition  of  ineffective  supervision  in  state  administra- 
tion is  given  marked  attention  in  all  the  reports.  "It  is  a curious  com- 
mentary on  our  respect  for  logic,"  observes  the  hew  York  commission,  "that 
the  article  of  the  constitution  which  confers  the  executive  power  upon  the 
governor  is  followed  by  one  which  deprives  him  of  a large  part  of  it  by  creat- 
ing a number  of  high  executive  officers  elected  by  popular  vote  and  almost 
wholly  independent  of  him  in  the  conduct  of  executive  business.  As  Governor 
Hughes  remarked  in  his  second  inaugural,  after  two  years'  experience  in  the 
office:  ‘While  the  governor  represents  the  highest  executive  power  in  the 

state,  there  is  frequently  observed  a popular  misapprehension  as  to  its  scope. 
There  is  a wide  domain  over  which  he  has  no  control,  or  slight  control. '"The 
fact  is,"  the  report  continues,  "that  while  the  constitution  provides  for  an 
officer  who  is  called  the  'governor',  only  as  a matter  of  declaration  of 
principle  may  he  be  said  to  be  endowed  with  'executive  power.'  . . Article  V 
is  a hisorical  accumulation,  not  a reasoned  product  of  administrative  science. 
There  is  no  consistent  scheme  for  defining  departmental  limits.  The  powers 
and  duties  of  five  important  officers  dignified  by  constitutional  mention, 
th6  secretary  of  state,  comptroller,  treasurer,  attorney-general,  and  en- 
gineer and  surveyor,  are  left  wholly  undefined.  . . One  hundred  and  thirty- 
eight  years  of  political  experience  has  demonstrated  the  inadequacy  of  mere 
declarations  to  make  a chief  executive.  . The  fact  is  that  the  constitution 
itself  inhibits  the  development  of  a responsible  chief  executive.  • • Provid- 
ing no  organization  for  a chief  executive,  the  constitutional  inhibition 

22 


Illinois  report  p.  21 


I 


. 


.-tf> 

■ 

■ . 

, 

. . . 

. 

■ 

. 


61 


against  the  expenditure  of  puolic  moneys  except  pursuant  to  appropriations 
has  done  the  rest.  Acting  within  these  constitutional  powers,  the  legisla- 
ture has  also  failed  to  provide  either  organization  or  funds  with  which  the 
governor  might  build  up  staff  agencies  • . . furthermore,  the  legislature 
has  estaolished  140  different  departmental  officers  and  commissions  having 
administration  duties  with  no  provision  for  coordination  and  with  little 
possibility  of  executive  direction  and  control.”  Turning  next  to  the  gov- 
ernor's power  of  appointment  and  removal,  the  commission  continues:  ”As  has 

been  pointed  out  in  other  connections,  no  consistent  principles  have  been 
applied  in  the  determination  of  what  officers  should  be  made  independent  of 
the  governor  through  popular  election  and  what  officers  should  be  made  sub- 
ordinate to  him  through  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  appointment,  for  instance 
the  state  engineer  and  surveyor,  an  officer  charged  with  duties  which  involve 
those  of  officers  appointed  by  the  governor,  is  made  elective  by  the  consti- 
tution, and  an  equally  technical  position,  for  which  no  qualifications  are 
established,  that  of  superintendent  of  public  works,  is  made  appointive.  The 
governor's  adviser  on  legal  matters  of  great  moment  who  is  responsible  in  a 

large  measure  for  the  enforcement  of  the  law,  the  attorney  general,  is  elect- 

23 

ed,  while  the  superintendent  of  prisons  is  an  appointive  officer.”  Carrying 
the  survey  farther,  the  Commission  finds  that  the  methods  of  removal  provided 
by  the  constitution  and  the  statutues  as  well  were  "confusing  beyond  measure.” 
The  constitution  authorizes  the  removal  of  two  officers  by  the  governor,  and 
the  suspension  of  a third.  In  the  case  of  the  removal  of  the  superintendent 
of  public  works,  the  governor  must  file  a statement  of  causes  with  the  sec- 


Report  of  the  New  York  State  Constitutional  Convention  Commission 
(1915)  p.  95. 


. 


I 

X 

. 

■ 

. 


62 


retary  of  state.  In  the  case  of  offices  elected  by  statute,  the  commission 
emphasizes  here  also  great  variation  and  inconsistency. 

The  most  exhaustive  study  of  this  phase  of  the  governor's  power  is  that 
of  the  Colorado  commission.  In  a summary  statement  it  points  out  the  lack  of 
uniformity  in  the  existing  method  of  appointment  by  the  governor  in  Colorado: 

1.  All  appointments  of  officers  on  examining  boards  are  made  by  the  governor 
without  the  consent  of  the  senate,  with  the  exception  of  the  board  of  dental 
examiners  who  are  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  senate. 

2.  Commissioners  like  those  of  state  banks  are  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  approval  of  the  senate,  while  the  commissioner  of  mines  and  others  are 
appointed  by  the  governor  alone.  3.  Whereas  the  state  engineer  is  appointed 
by  the  governor  alone,  the  five  irrigation  engineers  under  him  are  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  senate.  Here  follow  a 
dozen  other  similar  citations  of  inconsistency  in  appointment  provisions. ^ 

In  the  same  vein,  the  Oregon  commission  points  out  the  three  principal 
ways  of  choosing  state  officials:  election  by  the  people,  by  appointment 

of  the  governor,  by  appointment  of  the  governor  and  other  executive  officers. 
It  notes  thirteen  principal  elective  executive  officials;  thirty-two  boards 
and  commissions  which  elect  their  own  secretaries  entirely  independently  of 
the  governor;  and  sixteen  other  principal  executive  officials  appointed  by 
other  elective  officers,  also  independently  of  the  governor.  Commenting  on 
this  condition,  the  commission  continues:  "No  efficient  and  businesslike 

administration  of  state  affairs  in  Oregon  can  be  expressed  unless  some  one 

24 

Colorado  report  p.  15. 


* 

. 


. 


!. 


- 


' 


63 


officer,  who  is  fully  responsiole  to  the  people  can  control  all  the  important 
departments  of  the  administration,  with  the  possiole  exception  of  the  auditing 
and  treasury  departments*  The  governor  does  not  do  so  at  present,  however, 
for  three  main  reasons:  (l)  Because  there  are  too  many  elective  officers.  (2) 

because  the  administration  is  split  up  into  too  many  departments  for  the  gov- 
ernor to  exercise  adequate  control  over  them.  (3)  Because  the  appointing  pow- 
er is  too  often  shared  with  other  officials,  boards,  and  commissions  . • • 
Instead  of  one  governor,  Oregon  has  a multitude  of  governors  . . . There  is  no 
logical  reason  inhering  in  the  character  of  the  position  or  the  nature  of  the 
duties  why  some  officers  should  be  elective  and  others  appointive.  Why  should 
the  public  service  commissioners  be  elective  while  the  industrial  accident 
commissioners  and  the  highway  commissioners  are  appointive!  Why  should  the 
labor  commissioner  be  elective  while  the  corporation  commissioner  is  appoint- 
ive!”^ 

A degree  of  disintegration  greater  even  than  this  of  the  Oregon  execu- 
tive, however,  is  revealed  in  the  findings  of  the  Delaware  commission.  It 
was  found  in  making  the  survey  in  that  state  that  the  administrative  branch 
of  the  government  included  one  hundred  seventeen  separate  agencies,  which 
were  in  many  cases  independent  of  each  other  and  without  any  direct  and 
effective  supervision  by  the  governor*  Of  these  agencies,  the  heads  of  six 
were  elected  by  the  people,  eighty-three  appointed  by  the  governor  (in  most 
cases  with  the  senate's  approval) , two  were  appointed  by  the  judges  of  the 
superior  court  of  the  state,  twelve  by  boards  and  administrative  officers 
other  than  the  governor,  and  fourteen  were  ex-officio  bodies.  Fifty- four 

25 


Oregon  report  p.  9 


. 


64 

of  the  total  number  of  agencies  were  headed  by  boards  or  commissions*  In 
addition  to  certain  inherent  defects  which  it  points  out,  the  commission 
found  that  the  board  system  of  Delaware  was  so  organized  as  to  deprive  the 
governor  of  the  control  which  he  must  have  in  order  to  be  responsible  for 
the  state's  business.  This  was  especially  true  since  members  had  overlap- 
ping terms,  making  it  possible  for  the  governor  to  chose  only  a minority  dur- 
ing his  term.?,e  When  we  come  to  summarize,  then,  the  findings  of  commis- 
sions with  respect  to  the  impotency  of  the  American  state  governor  in  the 
matter  of  supervision,  we  find  that  a concensus  of  the  reports  shows: 

(1)  A so-called  "chief"  executive  surrounded  by  a group 
of  constitutional,  elective  executive  state  officers 
with  a political  relationship  such  that  the  governor 
can  actually  exercise  little  supervision  over  them. 

And  as  the  Illinois  commission  points  out,  this  lack 

of  control  extends  not  only  to  their  primary  functions, 
but  also  to  other  unrelated  powers  and  duties  imposed 
on  them  by  statute. 

(2)  A statutory  organization  of  the  executive  department 
with  a preponderance  of  boards,  officers,  and  commis- 
sions usually  appointive  by  the  governor  (with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  senate),  but  in  many  cases 
with  terms  so  adjusted  that  he  does  not  control  the 
appointment  of  individual  officers  or  of  a majority 
of  the  members  of  boards. 

26 


Report  and  Recommendations  of  the  Delaware  State  Survey  Commission 
(1920)  p.  11* 


65 


(3)  Statutory  as  well  as  constitutional  provisions  for 
appointment  and  removal  whicft  follow  no  consistent 
principle  of  effective  administrative  control  and 
thereby  remove  important  officers  from  even  the 
governor's  nominal  supervision. 

(4)  A multiplicity  of  separate  offices,  which,  though 
under  the  nominal  supervision  of  the  governor 
through  his  power  of  appointment  and  removal,  by 
their  very  number  makes  impossible  the  exercise  of 
any  adequate  control. 

4 finally,  there  logically  follows  from  this  lack  of  correlation  and  effect- 
ive supervision,  the  Illinois  commission  points  out,  one  of  the  most  serious 
defects  of  state  government:  namely,  the  absence  of  any  satisfactory  budget 

of  estimates  as  a basis  of  appropriation.  In  this  connection  the  Commission 
observes  that  although  the  constitution  expressly  provides  that  the  governor 
shall  "present  estimates  of  the  amount  of  money  required  to  be  raised  by  taxa- 
tion for  all  purposes"  no  governor  had  "heretofore  ever  complied  with  this 

27 

constitutional  duty."  The  Commission  concludes  that  the  failure  to  do  so 
had  undoubtedly  been  due  in  tne  main  to  the  fact  that  the  executive  author- 
ities as  organized  had  not  afforded  the  governor  the  facilities  he  needed  to 

perform  this  duty.  Identical  with  this  finding  is  that  of  t«e  Colorado  Com- 
?8 

mission. 4 The  Mew  York  Commission  sees  the  same  direct  relation  between  a 
disintegrated  executive  and  a sound  system  of  finance  and  budget.  Among  oth- 
er things  it  observes:  "The  present  numerous  independent  agencies  of  the 

^Illinois  report  p.  22. 

°Colorado  report  p.  24. 


■ 


‘ 


• 

, 

• 

• 

* 

' 

- 


« 


, 

. 


66 


state  government  make  impossible  wise  planning  in  the  distribution  of  public 
expenditures  among  the  several  branches  of  the  service;  and  they  likewise 
work  against  strict  and  effective  control  over  the  use  of  money  and  property  •. 
Where  there  are  unlimited  demands  made  by  a hundred  or  more  agencies,  a scram- 
ble ensues  • . Even  if  the  governor  should  be  empowered  to  prepare  the  budg- 
et of  the  state  for  legislative  consideration,  he  could  not  do  it  effectively 
under  the  present  organization.  A cabinet  of  a hundred  and  eighty  or  more 
members  is  unthinkable  and  a cabinet  is  necessary  to  financial  planning  . • . 
The  more  spigots  there  are  in  the  barrel  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  keep  a 
watch  on  them.  There  are  too  many  streams  and  rivulets  runnings  out  of  New 
York's  treasury.  Our  present  budget  system  instead  of  being  the  most  effect- 
ive instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  Executive  for  planning  order  and  economy 
in  the  work  of  all  departments,  has  been  the  means  of  further  scattering  au- 

29 

thority  and  responsibility  and  of  producing  enormous  waste  in  expenditures.' 

The  Massachusetts  Commission  draws  a convincing  conclusion  in  this  connection 
from  the  refusal  of  the  governor  in  1919  to  take  any  of  the  responsibility  for 
the  budget  of  that  year.  In  transmitting  the  budget  to  the  legislature  he  is 
reported  as  saying,  "The  estimates  for  expenditures  have  been  studied  by  the 
supervisor  of  administration  and  his  recommendations  are  embodied  in  the  sum- 
mary of  financial  statements  submitted  with  the  budget."  In  repeated  ref- 
erences to  this  budget,  the  Commission  observes,  the  governor  invariably 
referred  to  the  "recommendation  of  the  supervisor  of  administration,"  assum- 
ing no  responsibility  therefore,  though  the  budget  law  requires  the  supervis- 
or to  prepare  a budget  for  the  governor  "setting  forth  such  recommendations 
as  the  governor  shall  determine."  As  good  and  satisfactory  reasons  for  the 

29 


New  York  report  p.  29 


t 


• * * 

- 

. 

. 

. 

- 

• ■ 

. 

, 


67 


refuaai  of  the  governor  to  assume  any  of  the  responsibility  for  the  budget, 
the  Commission  points  out  (1)  That  both  an  elected  executive  council  and  a 
legislative  organization  and  procedure  prevent  his  leadership,  while  the 
supervisor  of  administration  who  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  preparing  the 
estimates  is  responsible  to  a ten-headed  executive,  the  "governor  and  coun- 
cil." (2)  A large  part  of  the  departmental  estimates  for  special  purposes 
was  filed  too  late  to  allow  for  the  necessary  revision  before  the  supervisor 
made  recommendations  for  the  governor's  budget.  (3)  The  tentative  budget  for 
1919  was  in  the  hands  of  the  governor  for  only  five  days  although  it  called 
for  an  outlay  of  over  thirty-five  millions  of  dollars.  The  Commission  then 
reviews  in  detail  the  procedure  by  which,  under  the  budget  act,  the  House 
Ways  and  Means  Committee  remade  the  budget  which  the  governor  submitted.  In 
approving  the  bill,  the  commission  points  out  that  the  governor  not  only 
"did  not  exercise  his  right  to  veto  items  in  appropriation  bills  or  to  reduce 
items,  but  accepted  every  change  made  by  the  legislature."  A more  striking 
example  of  executive  impotence  could  hardly  be  cited.  In  this  same  connec- 
tion, the  Illinois  Commission  observes:  "With  the  existing  lack  of  efficient 

organization,  both  the  Governor  and  the  General  Assembly  fail  to  receive  prop- 
er information  and  advice  as  to  needed  legislation.  The  constitution  provides 
that  the  governor  shall  recommend  to  the  General  Assembly  such  measures  as  he 
shall  deem  expedient,  hut  no  machinery  has  been  provided  by  which  the  rec- 
ommendations and  proposals  for  legislation  from  the  numerous  lists  of  of- 
ficers, boards,  and  commissions  can  be  carefully  weighed  and  sifted  by  of- 
ficals  charged  with  responsibility  over  a large  field  of  administration  . • 

30  "" 

Cf.  Cleveland  and  buck:  "The  budget  and  Responsible  Government"  p.226. 


* . 


■ 


. 


68 


As  a result  there  is  no  harmonious  legislative  policy  even  formulated;  and 
the  measures  enacted  not  only  lack  coherence,  but  at  times  are  passed  at  the 
same  session  which  contain  directly  contradictory  provisions.”0 

In  conclusion,  two  reports  may  well  be  quoted  as  representative  of  the 

general  conclusions  of  the  Commissions  with  respect  to  the  general  situation 

in  state  administrative  departments  as  they  found  it.  "Under  the  present 

arrangements,"  writed  the  Illinois  Commission,  "while  the  general  public  is 

deluged  with  printed  reports,  it  fails  to  receive  reliable  information  in 

digestible  form  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  state  administration,  and  is  unable 

to  locate  definite  responsibility  for  negligence  or  misconduct  in  public 

business.  Public  opinion  usually  considers  the  Governor  responsible  for  the 

conduct  of  the  State  government;  but  with  the  lack  of  effective  executive 

control  over  the  subordinate  officials  this  opinion  is  not  fully  justified. 

At  the  same  time,  the  popular  conception  of  the  Governor's  responsibility, 

in  the  opinion  of  this  Committee,  is  based  on  a sound  and  just  principle; 

and  the  machinery  of  state  administration  should  be  so  organized  as  to  enable 

32 

this  conception  to  be  adequately  realized." 

"Such  an  inquiry,"  concludes  the  New  York  Commission,  "reveals  at  the 
outset  the  fact  that  we  have  attempted  to  secure  responsible  and  efficient 
government  without  utilizing  the  means  which  are  known  to  be  effective  for 
locating  and  enforcing  responsibility,  and  have  adopted  methods  for  obtain- 
ing efficiency  which  are  repudiated  in  institutions,  both  public  and  private, 
where  efficiency  obtains.  We  have  sacrificed,  perhaps  unwittingly,  honest 

31 

^Illinois  report  p.  22. 

32Ibid.  p.  24. 


* 


. 


69 


and  efficient  government  to  our  fear  of  vesting  power  in  the  hands  of  our 
puolic  offices.  No  business,  public  as  well  as  private,  can  be  successful 
if  those  who  are  in  charge  of  it  are  not  given  powers  commensurate  with  their 
responsibilities.  It  may  be  that  political  expediency  makes  it  desiraDle  to 
create  such  a confusion  of  offices,  terms,  and  authorities  as  to  prevent  any 
person  or  group  from  doing  much  harm  (except  where  a party  organization 
controls  all  of  them  officially).  If  so,  then  the  quest  for  honesty  and  ef- 
ficiency all  through  the  government  is  futile.  Efficiency  depends  upon  the 
possession  of  adequate  authority  with  means  adapted  to  its  effective  ex- 
ercise."33 

Out  of  this  general  appraisement  of  existing  conditions  in  state  exec- 
utive departments,  the  following  enumerated  defects  are  noted  as  significant 
in  that  they  form  the  nucleus  around  which  the  efficiency  reports  were  built 
up: 

(1)  Unnecessary  duplication  of  positions  and  salaries. 

(2)  Lack  of  correlation  and  cooperation  in  the  work  of 
agencies  carrying  on  similar  or  closely  related 
functions. 

(3)  Overlapping  of  functions  even  where  there  is  no 
direct  duplication  of  work. 

(4)  Lack  of  equitable  or  logical  rates  of  compensation. 


70 


(5)  Irregularity  of  reports. 

(6)  Lack  of  effective  supervision  and  control  over  units 
of  related  services  and  over  the  adminstration  as  a 
whole. 

(7)  Lack  of  provisions  for  executive  leadership  in  mat- 
ters of  economy  through  control  of  the  budget. 

(8)  A large  variety  of  methods  of  appointing  administra- 
tive officers  so  that  no  single  agency  can  claim 
complete  authority. 

(9)  Overlapping  terms  in  the  same  commission  or  board, 
so  that  no  new  policies  can  be  speedily  adopted, 

(10)  Diversity  in  methods  of  removal  and  resulting  ir- 
responsibility of  administrative  agencies. 

5.  i*rom  this  analysis  of  exisiting  conditions  and  summary  of  findings, one 
comes  to  that  major  part  of  the  reports  of  commissions  to  find  an  even  great- 
er thoroughness  in  the  constructive  proposals  presented.  After  an  inten- 
sive study  of  municipal  and  national  administration  in  the  United  States, 
those  more  important  and  original  commissions,  Illinois  and  New  York, turned 
to  administrative  organization  in  Great  Britain  and  in  the  principal  govern- 
ments of  the  continent  in  a comparative  search  for  practical  standards.  The 
influence  of  this  study  is  indicated  in  the  statement  of  general  principles 
and  purposes  by  the  Illinois  Commission:  "In  order  to  secure  efficiency 

and  economy  in  the  executive  organization,  the  Committee  proposes  to  apply 


. 


. 


71 

to  the  State  services,  so  far  as  can  be  done  under  the  present  State  constitu- 
tion, the  general  principles  followed  in  the  organization  of  the  executive 
departments  of  the  United  States  Government.  These  principles  are  also  follow- 
ed in  the  administrative  organization  of  all  the  important  governments  in  the 
world,  in  the  recent  plans  for  the  reorganization  of  State  and  municipal  gov- 
ernments  in  this  country,  and  in  large  private  business  enterprises."  The 
most  comprehensive  report  of  a similar  comparative  study  is  that  of  the  New 
York  Commission.  As  a result  of  this  comparative  study,  the  Commission 

devotes  some  100  pages  to  establishing  certain  workable,  desirable  principles 

35 

for  appraisement  of  administration  at  home. 

An  example  of  this  comparative  method  and  of  the  critical  tests  develop- 
ed and  applied  is  its  statement  of  three  objections  to  the  Illinois  Code: 

(1)  "It  (the  code)  fails  to  give  the  governor  or  rather 
his  chief  administrative  officers  full  and  unhampered 
authority  in  the  appointment  of  a number  of  subor- 
dinate officers.  It  is  contrary  to  the  principle  of 
responsibility  to  have  a number  of  subordinate  officers 

o 

appointed  by  the  Governor  with  the  approval  of  the 
Senate.  Such  appointments  should  be  made  by  the  de- 
partment heads  after  consultation  with  the  governor. 

(2)  The  code  does  not  attempt  to  codify  the  existing  laws 
relating  to  administration.  The  old  laws  stand  as 
they  were  before  the  adoption  of  the  code.  Only  the 

34 

Illinois  report  p.  27. 

3 5 

Report  of  the  New  York  Reconstruction  Commission  p.  235. 


* 


. 


- 


72 


agencies  through  which  their  provisions  are  enforced 

36 

have  been  changed. 

(3)  It  is  not  sufficiently  comprehensive.  It  does  not 

include  all  the  administrative  agencies  of  the  State." 

In  conclusion,  however,  the  Commission  observes:  "Even  with  these  short- 

comings, the  Illinois  Administrative  Code  constitutes  the  first  comprehensive 
consolidation  scheme  enacted  into  law.  It  is  a worthy  example  to  other  states 
of  what  can  be  accomplished  by  statutory  means  in  the  bringing  together  of 

scattered  adminstrative  agencies  and  their  integration  into  a real  administra- 
37 

tive  system." 

With  a directness  characteristic  of  the  reports  in  general,  the  toew  York 
Commission  goes  straight  to  the  element  of  expediency  in  the  Illinois  plan 
and  raises  a question  which  must  have  divided  every  such  expert  body  engaged 
in  this  work:  What  considerations  of  expediency  shall  be  permitted  to  modify 

the  logical  administrative  arrangements  developed  in  accordance  with  sound 
principles:  That  the  several  noteworthy  commissions  had  debated  this  point 

is  clearly  evidenced  in  the  preliminary  statement  of  guiding  consderations 
with  which  the  majority  of  the  reports  begin:  "It  seems  advisable,  however, 

to  present  here  some  of  the  general  considerations  underlying  the  proposed 
plan  as  a whole,"  observes  the  Illinois  Committee,  "in  order  to  make  clear 
tne  main  purposes  of  the  Committee  . • • This  general  plan  has  been  prepared 
with  reference  to  the  existing  authorities  and  their  present  powers  and  du- 
ties. There  has  been  no  attempt  to  formulate  an  ideal  scheme  of  State  act- 
ivities, or  to  propose  extensive  changes  in  the  suostantive  law.  . j*'or  the 

36 


Ibid.  p.  258. 


' 


4 * 

* 

■ 


73 


most  part  provision  is  made  for  continuing  the  present  services  under  what  is 
believed  to  be  a more  effective  organization.  Nor  has  a strictly  uniform 
plan  of  organization  been  proposed  for  each  department  or  group  of  services, 
such  as  characterizes  the  French  system  of  administration.  This  might  be 
advisable  in  organizing  an  entirely  new  system;  and  may  be  worthy  of  considera- 
tion at  some  time  in  the  future,  with  the  further  development  of  State  admin- 
istration in  Illinois.  But  some  variations  in  the  organization  for  different 
purposes  seems  better  suited  to  existing  services  and  present  conditions  in 
this  State.  . . From  another  point  of  view,  the  plans  proposed  also  fall 
between  two  possible  extremes.  While  they  call  for  a larger  number  of  impor- 
tant changes,  they  are  not  presented  merely  as  a scheme  for  the  distant 
future.  They  have  been  framed  with  refexmce  to  present  conditions  in  this 

QC 

State;  and  it  is  believed  they  are  adapted  to  prompt  adoption  and  execution."*" 

In  contrast  to  this  position  seems  the  policy  of  the  Ohio  Commission 
indicated  in  its  preliminary  note:  "Considerations  of  expediency  have  been 

a negligible  factor  in  the  formulation  of  the  following  recommendations.  The 
controlling  thought  has  been  to  devise  the  best  possible  plan  of  state  re- 
organization after  careful  consideration  of  all  the  available  facts  bearing 
upon  the  problem."  On  the  other  hand,  the  New  Jersey  Commission  in  recount- 
ing some  of  it 8 difficulties  sets  out  the  eternal  human  element  involved,  of 
which  it  seems  it  wise  to  take  account.  "Whenever  we  have  broached  the  sub- 
ject of  consolidation,  we  have  been  met  by  the  statement  that  it  is  most 
excellent,  that  it  will  result  in  economy  and  that  it  will  promote  effi- 


'Ibid.  p.  259 
3bIllinois  report  p.  32 


• 

' 

. 

. 

• 

• ■ 

. . 

74 


ciency.  Usually,  however,  where  the  person  with  whom  the  discussion  takes 
place  is  a State  official,  while  he  is  loud  in  his  praises  cf  what  can  be 
accomplished  along  such  lines,  he  is,  at  the  same  time,  strong  in  his  denun- 
ciation of  the  application  of  it  to  his  particular  department.  In  other 
words,  many  of  the  departments,  boards,  and  commissions  admit  that,  from  a 
business  standpoint,  it  is  most  admirable,  but  that  it  should  hot  be  applied 
to  them,  as  they  are  most  efficient  in  the  administration  of  their  particular 
department.  As  exempli tying  this  sentiment,  we  have  set  forth  this  abstract 
of  a letter  written  by  a member  of  one  of  the  State  commissions  to  a rep- 
resentative State  civic  organization: 

Dear  Sir:  I am  in  receipt  of  the  notice  from  the  * * * 

informing  me  of  the  conference  that  has  been  called  for 
Tuesday,  December  23rd,  to  consider  the  work  of  the 
Economy  and  Efficiency  Commission.  It  is  a matter  of 
regret  to  me  that  I cannot  attend  the  conference,  but  I 
heartily  concur  in  the  recommendations  of  the  Efficiency 
Commission  for  the  consolidation  of  certain  homogeneous 
departments  and  the  elimination  of  existing  duplication 
of  effort.  However,  I want  to  go  on  record  as  saying 
that  I am  unalterably  opposed  to  any  move  or  recommenda- 
tion that  will  disturb  the  work  of  the  * * * Commission, 
etc.39 

following  the  general  trend  of  the  emphasis  which  the  commissions  seem 
to  place  in  preliminary  statements  on  considerations  of  practicability,  one 

39 

new  Jersey  report  (1914)  p.  15. 


‘ 


' 


. 


■ 


. 

■ 


. 


75 


is  led  to  believe  that  the  experience  of  the  New  Jersey  Commission  was  du- 
plicated v/ith  similar  subsequent  influence  upon  the  reports  made.  Observes 
the  Iowa  Commission:  "We  do  not  enter  upon  the  field  of  speculative  re- 

organization, but  simply  undertake  to  establish  a business  management,  taking 
things  as  we  find  them.  While  the  committee  is  in  sympathy  with  many  of  the 
proposed  theoretical  reforms  in  government,  yet  we  have  not  considered  it  our 
field  to  undertake  to  work  out  any  of  these,  leaving  that  field  to  general 
legislation.  As  a matter  of  fact,  our  work  is  not  in  conflict  with  any  of 
these,  and  is  in  harmony  with  some  of  them,  but  the  reforms  presented  in  this 
report  are  essentially  practical,  not  theoretical,  in  spirit.  We  ask  that 
the  proposed  reforms  suggested  by  the  committee  shall  be  judged  only  by  the 
reports  issued  by  tne  committee  and  the  measures  proposed  to  be  enacted  in- 
to law,  as  there  are  many  things  suggested  in  the  report  of  the  efficiency 
engineers  and  in  the  discussion  of  these  matters  issued  from  other  sources, 
with  which  the  committee  is  not  wholly  in  sympathy  and  there  are  other  sug- 
gestions, while  we  may  have  believed  them  to  be  based  upon  sound  judgment, 
we  have  not  deemed  it  wise  to  attempt  to  include  in  our  recommendations  for 
present  legislation  . . . We  wish  to  keep  before  the  minds  of  the  members  of 
the  Iowa  legislature  the  fact  that  this  committee  is  approaching  the  considers* 
tion  of  these  problems  from  a very  practical  and  conservative  point  of  view. 

It  should  be  pointed  out  in  the  case  of  the  Iowa  commission  that  the  initial 
investigation  and  report  was  conducted  by  a sub-committee  of  experts  whose 
findings  were  the  "dehumanized  expert  recommendations"  of  efficiency  engineers, 
The  California  Taxpayers'  Association  "wishes  it  to  be  understood:  (1)  That 

40 

Iowa  report  (1915)  p.  7. 


• * ' 

. 


76 


this  plan  does  not  involve  the  elimination  of  any  function  now  performed  by 
the  state  government.  The  elimination  or  addition  of  functions  is  a matter 
for  the  legislature  and  the  people.  (2)  This  plan  does  not  eliminate  any 
constitutional  officer  or  board.  The  constitution  should  be  amended  to  do 
so  in  certain  cases,  but  this,  likewise,  is  a matter  for  the  legislature  and 
the  people.  (3)  This  plan,  in  its  entirety,  can  be  adopted  by  the  1919  leg- 
islature, by  statutory  enactment.  There  are  no  constitutional  barriers,  and 

41 

therefore  no  necessities  for  delay."  The  wisdom  of  a body  like  that  of  the 
Taxpayers*  Association,  in  attempting  to  forestall  the  rejection  of  their  own 
plan  by  emphasizing  expediency,  is  better  appreciated  in  the  light  of  the  pol- 
icy of  the  Delaware  mixed  commission:  "The  Survey  Commission  has  not  attempt- 

ed to  follow  the  recommendations  made  by  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal  Re- 
search. The  recommendations  of  that  Bureau,  if  put  into  practice  in  Delaware, 
would  create  an  administrative  cabinet  of  nine  departments  of  State,  the 
heads  of  which  would  be  appointed  by  the  Governor.  It  would  abolish  several 
elective  offices  provided  by  Delaware's  State  Constitution.  The  Survey 
does  not  enter  into  a discussion  of  the  wisdom,  per  se,  of  such  a form  of 
administrative  government  in  the  State  of  Delaware,  but  it  clearly  is  not 
only  inadvisable  but  impossible  at  this  time  to  call  a State  Constitutional 
convention  for  the  purpose  of  considering  the  recommendations  made  by  the 
New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal  Research.  It  is  equally  inadvisable,  from 
the  standpoint  of  practical  results,  to  attempt  to  obtain  the  recommended 
constitutional  changes  through  the  slow  process  of  legislative  proposals  and 
general  elections,  consequently,  no  recommendations  herein  embodied  require 
any  other  action  than  legislative  enactment  to  make  them  effective.  Further- 
more, in  our  opinion,  some  of  the  recommendations  of  the  New  York  Bureau  of 

41  “ ~ ■ " 

California  Taxpayers'  Journal,  January,  1919,  p.  3. 


77 


Municipal  Research  are  not  practical  for  Delaware  at  this  time.  We  do  not 
decry  upholding  the  ideal.  Human  progress  is  accomplished  by  moving  onward 
and  upward  toward  the  ideal;  little  human  progress  is  achieved  by  violently 
discarding  everything  that  is  imperfect  and  attempting  over-night  to  sub- 
stitute the  perfect  or  ideal.  One  is  growth  and  development;  the  other  is 
revolutionary.  Institutions  and  governments  which  have  proved  their  worth 
and  permanency  are  the  results  of  growth  rather  than  evolution.  In  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Survey  Commission  there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  needlessly 
setting  at  defiance  the  traditions  of  a conservative  commonwealth,  or  at- 
tempting to  wrench  from  their  foundations  institutions  which  have  served 
this  commonwealth  for  generations  . • The  recommendations  herewith  suggest 
many  modifications  and  changes,  but  we  do  not  feel  that  anything  herein 
recommended  does  violence  to  any  worthy  tradition  or  calls  for  the  abandon- 
ment of  any  practice  or  method  which  is  honored  by  merit  and  virture  rather 

42 

than  by  time  and  custom." 

In  this  study  of  a representative  reports  of  commissions,  it  will  be 
noted  that  expediency  came  ultimately  to  play  the  dominant  role  in  the  rec- 
ommendations finally  submitted  to  the  legislative  body.  In  other  words,  (1) 
Where  the  purely  expert  body  like  that  of  the  efficiency  engineers  of  Iowa, 
or  the  Bureau  of  National  Research  of  New  York  City  was  guided  in  its  find- 
ings by  objective  investigation  and  analysis  solely,  a mixed  commission  of 
legislators  or  other  government  officials  and  a group  of  representative  lay- 
men, like  that  of  Delaware,  reviewed  and  modified  such  findings  to  meet  the 
political  exigencies  of  the  hour  and  place.  (2)  Where  sub- commit tees  of 
experts  worked  in  close  conjunction  with  the  legislative  or  citizen  commis- 

42 


Delaware  report  (1920)  p.  6 


. 


: 


„ 


» 


. 


78 

mission  itself,  practical  considerations  tended  to  modify  the  recommendations 
of  the  expert  investigators  as  in  the  case  of  Illinois.  (3)  Where  a special 
staff  of  investigators  employed  under  the  direct  supervision  and  control  of 
the  governor  submitted  to  him  a so-called  non-political  report,  the  governor 
himself  reviewed  and  revised  the  findings  on  grounds  of  expediency  before 
transmitting  them  to  the  legislature.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the 
effective  report,  of  that  which  ultimately  reaches  the  legislative  body  tends 
invariably  to  become  the  practical  report,  or  the  report  into  which  there  has 
entered  considerations  of  expediency. 

fc.  However,  much  or  little  the  Commissions  were  influenced  by  considerations 
of  expediency,  none  was  so  committed  one  way  or  the  other  that  it  did  not 
deem  a statement  of  the  general  considerations  which  had  guided  them  indispen- 
sable to  the  precise  understanding  of  its  recommendations.  A general  survey 
of  recommendations  of  the  Commission,  therefore,  quite  properly  must  begin 
with  a study  of  these  guiding  principles.  "It  seems  advisable  at  the  outset," 
notes  the  Illinois  Committee,  "to  present  here  some  of  the  general  considera- 
tions underlying  the  proposed  plan  as  a whole,  in  order  to  make  clear  the  main 
purposes  of  the  Committee.  In  the  first  place  this  comprehensive  scheme  of 
reorganization  has  been  formulated  in  preference  to  a more  limited  plan  deal- 
ing only  with  some  groups  of  offices  and  departments,  in  the  belief  that  the 
general  survey  is  more  likely  to  take  all  factors  into  consideration,  while  a 
partial  study  might  lead  to  proposals  for  the  offices  considered  which  would 
conflict  with  the  best  arrangements  for  other  offices  not  taken  into  considera* 
tion.  In  the  second  place,  this  general  plan  has  been  prepared  with  reference 
to  the  existing  authorities  and  their  present  powers  and  duties.  There  has 

43  *"  * “ T 1 

Cf.  Messages  of  Governors  Hart  and  Groesbeck  of  Washington  and  Michigan 

respectively.  Part  I. 


' t 

i 

, 

, 


• 

■ 

1 

. 

• f 

1 

t 

' 

. 

■ 


— 


79 


been  no  attempt  to  formulate  an  ideal  scheme  of  state  activities,  or  to 
propose  extensive  changes  in  the  substantive  law.  In  some  cases  where  exist- 
ing authorities  seem  to  be  clearly  of  no  value,  their  abolition  is  recommended, 
nut  for  the  most  part  provision  is  made  for  continuing  the  present  servies 
under  what  it  is  believed  to  be  a more  effective  organization.  Nor  has  a 
strictly  uniform  plan  of  organization  been  proposed  for  each  department  or 
group  of  services,  such  as  characterizes  the  trench  system  of  administration. 
The  plans  proposed  include  single  officials  for  some  purposes,  and  boards  or 
commissions  for  others.  The  number  of  boards,  however,  are  much  fewer  at 
present;  and  the  boards  proposed  will  be  either  composed  of  salaried  members 
giving  full  time  to  the  service,  or  of  unpaid  members,  with  a few  cases  of 
ex  officio  membership.  . Nor  does  the  Committee  approve  of  statutory  provisions 
requiring  the  representation  of  more  than  one  party  on  administrative  boards 
and  commissions  ...  The  purpose  of  the  Committee  has  also  been  to  propose 
boards  only  for  functions  where  consultation  and  consideration  of  several  per- 
sons is  advisable;  and  single  officials  are  recommended,  in  all  cases  to  be 
in  charge  of  distinctly  executive  work.  . • From  another  point  of  view,  the 
plans  proposed  also  fall  between  two  possible  extremes.  While  they  call  for 
a large  number  of  important  changes,  they  are  not  presented  merely  as  a scheme 
for  the  distant  future.  They  have  been  framed  with  reference  to  present  condi- 
tions in  this  state;  and  it  is  believed  they  are  adapted  to  prompt  adoption 
44 

and  execution."  In  much  the  same  purpose,  the  New  York  Commission  proposes: 

N(l)  A consolidation  of  all  administrative  departments,  com- 
missions, offices,  boards  and  other  agencies  into  a 
small  number  of  departments,  each  headed  by  a single 

44 


1 


'Illinois  report  pp.  31,32. 


. 


I 


. . 

. , . 


' 

t *>  . 

f 


officer,  except  departments  where  quasi-legislative  and 
quasi- judicial  or  inspectional  and  advisory  functions 
require  a boards* 

(2)  The  adoption  of  the  principle  that  the  governor  is  to  be 
held  responsible  for  good  administration  and  is  to  have 
the  power  to  choose  the  heads  of  departments  who  are  to 
const itutute  his  cabinet  and  who  are  to  be  held  strictly 
accountable  to  him  through  his  power  to  appoint  and  remove 
and  through  his  leadership  in  budget  preparation.  This 
involves  among  other  things  the  reduction  of  the  number 

of  elective  administrative  officers  to  two:  the  governor 

and  auditor. 

(3)  The  extension  of  the  term  of  the  governor  to  four  years 
and  the  careful  adjustment  of  the  terms  of  department 
heads  with  reference  to  the  term  of  the  governor.  Except- 
ing members  of  boards  with  overlapping  terms,  department 
heads  should  have  the  same  term  as  the  governor. 

(4)  The  grouping  of  related  offices  and  work  in  each  of  the 
several  departments  into  appropriate  divisions  and  bu- 
reaus, responsibility  for  each  branch  of  work  to  be 
centralized  in  an  accountable  chief. 

(5)  A budget  system  vesting  in  the  governor  the  full  respon- 
sibility for  presenting  to  the  legislature  each  year  a 
consolidated  budget  containing  all  expenditures  which 


• ''11? 


« 

* 


. 


, 


1 


. 


. 


■ 


■ 


81 


in  his  opinion  should  be  undertaken  by  the  state,  and 
a proposed  plan  for  obtaining  the  necessary  revenues— 
such  a budget  to  represent  the  work  of  the  governor  and 
his  cabinet* 

"In  case  a system  is  adopted  which  provides  for  a responsible  executive,'* 
note 3 the  New  York  Commission  in  this  connection,  "the  chief  executive  should 
be  provided  with  the  following  machinery: 

(a)  An  executive  officer  or  personnel  for  receiving  reports, 
issuing  orders,  and  handling  the  routine  work  of  the 
chief  executive* 

(b)  An  executive  council  or  cabinet  made  up  of  specialized 
vice-governors  or  heads  of  functionally  related  admin- 
istrative groups  who  will  serve  as  'line'  advisers. 

(c)  'Staff'  agencies  so  organized  and  related  to  the  chief 
executive  that  he  may  refer  any  question,  for  inquiry 
and  report,  to  a detached  expert  or  professional  per- 
sonnel who  may  also  be  relied  on  for  preparation  or 
review  of  the  budget  and  other  proposals  which  are  to 
go  before  the  legislature*" 

The  Iowa  Commission  states  as  the  three  elements  of  its  plan  of  reorgan- 
ization: efficiency,  economy,  and  the  fixing  of  responsibility  for  the  pur- 

46 

pose  of  making  the  government  more  responsive  to  the  will  of  the  people. 

With  each  bill  submitted  there  was  a brief  explanation  making  clear  of  the 

45 

New  York  Reconstruction  uommission  report  (1919)  p.  11. 


, 


. 


. 


82 


application  of  the  foregoing  principle.  In  its  initial  summary  of  recommenda- 
tions, the  Oregon  Commission  proposes  (1)  That  th6  governor  appoint  all  heads 
of  state  administrative  departments  under  reorganized  and  consolidated  admin- 
istration. (2)  That  in  making  appointments  the  governor  be  privileged  to  act 
in  all  cases  without  confirmation  by  the  Senate.  (3)  That  all  minor  officers 
be  chosen  under  civil  service  regulations.  (4)  That  the  governor  be  relieved 
of  membership  on  all  state  boards  except  constitutional  boards.  "In  setting 
forth  the  reorganization  plan,"  reports  the  California  Taxpayers'  Association, 
"the  Association  has  recognized  and  sought  to  apply  the  following  principles: 

(1)  Departments  having  to  deal  largely  with  matters  of  policy  should  be 
controlled  by  boards,  in  order  to  insure  the  application  of  group  judgment. 

(2)  Departments  dealing  with  administrative  and  executive  functions  should  be 
under  the  direction  of  a single  head, in  order  the  better  to  centralize  respon- 
sibility for  performance  of  function.  (3)  Policy-making  departments  controlled 
by  boards  should  be  divisionally-organized,  so  as  to  centralize,  in  division 
heads,  responsibility  for  the  performance  of  functions.  (4)  Boards  presiding 
over  policy-determining  departments  should  consist  of  the  heads  of  the  respect- 
ive divisions  falling  within  such  departments.  The  heads  of  divisions  are  famil 
iar  with  the  practical  phases  of  departmental  work,  and  themselves  direct  it. 
Their  value,  therefore,  as  members  of  a department  board  is  increased.  There  is 
no  necessity  for  the  appointment  of  boards  otherwise  constituted,  as  they  tend 
toward  confusion,  interference  and  loss  of  responsibility,  and  also  increase 

of  pay  roll.  (5)  All  department  heads  and  chiefs  of  divisions  should  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  and  be  directly  responsible  to  him.  Under  the  Con- 

4_Iowa  report  (1914)  p.  5. 

'Oregon  report  p.  11. 


, 


'■ 

. 

. 

„ 


, 

■ 

. 

• ■ 


BBC  * • - 


! . 


( 

’ 


■ 


83 

stitution  there  are  a number  of  elective  officers.  These  have  been  placed  at 

the  heads  of  appropriate  divisions.  The  matter  of  amending  the  constitution, 

with  respect  to  such  officers,  is  a matter  for  determination  in  the  future. 

48 

It  rests  with  the  legislature  and  the  people.  Special  interest  attaches  it- 
self to  the  report  of  the  California  commission  when  compared  with  that  of  the 
Taxpayers*  agency.  "The  important  features  of  the  recommended  plan  of  re- 
organization," reads  the  California  Commission  report,  "are  the  establishment 
of  certain  principles  which  are  essential  to  efficient  governmental  management. 
These  are:  (1)  centralization  of  responsibility.  (2)  Co-opex’ation  of  the 

larger  organization  units.  (3)  Co-ordination  of  agencies  which  perform  sim- 
ilar or  allied  functions.  These  principles  have  been  carried  into  the  proposed 
plan  by:  (1)  The  creation  of  a governor's  cabinet,  composed  of  departmental 

executives  appointed  by  him.  (2)  Insuring  co-operation  of  various  departments 
by  bringing  their  administrative  officers  together  in  an  executive  council. 

(3)  Placing  in  departments,  under  one  executive  head,  those  agencies  which 
perform  similar  or  allied  functions.  The  departmental  units  created  are  suffi- 
ciently comprehensive  to  include  such  agencies  as  may  from  time  to  time  be 
established,  because  of  the  great  diversity  in  the  nature  of  the  state's 

activities  the  committee  has  found  it  impracticable  to  correlate  all  of  them 

49 

into  larger  administrative  units." 

Compared  with  these  earlier  reports,  one  of  the  most  recent,  that  of  Ohio 
Commission  has  special  significance.  "In  formulating  the  plan  for  reorganiz- 
ing the  state  government,  the  following  principles  have  been  followed: 

(1)  The  governor,  who  is  elected  by  the  people,  would  be 


48 

California  Taxpayers*  Journal,  January,  1919,  p.  4. 
^California  report  (1919)  p.  7. 


* 


• t • 


• • 

. 


' 

* 


. . . 


, 


• * 


* 

. . 

. . 


84 


the  responsible  head  of  the  state  government  and  would 
possess  power  and  authority  commensurate  with  his  respon- 
sibility. The  term  of  the  governor  would  be  extended 
from  two  to  four  years  and  all  department  heads  would 
have  the  same  term  as  governor  except  members  of  boards 
with  overlapping  terms* 

(2)  The  auditor,  who  is  also  elected  by  the  people,  would 
constitute  a continuing  check  upon  the  work  of  the 
governor  and  his  subordinates.  The  investigations  of 
the  auditor  would  include  not  only  financial  audits, 
but  criticisms  of  operation  and  results. 

(3)  Departments  and  boards  performing  work  of  a similar 
or  related  character  would  be  grouped  together  into  a 
major  department;  the  various  functions  would  constitute 
bureaus  or  divisions  operated  under  an  accountable  chief 
who  would  report  to  the  head  of  the  department.  The  de- 
partment head  would  be  directly  responsible  to  the  gov- 
ernor. 

(4)  Departments  having  to  do  largely  with  matters  of  policy 
would  be  controlled  by  boards  in  order  to  insure  the 
application  of  group  judgment,  boards  would  be  retained 
for  the  health  department,  industrial  commission,  public 
utilities  commissions,  and  state  board  of  welfare.  The 
following  methods  are  outlined  for  making  the  governor 
the  responsible  head  of  the  state  government  in  fact 


' 


, , 


85 


as  well  as  in  name: 

(1)  All  department  heads  would  be  appointed  by 
the  governor  and  be  directly  responsiole 
to  him  without  confirmation  of  the  senate. 

This  involves  an  amendment  to  the  constitu- 
tion permitting  the  appointment  of  the  sec- 
retary of  state,  attorney-general,  and 
treasurer,  by  the  governor. 

(2)  A reduction  in  the  number  of  independent 
departments,  offices,  boards,  and  commissions 
is  recommended.  The  numoer  of  elective  of- 
fices would  be  reduced  from  six  to  three  and 
the  activities  now  performed  by  thirty- six 
independent  boards  and  commissions  would  be 
combined  into  thirteen  major  departments.  The 
governor  could  be  relieved  of  the  necessity 
of  supervising  and  coordinating  the  work  of 
thirty- six  departments,  staff  meetings  of 
department  heads  would  become  possible  and 

by  this  method,  he  could  obtain  a bird's-eye 

50 

view  of  all  the  state's  activities." 

The  Minnesota  commission  set  forth  three  subjects:  administrative 

consolidation,  the  merit  system,  and  the  adoption  of  a budget.  A few  special 
functions  were  to  be  performed  by  the  administrative  agencies  outside  the  six 
executive  departments  estaolished,  such  as  the  civil  Service  Commission  and 


86 


the  Tax  commission.  The  constitutional  officers  were  not  affected  by  the  re- 
organization plan.  There  were  two  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  that  there 
shall  be  a single  head  of  each  department  appointed  by  the  governor:  finance 

and  education*  In  the  former  case  the  treasurer,  who  is  a constitutional 
officer  elected  by  the  people,  was  to  be  made  acting  head  of  the  department. 

In  the  latter  case,  the  commission  recommended  two  boards,  the  Regents  of  the 
University  and  the  new  board  of  Education,  the  latter  to  have  charge  of  all 
other  state  educational  work.  The  Commission  claimed  that  in  recommending 
this  form  of  organization  it  was  following  the  general  practice  or  custom  of 
treating  education  as  independent  of  other  functions  of  government*  The  direct- 
ors of  departments  were  to  hold  office  at  the  pleasure  of  the  governor  and  to 
be  responsible  to  him  for  the  conduct  of  their  departments,  and  were  to  consti- 
tute the  permanent  staff.  Advisory  boards  were  attached  to  the  departments  of 
labor  and  commerce,  public  domain,  welfare  and  agriculture.  These  were  to  be 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  overlapping  terms.  * 

The  Delaware  Commission  because  of  the  peculiar  condition  in  that  state 
where  fifty-four  boards  and  commissions  were  exercising  administrative  powers, 
indicated  a general  principle  for  reorganization  in  an  initial  four-fold  crit- 
icism of  the  board  system: 

(1)  boards  seldom  show  any  real  initiative,  and  therefore 
business-like  leadership  in  improving  service  is  not 
to  be  expected  from  them.  They  are  a check  upon  good 
work,  not  a spur  to  invention  and  activity. 

(2)  In  addition  to  being  a drag  upon  administration,  boards 

■ ■ — I ■ i— 1 ■■  — m 

j^Ohio  report  (1920)  p.  7. 

^Minnesota  report  (1917)  p.  9. 


* 


* 


. 

" 


■ 

. 

. 


* 

. . 


87 


and  commissions  are  so  constructed  that  definite 
responsibility  for  action  or  inaction  cannot  be 
located.  In  fact,  board  government  in  general  may 
be  regarded  as  a clever  means  of  escaping  account- 
ability and  consequently  criticism  or  blame,  hence 
the  board  system  appeals  particularly  to  a certain 
class  of  administrative  officials  vho  wish  to  shift 
responsibility  from  themselves. 

(3)  The  board  system  tends  to  delay  and  inefficiency. 

Boards,  meeting  as  they  do  only  periodically,  can- 
not exercise  effective  supervision  and  control. 

(4)  In  addition  to  its  inherent  defects,  the  board 
system  of  Delaware  is  so  organized  as  to  deprive 
the  governor  of  the  control  which  he  must  have  if 
he  is  to  be  responsible  for  the  state's  business. 

The  board  members  usually  have  overlapping  terms, 
hence  each  governor  may  appoint  only  a minority. 

Each  board  is  therefore  a government  within  it- 
self. 

In  concluding,  they  observe  that  boards  can  be  justified  only  when  they 
function  in  a quasi- judicial,  quasi-legislative,  or  advisory  capacity.  Ad- 
ministration or  the  execution  of  policies  should  not  be  entrusted  to  boards. 
It  should  be  done  by  individuals  and  not  by  boards.  The  Commission  then 
offers  the  following  suggestions  for  reorganization: 


. 

. 


' f 


88 


•*(1)  The  governor  should  be  the  only  elective  administra- 
tive officer  in  the  state  government. 

(2)  The  governor  should  have  the  sole  power  to  appoint 
and  remove  all  executive  officers.  To  require  the 
consent  of  the  senate  is  to  make  this  power  condi- 
tional and  to  permit  responsibility  to  be  shifted. 

(3)  The  responsibility  for  preparing  the  budget  of  the 
state  should  be  placed  squarely  on  the  governor. 

(4)  The  office  of  lieutenant-governor  should  be  abolished. 

except  in  the  case  of  succession  to  the  governorship  • 

. . the  lieutenant-governor  plays  an  insignificant 

role  in  Delaware.  The  senate  should  choose  its  own 

presiding  office  . • • The  secretary  of  state  might 

well  be  designated  governor  in  case  that  office  should 
52 

become  vacant.” 

The  tendency  to  uniformity  in  basic  proposals  of  the  several  types  of 
commissions  is  borne  out  by  the  following  citation  from  the  Maryland  report 
(1921)  prepared  by  a private  firm  of  efficiency  engineers.  "The  plan  rests 
in  part  in  the  short  ballot  principle  in  that  it  proposes  a reduction  in  the 
number  of  elective  officials  . • • Kach  major  department  is  to  be  made  up  of 
one  or  more  bureaus  and  an  administrative  office.  The  latter  would  concen- 
trate the  administrative  work  of  the  department  as  a whole  and  would  have 
general  control  over  the  preparation  of  departmental  estimates,  and  over- 

52 

Delaware  report  ^1920)  p.  14. 


* 


. . . 

‘ 

. 


' 


89 


expenditures,  cost  accounting,  and  reports.  The  principle  policy-determin- 
ing and  administrative  officer  for  each  department  would  be  a 'director'  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  and  removable  at  pleasure.  The  eleven  directors 
would  all  be  members  of  the  governor's  cabinet  . . . There  would  be  one  or 
more  'permanent'  executive  officers  in  each  department,  one  at  the  head  of 
each  bureau  ...  In  conjunction  with  the  eleven  executive  departments  and 
the  independent  auditing  office  it  is  proposed  to  establish  certain  advisory 
boards  or  councils  whose  function  it  would  be  to  advise  administrative  of- 
ficials and  to  assist  in  the  formulation  of  policies.  Each  of  these  boards 
would  be  an  integral  part  of  a departmental  organization,  but  it  is  not  in- 
tended that  it  should  have  active  part  in  administration.  It  should  serve 
a useful  purpose,  however,  in  situations  where  the  judgment  of  more  than  one 
person  is  valuable,  and  where  the  opinions  of  representatives  of  the  general 
public  would  tend  to  assure  the  government  of  the  soundness  of  a given 
proposal.  Positions  on  such  boards  would  be  non-remunerative."  The  Commis- 
sion then  recommends  with  reference  to  these  boards  that  they  be  placed  in 
the  departments  of  finance,  welfare,  health,  education,  commerce,  labor, 
employment  and  registration.^ 

The  most  recent  recommendation  relating  to  general  principles  underly- 
ing administrative  reorganization  is  sections  41-48  of  the  "Model  State  Con- 
stitution" mentioned  in  another  place.  In  general,  the  provisions  are  based 
on  the  principle  of  concentrated  executive  power  as  found  in  the  national 
constitution.  By  the  provisions  of  the  "model"  instrument,  the  executive 
power  of  the  state  shall  be  vested  in  a governor,  elected  for  a term  of  four 
years.  He  is  to  appoint  and  remove  heads  of  all  executive  departments,  and 

5 3 ’ ' ‘ 

Report  in  The  Organization  and  Administration  of  the  State  Government , 


, 


90 

all  other  officers  and  employees  in  the  executive  service  are  to  be  appointed 
by  the  governor  or  by  heads  of  executive  departments  as  may  be  provided  by 
law.  section  47  attempts  to  secure  a close  relationship  between  legislature 
and  governor  by  providing  that  Mthe  governor  and  heads  of  executive  depart- 
ments shall  be  entitled  to  seats  in  the  legislature , may  introduce  bills 

54 

therein,  and  take  part  in  the  discussion  of  measures,  but  shall  not  vote.** 

The  preliminary  statements  by  the  commissions  of  underlying  principles, 
therefore,  show  that  the  one  basic  consideration  is  the  status  of  the  gover- 
nor. In  a word,  an  explanation  of  a plan  for  reorganizing  state  government 
invariably  includes,  as  that  of  the  Ohio  report,  an  outline  of  methods  for 
"making  the  governor  the  responsible  head  of  the  state  government  in  fact  as 
well  as  in  name.'*  In  the  whole  series  of  reports  where  preliminary  state- 
ments of  aims  appear,  not  a single  exception  was  to  be  found  to  this  rule 
wherever  the  recommendations  of  specialists  had  been  incorporated  in  whole  or 
in  part,  common  to  all  of  them  is  the  adoption  at  the  outset  of  the  principle 
that  the  governor  is  to  be  held  responsible  for  the  administration  of  the 
state.  In  other  words,  to  design  a strong,  sole,  executive  leadership— *'a 
leadership  within  the  government  which  could  be  effective  for  directing  and 
improving  the  public  service  and  at  the  same  time  could  be  reached  and 
controlled  by  the  electorate  and  their  representatives  through  their  cons- 
titutional power  to  control  the  purse"— seems  the  manifest  intent  of  this 
part  of  the  reorganization  scheme. 

Reduced  to  working  principles,  the  general  provisions  of  the  reports  ae 
they  relate  to  the  new  status  of  the  governor  may  be  expressed  as  follows: 

Maryland,  crif fenhagen  and  Associates,  ctd.  Chicago,  April  15,  1921, 

54P*  25# 

"Progress  Report  on  a Model  State  Constitution"  by  the  Committee  on 


‘ 

* 


« 


' 


. 


. 


' 


; I I o 1 

. 


* 


91 


(1)  no  officer  should  be  elected  whose  powers  and  duties 
do  not  make  him  important  enough  to  attract  and  secure 
intensive  and  extensive  popular  interest,  concern, and 
scrutiny. 

(2)  Only  those  officers  should  be  elected  who  have  the 
power  to  decide  important  questions  of  policy  or  who 
are  expected  to  assume  leadership  in  the  formulation 
and  execution  of  governmental  programs. 

(3)  The  number  of  officers  elected  at  any  one  time  should 
be  so  limited  that  the  policies  and  merits  of  each 
may  receive  adequate  and  effective  scrutiny  by  the 
voters. 

(4)  The  number  of  administrative  departments  should  be 
reduced  to  the  smallest  number  consistent  with  the 
general  lines  of  functional  grouping  to  secure 

a-Effective  supervision. 
b-A  Cabinet  not  too  large  for 
consultation  purposes. 

(5)  single  heads  appointed  by  the  governor  should  be 
charged  with  the  administrative  work  of  the  several 
departments. 

(6)  Boards  ought  not  to  be  charged  with  administrative 
duties. 


State  Government  for  the  National  Municipal  League  (1921)  p.  8. 


92 


(7)  Boards  consisting  of  members  having  experience  in 
work  of  departments  to  which  they  are  attached  may 
be  logically  assigned  for  advisory  or  for  quasi- 
legislative  and  quasi- judicial  functions  in  such 
departments  as  Agriculture,  Public  Works,  Public 
Welfare,  Public  Health,  and  Education* 

(8)  Terms  of  department  heads  or  other  administrative 
officers  with  discretionary  powers  should  coincide 
with  that  of  the  governor* 

(9)  Bureau  and  division  heads  should  be  appointed  by 
the  governor  or  heads  of  departments. 

(lOj  A responsible  chief  executive  should  be  provided 
with  the  following  staff  machinery: 

a- An  executive  officer  or  personnel  for 
receiving  reports,  and  handling  routine 
work. 

b-A  Cabinet  for  consultation, 
c-cetached  staff  experts  or  professional 
personnel* 

7 One  of  the  most  significant  of  the  more  recent  tendencies  in  reorganiza- 
tion disclosed  by  the  Commissions  is  the  new  emphasis  on  the  functional  unit 
as  a basis  for  reorganization.  Indeed,  the  California  Taxpayers’  Association 
Committee,  to  whose  report  we  have  already  referred,  takes  pains  to  observe 
in  the  introductory  statement  of  their  own  plan,  that  "so  far  as  the  Associa- 


93 


tion  is  aware,  no  plan  of  reorganization,  in  any  state,  has  heretofore  been 
worked  out  on  the  basis  of  th6  functional  unit."  The  new  emphasis  made  in 
their  distinctly  functional  reorganization  is  indicated  in  a comment  which 
follows:  "In  the  absence  of  such  a base,  no  exact  and  thorough  coordination, 

eliminating  all  conflicts  and  duplications  is  possible. 

The  Association,  however,  is  not  wholly  accurate.  In  Chapter  IA  of  the 
Report  of  the  New  York  state  constitutional  convention  commission  (1915)  a 
proposal  for  reorganization  of  the  administration  proper  is  preceded  by  a 
functional  classification  which  forms  the  basis  of  a logical  correlation  of 
activities  in  departments  as  well  as  a correlation  of  activities  and  of  the 
agencies  which  carry  them  into  effect.  The  N6w  York  report  begins  with  a 
precise  definition  of  administration  as  distinguished  from  politics.  "The 
word  ’administration*  is  from  a Latin  verb,  which  means  to  manage,  to  ex- 
ecute. Management  has  to  do  with  the  preparation,  submission,  approval, and 
execution  of  plans.  In  a representative  system  the  board  is  a part  of  manage- 
ment to  the  extent  that  its  approval  is  necessary.  Otherwise  management  is 
primarily  an  executive  function.  The  problems  of  management  fall  into  two 
general  classes  corresponding  to  functions  or  activities  of  similar  char- 
acter, Yiz.:  (1)  those  which  have  to  do  with  the  state  or  other  institution 

acting  as  a proprietor— activities  of  a kind  that  must  be  carried  on  no  mat- 

ter how  extensive  its  functions;  (2)  those  functions  or  activities  in  the 
nature  of  services  rendered  to  the  public— things  done  in  carrying  out  the 

purposes  for  which  the  institution  exists.  The  first  of  these  will  herein- 

after be  referred  to  as  proprietary  functions;  the  second  will  be  called  in 

55  , - . —~ 

oalifornia  Taxpayers*  Journal,  January,  1919,  p.  1. 


' 


, 

« 

• ■ 

. 


. 


» 


94 


contradistinction  public  service  functions.  Each  institution  has  its  own 
purpose  and  an  organization  and  technique  developed  or  to  be  developed  suit- 
ed to  its  work.  Among  the  common  proprietary  functions  or  groups  of  activ- 
ities are  these: 

(1)  Obtaining  and  caring  for  the  funds  required,  whether 
raised  as  revenue  or  by  borrowing* 

(2)  The  employing  and  caring  for  the  personnel  needed  on 
the  enterprise* 

(3)  Acquiring  and  caring  for  the  supplies  and  equipment 
and  properties  required  to  make  the  personnel  effect- 
ive. 

(4)  Paying  the  debts  and  current  obligations  of  the  govern- 
ment* 

The  public  service  functions  differ  with  each  institution  or  enterprise* 
Those  which  are  carried  on  by  the  government  of  the  state  may  be  grouped  as 
follows: 

(1)  Military  protection. 

(2)  Promotion  of  public  education,  art,  science,  and 
recreation* 

(3)  Construction,  operation,  and  maintenance  of  public 

worke. 

(4)  Promotion  of  public  health  and  safety. 


95 


(5)  Regulation  of  puolic  service  corporations. 

(6)  Promotion  of  agriculture  and  industry. 

(7)  Protection  and  promotion  of  the  interests  of 
laDor. 

(8)  care  and  education  of  the  dependent,  defective, 

56 

and  delinquent  classes.*4 

Mere  follows  tabulated  considerations  under  general  heads:  “General 
Requirements  of  Organization  for  Administration, M "Principles  Governing  De- 
termination as  to  Whether  Executive  uontrol  Should  be  centralized,"  "Applica- 

57 

tion  of  General  Principles  to  functional  Groups.*4 

functional  organization,  therefore,  was  a basic  consideration  in  the 
more  comprehensive  reports,  of  which  the  New  York  findings  are  a fair  example, 
a number  of  years  before  the  publication  of  the  Taxpayers’  plan.  Furthermore, 
the  Association,  notes:  "It  has  been  rather  common,  in  re-organization  enter- 

prises heretofore  undertaken  by  states  and  municipalities  to  group  officers, 
boards,  etc.  which  perform  similar  or  somewhat  similar  functions;  or  officers, 
boards,  etc.  whose  main  functions  are  similar;  or  to  eliminate  existing 
boards,  officers,  etc.  by  transferring  their  functions  in  their  entirety  to 
this  or  that  group  or  department.  Such  work  is  regarded  as  a ’functional 
reorganization;*  but,  as  a matter  of  fact,  it  is  not  fundamentally  functional, 
because  it  does  not  deal  with  the  individual  function  as  the  unit.  (Italics 
their  ©wn)i°C  Again  the  Association  falls  into  error  by  too  sweeping  a gen- 
eralization as  the  careful  analysis  of  the  recent  reorganization  measures  in 

56wew  York  constitutional  commission  report  (1915)  p.  39. 


I t 


' 


• 

' 

' 

► 

- 

• 

. 


••• 


96 


the  states  vill  show. 

What  is  this  functional  principle  they  claim  to  have  evolved!  We  give 

their  own  statement:  “The  acceptance  of  each  individual  function  performed 

as  a unit  means  that  the  reorganization  which  follows  will  of  necessity  be 

fundamental  and  complete.  The  first  operation  called  for  by  the  acceptance 

of  this  standard  is  a logical  arrangement  of  the  individual  functions  to  be 

performed  by  the  state.  The  next  step  is  to  determine  the  existing  agencies 

performing  these  functions  and  the  exact  powers  or  duties  imposed  upon  them 

by  the  legislature  in  each  instance.  . The  third  operation  calls  for  the 

transfer,  or  distribution  of  each  function  properly  classified,  into  a re- 

59 

organization,  uomplete  reorganization  is  the  result. M 

otill  another  inaccuracy,  or  better,  over- statement  of  the  Association 
should  be  pointed  out.  complete  coordination  is  never  the  result  of  reorgan- 
ization on  a functional  basis.  Such  reorganization  can  hope  only  to  approx- 
imate “complete  coordination.”  There  is  always  the  difficulty,  for  example, 
of  definitely  assigning  the  several  phases  of  educational  administration: 
agricultural,  vocational,  sub-normal,  etc.  Shall  agricultural  education  be 
assigned  to  the  agriculture  department  or  to  the  department  of  education! 
what  aoout  the  claim  of  the  labor  department  for  control  of  certain  aspects 
of  vocational  training;  of  the  welfare  department  to  certain  phases  of  sub- 
normal education!  what  about  the  function  of  registering  and  licensing  the 
professions:  Are  these  matters  for  the  education  department  to  administer 

as  in  Illinois,  or  for  a law  enforcement  department  as  in  Idaho!  Shall  all 

j?glbid.  pp.  9C-93. 

^California  Taxpayers*  report,  p.  4. 

59Ibid.  p.  5. 


’ 


. 

. 


1 


* 


. 


, . . 


97 


public  buildings  be  constructed  and  cared  for  by  the  department  of  works,  or 
by  the  several  departments  for  whose  purposes  they  must  be  carefully  designed? 
Shall  inspection  agencies  be  directed  under  a separate  department,  or  shall 
the  labor  inspectors  be  identified  with  the  labor  departments?  In  this  connec- 
tion  where  will  you  locate  the  factory  inspectors  between  the  rival  claims  of 
labor  and  commerce  and  law  enforcement  departments?  The  functional  basis  per- 
haps serves  the  best  of  all  bases  of  reorganisation,  but  it  still  remains  very 
difficult  to  get  a scheme  of  logical  arrangement  of  departments  with  a special, 
exclusive  field  for  each. 

With  these  limitations  in  mind,  the  search  for  such  general  functional 
classi ficiation  in  the  reports  of  uommissions  should  preclude  any  hasty  assump- 
tion as  to  what  the  results  will  show. 

A comparison  of  the  New  York  and  the  Taxpayers1  functional  classification 
shows  that  whereas  the  former  made  a two-fold  general  classification  under 
proprietary  and  public  service  functions,  the  latter  names  them  protective  and 
constructive  functions,  noth  include  fiscal,  executory,  and  clerical  activi- 
ties under  the  first,  but  the  Taxpayers'  plan  goes  further  and  includes  under 
the  same  head  those  public  welfare,  public  health,  commerce,  and  charitable 
functions  which  the  New  York  plan  classifies  under  public  service.  Under  the 
head,  constructive,  the  Taxpayers*  plan  lists  natural  resources,  including 
agriculture,  viticulture,  horticulture,  animal  industries,  mineral  resources, 
marine,  harbors  and  rivers,  highways,  utilities,  and  buildings:  reclamatory: 
drainage  and  irrigation;  and  educational:  scholastic  and  vocational,  li- 
braries, museums,  institutes,  lectures,  publications,  and  expositions.  In  the 
New  York  classification,  these  "constructive"  functions  are  listed  under  pub- 


n v 

' < ■ 


* 

. 

- 


98 


lie  services*  In  brief,  the  New  York  classification  presents:  (1)  the  state 
equipping  itself  for  service  and  (2)  the  state  doing  the  things  which  contrib- 
ute to  the  welfare  of  citizens.  In  other  words,  it  distinguishes  between  those 
activities  that  constitute  the  business  side  of  public  enterprise— the  govern- 
ment as  proprietor,  and  the  services,  themselves,  which  it  renders.  The  Tax- 
payers' grouping,  on  the  other  hand,  makes  no  such  distinction;  it  considers 
ail  activities  of  the  government  services  and  classifies  them  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  services  rendered. 

The  distinction  becomes  significant  when  functional  groups  are  depart- 
mentalized. The  New  York  Commission  points  out  the  inherently  business  qual- 
ity of  the  proprietary  activities  of  government  and  deduces  from  prevailing 
business  practice  the  principle  of  single-headed  administration  and  strict 
accountability  in  administration.  It  follows,  therefore: 

"(1)  There  should  be  central  executive  or  administrative 
control  over  the  functions  of  money-raising  where- 
ever  and  to  the  extent  that  the  same  revenue— paying 
or  money-lending  constituency— is  to  be  dealt  with." 

(2)  The  purchase  and  custody  of  supplies  and  equipment 
should  oe  centrally  controlled. 

(3)  Central  control  over  disbursements  is  advantageous— 
whether  operated  under  a centralized  or  a decentralized 
system  of  administration. 

(4)  There  should  be  central  control  over  the  employment  and 
improvement  of  the  personnel  of  public  service.6® 


. 

<• 


. • 


' 

► 


. 


. 


. 


. 

. 


' 


. 


' 


99 

In  other  words,  all  the  proprietary  functions  of  government  should  be 
under  the  direct  control  of  a single  executive,  and  all  functional  units  with- 
in the  proprietary  department  should  likewise  be  centrally  controlled  by  bu- 
reau or  division  chiefs  appointed  by  the  chief  executive.  Such  a principle 
precludes  the  usual  elective  officers:  secretary  of  state,  treasurer,  attor- 

ney-general, etc.  “Unless  the  secretary  of  state  is  restored  to  the  position 
of  secretary  to  the  governor  (as  in  colonial  days)  and  made  his  appointee, 
removable  at  will,  the  only  excuse  for  retaining  the  office  as  a separate  de- 
partment, would  be  to  make  the  secretary  the  head  of  the  proprietary  group. 

The  present  working  relation  of  the  office  of  secretary  of  state  has  about 

the  same  significance  and  relative  importance  as  the  vermiform  appendix  in 
61 

the  human  body.  • • either  the  treasurer  should  be  given  executive  duties 
which  correspond  roughly  to  the  headship  of  a department  covering  every  phase 
of  administration  of  the  proprietorship  which  is  to  be  centrally  controlled, 
or  he  should  be  reduced  to  the  position  of  a 'technical'  head  of  a treasury 
bureau  in  a proprietary  branch  of  the  service."  . • If  the  provision  is  made 
that  the  governor  shall  be  the  responsible  head  of  the  administration,  the 
assumption  that  the  treasurer  should  be  independent  fails  . • . mrther  con- 
firmation of  this  conclusion  is  found  in  the  fact  that  this  is  the  original 

relation  of  the  treasurer  in  every  existing  government  which  provides  for  a 

62 

responsible  chief  executive.  In  a special  chapter,  the  commission  deals 
with  the  desired  status  of  the  comptroller  as  a purely  audit  officer  outside 
the  administration.  "One  of  the  prime  reasons  for  the  establishment  of  rep- 
resentative government  was  to  call  the  executive  to  account  for  expenditures.  • 

^^wew  York  constitutional  commission  report,  p.  97. 

6Jlbid.  p.  109. 

62Ibid.  p.  88. 


. 

■ 


. . . 

( 

- 


...  ' 


• • 


, 


. 


. 


• * 

. - 


loo 


In  some  countries  the  king  or  his  immediate  representatives  are  required  to 
appear  personally  and  make  the  statement  with  respect  to  expenditures  under 
past  authorizations  by  the  legislative  body  (audit  by  the  legislative  body  as 
a whole)  . • . The  next  step  • • was  the  appointment  of  an  auditing  committee 
. • A third  step  was  the  creation  of  an  auditing  department  or  office,  which 
was  made  independent  of  the  executive  • • The  independent  auditor  came  to  be 
a comptroller  of  expenditures— a person  who  was  in  a position  to  prevent  ir- 
regularity and  losses  due  to  discoverable  neglect  or  attempted  diversion  .... 

At  the  present  time  v/e  have  an  auditing  office,  established  as  a part  of  the 
const itututional  machinery  for  fixing  and  enforcing  administrative  respon- 
sibility, and  yet  laboring  under  administrative  duties  assigned  to  it  by 
statute,  the  effect  of  which  is  to  destroy  the  disinterestedness  of  its 
audit  and  verification.  Th6  author  as  an  instrument  for  enforcing  respon- 
sibility has  had  turned  over  to  him  by  an  irresponsible  representative  gov- 
ernment the  very  autocratic  powers  that  the  representative  system  was  estab- 
lished  to  correct,  when  these  powers  were  exercised  by  the  executive. **  The 
Commission  concludes:  "It  is  essBntial  that  the  comptroller,  as  the  auditor- 

general  of  the  state  be  set  aside  and  entirely  isolated  so  that  pressure  may 

not  be  brought  to  bear  upon  him  to  permit  the  office  of  the  audit  to  be  used 

63 

for  ends  that  are  inconsistent  with  its  underlying  purpose." 

With  no  specific  reference  to  general  functional  principles  involved, 
the  Illinois  commission,  nevertheless,  observes  much  the  same  logical  correla- 
ting of  fiscal  administration  as  that  of  New  York.  The  one  exception,  and  a 
generally  criticised  one,  is  the  recommendation  of  a comprehensive  state 
department  of  finance  under  the  general  supervision  of  a state  finance  commis- 

63Ibid.  p.  89. 


- 


101 

sion.  "This  form  of  organization,"  the  commission  explains,  "is  proposed  so 
as  to  emurace  the  constitutional  elective  officers  in  the  general  system; 
while  by  this  method  there  is  also  given  recognition  to  the  opinion  held  by 
some,  that  the  final  authority  in  such  matters  should  not  be  entirely  in  the 
hands  of  appointive  officers."  While  the  Illinois  commission  makes  no  such 
sweeping  recommendation  for  constitutional  reorganization  to  eliminate  the 
elective  executive  officers  of  auditor  and  treasurer,  for  reasons  already 
noted,  it  does  recognize  the  new  York  principle  of  strict  functional  correla- 
tion with  single-headed  supervision  in  fiscal  matters.  In  other  words,  each 
member  of  the  finance  commission  is  given  charge  of  a special  division.  The 
state  comptroller,  is  made  chairman  of  the  commission,  and  charged  with  the 
preparation  of  a budget  of  revenues  and  expenditures  for  submission  to  the 
governor,  with  supervision  over  salaries  and  other  expenditures,  with  the 
preparation  and  installation  of  accounts,  and  with  inquiries  into  the  business 
methods  of  state  officers  and  institutions.  In  this  capacity  he  is  almost 
identical  with  chief  finance  officer  on  the  immediate  governor’s  staff  rec- 
ommended in  the  wew  York  report.  The  auditor  of  public  accounts,  a constitu- 
tional officer  is  retained  to  continue  his  present  functions,  which  in  Ill- 
inois are  exclusively  those  of  audit,  he  compares  favorably  with  the  comptrol- 
ler outside  the  administration  recommended  in  New  York.  There  is  not,  how- 
ever, the  logical  discrimination  between  the  purely  accounting  functions  which 

the  «ew  York  report  would  place  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  governor’s 
64 

staff* 

The  California  commission  establishes  a department  of  accounts  and  ex- 
penditures and  a department  of  receipts  and  supplies  under  separate,  single 
directors,  all  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  governor.  An  independent 

^Illinois  report  p.  33. 


' 


* 


, 


* 

• V 


' 

1 


102 


board  of  finance  is  provided,  composed  of  the  directors  of  accounts  and  ex- 
penditures, and  of  receipts  and  supplies,  respectively,  end  the  state 
comptroller  (a  constitutional  officer) , the  chairman  to  be  designated  by  the 
governor,  special  functions  of  this  body  shall  be:  preparation  of  budget, 

investment  of  state  funds,  count  of  money  in  treasury,  corporation  franchise 
tax  appeals,  and  recommendations  of  legislation  where  necessary  to  affect 
modernization  of  state  business  methods.^  The  following  features  of  this 
organization  of  finance  should  be  noted:  (1)  functional  correlation  audit; 

accounting;  purchase  and  custody  of  supplies,  equipment,  etc*;  (2)  central 
control  over  all  fiscal  activities  as  a whole,  and  over  each  correlated  func- 
tional group; (3)  a governor's  staff  agency  (Board  of  Finance);  (4)  An  au- 
ditor-general or  comptroller  outside  the  administration. 

A more  clearly  functional  organization,  even,  than  this  of  California 
are  the  proposals  of  the  Ohio  Commission.  The  auditor  of  state  who  is  a 
constitutional  officer,  elected  for  a term  of  four  years,  end  hence  outside 
the  administration,  is  retained.  "Statutory  changes  are  recommended  limit- 
ing the  functions  of  the  auditor  to  those  of  an  auditing  nature,  transferring 
to  a new  department,  the  department  of  finance,  all  those  financial  functions 
which  have  to  do  with  planning  and  spending,  and  specifying  that  the  auditor 
shall  make  operation  as  well  as  financial  audits. "66  in  explaining  this 
recommendation,  the  commission  observes:  "At  present  the  auditor  not  only 

audits  all  financial  accounts,  but  handles  the  routine  administrative  func- 
tions concerned  with  accounting,  collection  of  revenues,  expenditures, property 
control  and  other  financial  transactions.  No  distinction  now  exists  between 


^California  report  (1919)  p.  21. 
660hio  report  (1920)  p.  10. 


1 ' 


. 


. 


■ 


* 


. 




103 


tne  function  of  auditing  and  the  function  of  bookkeeping  and  accounting.  The 
auditor  is  in  the  position  of  auditing  his  own  work,  which  of  course  tends 
to  destroy  the  disinterestedness  of  his  audit.  The  routine  administrative 
duties  divert  the  energy  of  the  auditor  and  his  staff  from  the  much  needed 
study  and  investigation  of  operation  results."  Then  follows  this  most  signif- 
icant recommendation:  "It  is  recommended  that  the  auditor  should  be  charged 

only  with  the  auditing  function  and  that  he  be  continued  to  be  elected  by  the 
people  so  that  he  may  be  independent  of  the  whole  executive  government  and  be 
free  to  criticise  its  performances  when  necessary."  The  most  unique  of  all 
the  recent  provisions  relating  to  the  auditor's  office  is  then  added:  "In 

addition  to  auditing  the  financial  records  with  respect  to  accuracy  and  legal- 
ity, he  should  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  ascertaining  the  wisdom,  economy. 
and  effectiveness  of  expenditures;  in  other  words,  there  is  need  for  a contin- 
uous independent,  analytical  study  of  operations  and  results  accomplished  by 
the  executive  government.  Provision  should  be  made  by  law  for  the  publica- 
tion of  the  findings  of  the  auditor  so  that  these  would  be  available  to  the 
general  assembly,  the  governor,  and  citizens."  Then  follows  a proposal  for 
a specific  transfer  of  fiscal  administrative  functions  from  the  auditor,  as 
present  constituted,  to  the  department  of  finance.  At  the  head  of  the  finance 
department  is  the  director  appointed  by  the  governor  to  serve  at  his  pleasure. 
There  is  the  provision  "that  all  the  administrative  financial  affairs  of  the 
state  now  performed  by  several  different  offices  and  boards  would  be  coor- 
dinated  and  centralized  in  this  department."  The  head  of  the  department  is 
made  the  financial  adviser  to  the  governor  on  all  matters  of  state  finance. 

The  state  treasurer,  who  is  an  elective  officer  under  the  constitution,  is 
made  appointive  officer  under  the  director  of  finance.  Within  the  department 


67Ibic.  15. 


• 

, 

1 

. 

• 

* 

- 

■ 

»• 

<■' 

I 


, . 


, ' 


104 

the  following  centralized  bureaus  are  set  up:  accounting,  income  and  taxa- 

tion, motor  vehicle  licenses,  treasury,  purchasing* 

The  most  fitting  citation  to  be  found  in  summarizing  the  recent  analysis 
of  fiscal  functions  by  commissions,  is  this  from  the  Maryland  report:  "In 

finance  organization  two  groups  of  activities  should  be  recognized;  the  first 
including  activities  involved  in  the  financial  transactions  that  are  arranged 
for  and  carried  out  as  a part  of  the  operation  of  the  business;  and  the  sec- 
ond including  the  independent  review  and  audit  of  the  affairs  of  officials 
responsible  for  such  financial  transactions.  The  audit  should  compel  the  en- 
forcement of  laws,  regulations,  and  executive  orders,  and  should  ensure  the 
maintenance  of  adequate  accounting  and  standards* 

MIt  has  come  to  be  generally  accepted  as  the  consensus  of  authorities 

that  independent  organization  units  should  be  set  up  to  take  care  of  these 

two  sides  of  financial  administration,  management  of  finance  and  accounting 

on  the  one  hand,  and  audit  control  on  the  other.  The  first  of  these  should 

be  under  the  control  of  the  executive.  The  organization  dealing  with  the 

enforcement  of  laws  and  regulations  and  checking  the  work  of  the  other  group 

68 

should  have  a measure  of  independence*"  In  addition,  the  Commission  points 
to  a third  group  of  fiscal  activities  as  distinct,  viz:  the  custody  of  funds 

of  the  organization.  The  full  development  of  an  audit  procedure,  however, 
and  the  creation  of  an  independent  reviewing  and  auditing  office  constitutes 
a sufficient  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  the  treasurer  and  at  the  same  time 
makes  possible  a thorough  and  valuable  control  of  the  financial  operations  of 
the  organization.  The  Commission  further  states  the  principle  of  a central 

68Maryland  report  (1921)  pp.  55,  56. 


' 

. 

. 

* 


. 


105 


department  of  finance,  the  chief  of  which  should  be  responsiole  to  the  chief 
executive,  tie  should  supervise  all  financial  activities  except  those  of 
review  and  audit.  It  holds  that  there  is  no  department  of  the  government 
which  should  so  directly  represent  and  carry  out  the  powers  of  the  governor 
as  the  finance  or  treasury  department. 

The  Commission  then  proposes  the  creation  of  an  independent  office  of 
audit  and  control  outside  of  the  executive  departments  to  stand  midway  between 
the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  the  government.  Its  head  should  be 
responsible  not  to  the  governor,  but  directly  responsiole  to  the  general 
assembly,  coinciding  with  the  unique  provision  of  the  Ohio  report  is  its 
further  proposal  to  make  the  "operation"  audit  a distinct  feature  of  the 
work  of  the  auditing  office. 

The  importance  of  a discriminating  functional  organization  could  hardly 
be  made  more  evident  than  by  contrasting  this  latest  and  best  analysis  of 
fiscal  administration  in  Maryland  with  that  of  the  Taxpayers'  Association  to 
which  we  have  already  referred.  In  the  letter's  report  a board  of  five  mem- 
bers, is  placed  in  charge  of  a finance  department,  three  of  whom  are  elect- 
ive; two  appointive.  In  other  words,  the  entire  finance  administration  is 
put  beyond  the  control  of  the  governor  in  the  hands  of  elective  officials, 
with  no  reference  to  functional  purposes  served.  Again,  within  the  depart- 
ment itself,  the  state  comptroller  (elective)  is  indiscriminately  given  ad- 
ministrative duties  of  collection  and  accounting,  while  the  duties  relating 
to  matters  of  taxation,  revenue,  disbursement,  purchasing,  and  printing  are 
distributed  among  elective  and  appointing  officers  alike,  just  what  the  Tax- 
payers' Committee  proposes  to  effect  through  its  functional  organization 
scheme  is  certainly  not  evident  in  this  application  to  the  most  important 


' ■ 


, 


. 


106 


functional  unit  of  all— the  fiscal* 

Another  recent  and  discriminating  financial  organization  is  that  devised 
by  the  «ew  York  Reconstruction  commission  (1919).  In  a summary  of  recommenda- 
tions it  proposes:  (1)  The  establishment  of  a department  of  audit  and  control 

of  which  the  comptroller,  elected  for  a term  equal  in  length  to  that  of  the 
governor,  will  be  the  head.  The  fundamental  duties  of  the  comptroller  are  to 
be  outlined  in  the  constitution  in  order  to  prevent  the  statutory  assignment 
to  his  department  of  purely  administrative  functions.  The  department  is  to 
be  required  to  perform  only  those  functions  which  come  within  the  category 
of  audit  and  control,  and  the  numerous  administrative  duties  now  performed 
by  the  comptroller's  office  are  to  be  transferred  to  the  administrative  de- 
partments. This  department  is  not  to  receive  budget  estimates  or  to  be 
responsible  for  their  compilation.  (2)  All  functions  not  distinctly  those 
of  audit  and  control,  as  the  accrual  and  collection  of  revenues,  will  be 
removed  from  the  comptroller  and  given  to  administrative  departments.  Then 
follows  the  recommendation  for  a department  of  taxation  and  finance  within 
the  executive  department.  The  head  of  the  department  is  a commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  to  serve  his  pleasure.  An  express  provision  is: 

"The  work  of  the  department  will  include  only  those  functions  of  the  state 
government  which  are  essentially  financial  in  character,  i.e.  the  assessment, 
equalization,  levy,  collection,  management,  and  disbursement  of  public  rev- 
enues. The  department  is  organized  with  five  bureaus:  Taxation  and  Revenue, 

Motor  vehicles,  Treasury,  Purchasing,  Administration.  All  bureau  heads  are 
to  be  appointed  by  the  director  of  taxation  and  finance  under  competive  civ- 

r“'  “ ' 11  ' " ---  - - - - - , , 

’New  York  Reconstruction  Commission  report,  p.  58. 


‘ 

. 


♦ ' ■ 

. . 

v" 


i ; * - . 


> 


107 


il  service  rules.  The  head  of  the  department  a made  chief  of  the  bureau  of 
administration." 

olosely  related  to  the  principles  which  underly  the  organization  of 
financial  activities  as  a division  of  proprietary  functions  of  government, 
are  those  considerations  with  respect  to  the  legal  department.  Again,  the 
New  York  Constitutional  Commission  is  suggestive.  "Given  a political  system 
in  which  there  is  a real  chief  executive,"  it  observes,  "then  the  political 
independence  of  the  law  office  presents  only  vices  with  no  offsetting  virtues. 

. • .When  a matter  comes  before  the  executive  he  must  first  decide  whether  he 
will  assume  responsibility  for  action  without  referring  to  the  law  office  for 
advice,  or  run  the  risk  of  an  opinion  which  is  adverse.  . .And  the  disposition 
of  the  officer  is  likely  to  be  adverse.  The  reason  is  obvious.  The  law  of- 
ficer has  no  political  or  other  responsibility  in  common  with  the  executive. 

. • The  law  office  as  at  present  organized  is  simply  one  of  the  great  nega- 
tive forces  in  government— a negative  force  that  in  its  operation  is  respon- 
sible for  the  construction  of  some  of  the  most  involved,  unbusinesslike, 
ludicrous  practices  which,  in  a system  that  provides  only  for  divided  powers 
and  no  effective  central  control,  continue  to  become  more  involved  and  un- 
businesslike with  each  added  legislative  enactment.  Laws  made  by  detached 
committees,  procedures  elaborated  by  detached  bureaucracies;  practices  develop- 
ed without  controveraey  by  construction  'down  the  line';  situations  arising 
that  could  not  be  foreseen  demanding  a change  in  practice;  proposals  referred 
to  detached,  irresponsible  executives— irresponsible  so  long  as  they  do  not 
make  changes;  references  to  a detached  attorney-general  to  avoid  executive 
responsibility;  the  law  officer  for  protection  doing  the  same  thing— these 


. 


U, 


. 


I . ... 


. 


' 


* ■ 


■ 


* 


, u 


108 


are  among  the  matters  to  be  considered  when  deciding  whether  the  constitution 
should  provide  for  a responsible  chief  executive,  and  a law  officer  who  will 
be  constituted  a general  staff  adviser."  (p.  117.) 

Four  years  later,  the  California  commission  recommends:  "that  the  posi- 

tion of  special  attorney  for  each  of  the  following  seven  departments  be  abol- 
ished, and  that  the  legal  service  of  the  departments  be  performed  in  the 
attorney-general '8  office:  state  board  of  health,  commission  in  lunacy,  cat- 

tle protection  board,  board  of  harbor  commissioners,  market  commission,  min- 
ing bureau,  water  commission.  The  state  railroad  commission  and  the  indus- 
trial accident  commission  exercise  functions  which  are  judicial  or  quasi- 
judicial in  nature  and  these  commissions  require  full-time  attorneys  subject 
to  their  exclusive  control.  Other  attorneys  employed  by  state  departments 
may  be  classified  in  three  groups,  those  employed  on  full  time  because  of  the 
volume  of  legal  work  required  to  be  done;  those  employed  because  of  the  high- 
ly specialized  nature  of  the  legal  work  of  the  particular  department;  and 
those  specially  employed  from  time  to  time  for  the  purpose  of  conducting 
police  court  and  other  criminal  prosecutions.  In  the  opinion  of  the  committee 
efficiency  would  be  impaired  and  expense  increased  if  the  present  arrangement 
were  disturbed."  (p.  19). 

On  this  same  point,  the  Ohio  commission  observes  that  "one  question 
which  has  aroused  some  discussion  among  students  of  government  is  that  of  the 
relation  of  the  attorney- general  to  the  legal  staffs  of  other  departments. 

i 

This  question  is  not  an  important  one  in  Ohio  because  both  in  law  and  in  fact 
all  the  legal  counsel  employed  in  the  several  departments  are  under  the  super- 
vision and  control  of  the  attorney-general.  The  law  provided  that  no  state 


, 


. 


109 


officer,  board,  or  the  head  of  a department  or  institution  of  the  state  shall 
employ,  or  be  represented  by  other  counsel  or  attorneys-at-law.  The  trend  of 
judicial  opinion  in  other  states  where  the  question  has  been  raised  is  in 
accord  with  the  present  situation  in  Ohio.  It  has  come  to  be  generally  rec- 
ognized that  all  the  legal  work  of  the  state  should  be  centralized  under  the 
attorney-general.**  On  the  point  of  selection,  the  Commission  adds:  **With 

the  attorney- general  selected  by  the  people  and  thus  independent  of  the  gov- 
ernor, there  exists  a condition  which  might  develop  to  seriously  limit  the 
effective  authority  of  the  governor  as  the  chief  executive  of  the  state.  If 
the  elected  attorney-general  were  of  opposite  political  faith  to  the  governor, 
the  situation  might  become  embarrassing.  In  governmental  activities,  exec- 
utive officials  are  circumscribed  in  their  work  by  a mass  of  legal  require- 
ments and  technicalities  and  if  results  are  to  be  secured  it  is  necessary 
that  the  executive  officer  be  guided  through  the  maze  of  legal  restrictions 
by  competent  and  sympathetic  legal  counsel  (italics  ours).  . .Furthermore, 
the  plan  of  appointment  by  the  executive  works  satisfactorily  in  the  United 
States  department  of  Justice,  in  cities,  and  in  is  in  operation  in  a few 
states.  . . It  is  recommended  that  the  attorney-general  of  Ohio  be  appointed 
by  the  governor  and  serve  at  his  pleasure.”  (p.15). 

"As  long  as  department  heads  are  appointed  by  the  governor  and  the  attor- 
ney-general is  elected  by  the  people,**  points  out  the  New  York  Commission, 

"here  will  be  some  opposition  to  the  centralization  of  the  legal  business  of 
the  state.  It  has  frequently  happened  that  the  attorney- general,  being  elect- 
ed by  the  people,  is  of  the  opposite  political  faith  to  the  governor.  The 
department  head  is  often  reluctant  to  call  on  the  attorney-general  of  a differ- 


» 


. » 

. 


* 


. 


■ 


110 


ent  party  from  his  own  for  advice.  This  is  the  principal  objection  to  having 
all  attorneys  assigned  to  the  various  departments  by  an  elected  attorney- 
general,  and  this  objection  will,  of  course,  disappear  with  the  appointment 
of  the  attorney-general  by  the  governor.**  The  Commission  then  makes  the 
following  exception  to  the  complete  transfer  of  all  law  work  to  him;  counsel 
to  the  governor  and  to  the  quasi- judicial  public  service  and  industrial  com- 
missions. While  the  arguments  that  influenced  the  California  Commission  to 
make  further  exceptions  in  the  case  of  full  time  attorneys  in  the  several 
departments  are  noted,  the  report  says:  "It  is  obvious  that  if  the  whole 

time  of  some  attorneys  is  needed  by  some  departments,  the  attorney-general 
may  assign  deputies  or  special  attorneys  to  these  departments  on  full  time.** 
nut  it  points  out:  "the  question  as  to  the  active  assistance  needed  in  pros- 

ecuting cases  for  a department  by  representatives  of  the  attorney-general 
must  necessarily  be  viewed  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  state  as  a whole. 

The  attorney-general  should  be  responsible  for  all  prosecutions  and  for  de- 
fending all  actions  and  for  his  interpretations  of  the  constitution  and  of 
the  laws.”  (p.77). 

8,  In  the  organization  of  the  new  legal  department,  the  Commission  provides 
for  the  following  bureaus:  legal  staff,  bureau  of  police,  courts  of  claims, 

titles,  finance  and  claims.  The  legal  staff  is  to  include  all  attorneys 

c. 

employed  in  the  legal  business  of  all  departments.  A fourth  and  final  major 
grouping  within  the  proprietary  functions  of  government,  uniformly  observed 
in  the  more  recent  reports,  are  those  activities  of  the  administration  which 
relate  to  the  employing  and  caring  for  the  personnel.  "According  to  the  New 
York  Constitutional  Commission,  central  control  over  the  employment  and  im- 


. 


■ 


Ill 


proveraent  of  the  personnel  of  the  public  service  should  be  established  when- 
ever and  to  whatever  extent  justice  to  a class  of  employees  and  individual 
efficiency  may  be  promoted  through  the  use  of  a common  agency.”  For  it 
points  out,  “It  is  an  advantage  both  to  the  executive  and  the  public  which 
it  served  to  provide  a common  agency  for  determining  the  fitness  and  qualifica- 
tion of  persons  seeking  employment,  for  providing  common  labor  conditions 

affecting  promotions,  transfers,  discipline,  health,  compensation,  sick  leave, 

70 

vacations,  retirement  pensions,  etc.”  All  of  which  would  imply,  the  Commis- 
sion shows,  “that  any  quest,  therefore,  for  responsible  and  efficient  govern- 
ment must  go  deeply  into  the  establishment  of: 

(1)  Proper  tests  for  selecting  official  agents— eloction 
or  appointment# 

\2)  Tenures  of  office  adapted  to  the  ends  sought. 

(3)  Adequate  tests  to  be  applied  in  determing  the  fitness 
and  qualifications  of  public  servants. 

(4)  Satisfactory  conditions  governing  the  treatment,  pro- 
motion, and  dismissal  of  public  servants. 


“The  solution  of  these  problems  with  reference  to  standards  of  respon- 
siveness, responsibility,  and  efficiency,”  the  commission  continues,  has  nev- 
er been  undertaken  in  a systematic  and  thorough  manner  by  any  convention  or 
other  body  of  representatives  in  this  state.  . . On  the  contrary,  temporary 
expedients  and  partisan  consideration  have  been  too  often  the  decisive  fac- 


70 


New  York  constitution  Commission  (1915)  report  p.  92 


* 

, ' ■ 

. 


. . . 


4 


' 


112 


tors  in  determing  what  officers  should  be  elected,  what  officers  should  be 

appointed,  and  what  conditions  should  be  attached  to  public  employment.  Where 

attempts  have  been  made  to  regulate  the  conditions  of  official  employment  in 

the  public  interest,  they  have  usually  been  negative  in  character— that  is, 

designed  to  prevent  known  evils,  such  as  the  so-called  spoils  system,  rather 

iJ71 

than  to  promote  efficiency.  In  establishing  some  standards,  the  Commission 
points  out  that  past  experience  may  be  reduced  to  conclusions  to  serve  as  guid- 
ing principles:  namely,  that  if  governing  agents  are  to  be  made  responsible 
for  what  they  propose  as  well  as  what  they  do— for  fidelity,  for  efficiency, 
and  for  economy  in  the  use  of  public  powers  and  resources— then  another  prin- 
ciple is  “that  only  such  officers  should  be  elected  as  are  to  act  independent- 
ly; that  those  who  are  are  act  as  subordinates  should  be  appointed.**  (Italics 
72 

ours ) . 

from  the  consideration  of  what  officers  shall  be  appointed,  the  commis- 
sion comes  to  study  the  method  of  appointment  as  the  problem  of  prime  import- 
ance. The  underlying  reason  for  appointing  instead  of  electing  administrative 
officers,  it  points  out,  is  to  locate  responsibility  and  make  it  enforcible. 
Moreover,  the  appointing  officer  assumes  responsibility  for  the  proper  conduct 
of  the  appointee. 

*'As  in  private  employment,**  quoting  from  the  report,  “the  determination 
of  the  qualifications  and  relative  merits  of  persons  who  are  available  for 
employment  or  already  in  the  service,  is  of  primary  importance.  The  dif- 
ficulty of  forming  any  genuinely  helpful  rules  for  guidance  is  great,  owing 


'~Ibid.  31 
72 

Ibid.  33 


113 


to  the  subtle  human  elements  involved,  Nevertheless  there  are  certain  general 
principles  that  may  serve  to  guide: 

(1)  Any  metnods  devised  for  determining  ability  and 
fitness  must  be  adapted  to  the  methods  of  choice 
imposed  upon  one  who  must  make  the  selection. 

^2)  It  is  necessary  to  differentiate  between  those 

offices  which  are  technical  or  routine  in  character 
and  t ho se  which  involve  managerial  discretion  and 
the  settlement  of  important  matters  of  policy. 

(3)  facilities  should  be  afforded  for  the  prompt  remov- 
al of  persons  who  show  infidelity  or  who  by  a prac- 
tical test  or  record  of  work  done  have  shown  in- 
capacity." 

These  principles,  the  Commission  observes,  reveal  the  following  defects 
in  the  average  merit  system:  (1)  It  limits  the  judgment  of  comparative  mer- 

its to  the  results  of  "examinations particularly  as  there  is  an  increasing 
tendency  to  rely  on  educational  and  professional  training.  (2)  It  fails  to 
provide  a proper  basis  for  the  advancement  or  promotion  of  employees  after 
selection.  (3)  It  fails  to  provide  a proper  basis  for  dismissal  or  dis- 
cipline of  employees.  In  other  words,  "the  uncertainty  and  injustice  which 
results  . . • narrow  and  limit  the  outlook  of  civil  servants  who  feel  that 
the  civil  service  is  not  holding  out  pro  per  rewards  for  meritorious  service. 

As  a result,  a condition  of  stagnation  and  indifference  prevails." 

The  function  and  purpose  of  a civil  service  department,  thus  presented, 


* 


, 


. 


. 


* * * 

f 

. . 


114 


"which  would  operate  positively  instead  of  negatively  and  be  cooperative  in 
the  development  of  better  conditions  for  employees  and  better  conditions  for 
employees  and  better  conditions  for  the  management  raises  the  following  ques- 
tions of  organization,  according  to  the  constitutional  Commission:  (1) 

‘Should  this  department  be  so  developed  that  there  would  be  a close  working 
relation  between  it  and  the  officers  charged  with  responsibility  for  prepar- 
ing the  budget,  for  making  contracts  for  services  other  than  personal,  such 
as  repairs,  construction,  printing,  etc.  and  for  decisions  on  matters  of  ad- 
ministrative law!'  (2)  'What  will  be  the  means  of  correlating  all  these 
activities  dealing  with  proprietary  matters— matters  of  finance,  of  purchase, 
of  employment,  as  well  as  the  custodianship  of  funds  and  properties  of  the 
stater'  (3)  'Shall  the  branch  handling  employment  be  made  a department  and 

the  head  given  a place  in  the  cabinet  along  with  the  attorney-general  and 

73 

the  finance  officerT"* 

The  New  York  Reconstruction  Commission  in  1919  met  these  points, raised 
by  the  Constitutional  Commission,  in  the  following  summary  of  recommendations 
for  a department  of  civil  service: 

(1)  There  will  be  a department  of  civil  servict.  At 
the  head  of  the  department  there  will  be  a chair- 
man designated  by  the  governor  who  will  receive 
an  adequate  salary  and  will  be  solely  responsible 
for  all  the  administrative  work  of  the  commission. 

There  will  be  two  additional  commissioners  on 
part  time  who  with  the  chairman  will  constitute 

73 


New  York  Constitution  Commission  report  p.  97. 


, 


l 


' 


. ■ 


. 


. 


115 


a board  which  will  meet  once  a week  to  pass  on 
quasi- judical  and  quasi- legislative  matters* 

(2)  The  work  of  the  Commission  will  be  divided  between 

two  bureaus:  administration,  examinations. 

(3)  There  will  be  a director  in  charge  of  each  bureau 
appointed  by  the  head  of  the  department. 

(4)  Salaries  of  ail  positions  in  the  department  will 
be  such  as  to  attract  and  hold  competent  persons 
of  broad  education  and  experience* 

(5)  Bureaus  will  receive  a large  appropriation  so  that 
adequate  equipment  and  office  machinery  and  methods 
may  be  installed  and  maintained. 

(6)  There  will  be  a Manager  of  personnel  in  each  large 
department  of  state  government  who  will  be  in  charge 
of  all  civil  service  matters  and  who  will  develop 
and  administer  a program  covering  labor  turnover, 
welfare  activities,  health,  personal  service, budget , 
changes  of  status,  i.e.  promotions,  transfers,  dis- 
charges, etc. 

(7)  The  head  of  the  department  will  be  a member  of  the 
governor's  cabinet. 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  actual  control  over  changes  in 


. 


* 

< 


. 


. 


. 


, 


. • 


. 


116 


personnel  in  the  several  departments,  according  to  the  proposal  of  the  Commis- 
sion, is  lodged  with  the  eureau  of  Administration,  an  independent  staff  agency 
in  the  executive  department.  This  bureau  is  charged  with  making  a logical 
classification  of  state  employees  based  on  duties  and  value  of  services,  this 
work  to  be  done  in  cooperation  with  the  civil  service  department.  Positions 
not  of  a policy-determining  character  are  to  be  placed  in  the  competitive 
class  directly  under  the  control  of  the  civil  service  department.  A division 

of  pensions  in  the  bureau  of  Administration  will  formulate  and  administer  pen- 

74 

sion  and  retirement  systems* 

It  should  be  noted  also,  in  the  New  York  plan  that  the  seeming  division 
of  responsibility  for  personnel  between  the  staff  agency  and  the  civil  service 
department,  is  more  nominal  than  actual,  since  both  agencies  are  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  governor  through  his  power  of  appointment  and  removal 
of  the  chief  officers.  Such  a division,  however,  does  serve  a purpose.  The 
more  important  appointees  of  the  state  government  are  supervised  from  the 
governor’s  immediate  staff  under  his  own  personal  supervision;  appointees  of 
the  grade  of  employees  are  supervised  by  an  administrative  agency  not  under 
the  governor’s  direct  control.  This  practice  is  in  conformity  with  the  gener- 
al principle  of  relieving  the  chief  executive  of  all  matters  of  routine, even 
as  they  affect  the  personnel  of  the  administration,  still  another  purpose  is 
served  by  such  an  arrangement  as  this  provided  by  the  New  York  Commission.  The 
executive  staff  agency  views  personnel  from  the  standpoint  of  the  administra- 
tion as  a whole.  The  administrative  department  of  civil  service  will  have 
the  departmental  point  of  view,  cooperation  between  the  two  agencies  will 
tend  to  result  in  the  same  relationship  as  exists  between  the  cabinet  as  a 

74”  — " ~ """ 

New  York  Reconstruction  commission  report  p.  42. 


- 

* 


- 

• • 


. 

. 


. 


■ • ) % K t Hi 

. 

* 


. 


117 


whole  and  an  administrative  department  in  an  parliamentary  government. 

very  similar  to  the  New  York  plan  with  respect  to  personnel  as  a propri- 
etary function  of  administration  is  that  of  the  Ohio  report.  Here  as  in  New 
York  a department  of  civil  service  is  recommended,  charged  Mwith  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  civil  service  laws  which  were  passed  in  conformity  with  that 
provision  of  the  constitution  which  provides  that  appointment  and  promotion 
shall  be  made  according  to  merit  and  fitness  to  be  ascertained,  as  far  as 
practicable,  by  competitive  examination.”  The  Commission’s  analysis  of 
prevailing  conditions  of  personnel  in  Ohio  government  is  very  similar  to  that 
of  the  New  York  agency.  In  addition,  it  observes  "that  at  the  present  time 
increased  attention  is  being  given  to  the  methods  of  securing  and  holding 
high  grade  experts  in  the  public  service.  The  excessive  cost  of  labor  turn- 
over or  the  hiring  and  firing  of  employees  indiscriminately,  is  realized  as 
never  before  and  efforts  are  being  made  in  both  industry  and  public  service 
to  reduce  these  costs.  . . *rom  an  organization  standpoint,  the  work  of  the 
department  of  civil  service  is  exactly  comparable  with  the  employment  depart- 
ment in  industry;  both  are  likened  to  the  purchasing  department,  the  differ- 
ence being  that  the  two  former  purchase  personal  service  and  the  latter  mate- 
rial,  supplies,  and  equipment.”  The  commission  then  notes  that  out  of  a 
total  expenditure  of  §25,000,000  for  the  state  in  1919,  §7,000,000,  or  one- 
third  was  spent  for  personal  service.  The  department  as  proposed  in  the  Ohio 
report  "is  organized  under  a single  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor, 
to  serve  at  his  pleasure  to  replace  the  present  commission  of  two  members 
appointed  by  the  governor  for  terms  of  two  years  each.  That  the  law  specify 
that  this  personal  shall  have  knowledge  and  experience  in  employment  methods 

Ohio  report  p.  37. 

— ■■ 


, 


» 

. 


' 
4 


- 


' 


1 ' 


118 


and  personnel  management.  That  a personnel  board  be  created,  composed  of 

department  heads  or  their  representatives  to  cooperate  with  the  civil  service 

commissioner  in  the  performance  of  quasi-legislative  and  quasi- judicial  func- 
76 

tions.  An  alternate  recommendation  is  that  there  be  at  the  head  of  the 

department  of  civil  service  a chairman  appointed  by  the  governor  who  would 
receive  an  adequate  salary  and  be  responsible  for  the  administrative  work. 

Two  other  additional  commissioners  would  be  appointed  by  the  governor  on  a 
part  time  basis,  who  with  the  chairman  would  constitute  a board  to  pass  on 
quasi-legislative  and  quasi- judicial  matters.  These  two  additional  commis- 

nn 

sioners  would  receive  nominal  salaries  and  traveling  expenses.  In  justify- 
ing the  change  from  a commission  controlled  civil  service  department  to  a 
single-head  control,  the  report  points  out  that  the  functions  of  such  a de- 
partment are  chiefly  administrative,  hence  would  be  performed  more  efficient- 
ly by  one  man  than  by  a commission.  In  devising  a board  for  the  department, 
the  report  notes  that  by  including  as  members,  heads  of  some  of  the  major 
departments  and  the  administrative  head  of  the  civil  service  which  would  be 
valuable  in  many  ways,  especially  in  the  work  of  drafting  specifications,  in 
devising  efficiency  rating  methods,  and  in  creating  a sense  of  obligation  on 
the  part  of  all  public  employees  to  comply  with  the  civil  laws  of  the  state. 

While  the  Illinois  Commission  makes  no  recommendation  for  a reorganiza- 
tion of  the  civil  service  in  that  state,  it  does  analyze  much  in  the  same 
way  the  existing  arrangements.  "The  civil  service  laws  have  laid  the  founda- 
tions of  the  merit  system  for  the  public  service  in  the  state;  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  this  system  should  be  continued  and  strengthened  . . yet  these  laws 


76Ibid.  p.  38. 
77lbid.  p.  39. 


. 


. 


■ 


, . 


r.V-  . 


I 

1 


119 


are  in  some  respects  too  rigid  in  their  detailed  provisions.  The  specific 
enumeration  of  all  exemptions  in  the  statute  is  not  entirely  satisfactory. 
t>om.e  of  the  exemptions  named  . • are  not  justified  . • More  flexibility  will 
be  secured  by  reducing  the  exemptions  specified  in  the  law,  and  providing  a 
limited  authority  to  make  other  exemptions  • . The  bills  recommended  (by  the 
Commission)  will  extend  the  merit  system  to  a considerable  extent,  and  in 
some  case  also  provide  that  the  governor  shall  have  power  to  exempt  positions 
of  administrative  responsibility  which  it  is  impracticable  to  fill  by  compet- 
itive examination.  • .The  authority  of  the  state  civil  service  commission 
over  the  efficiency  of  the  state  administrative  services.  A continuous  super- 
vision over  the  efficiency  of  the  state  service  is  needed;  and  to  be  effect- 
ive it  should  be  exercised  by  a permanent  state  authority,  with  larger  powers 
than  are  now  conferred  to  control  salaries  and  other  expenditures.  . . This 
work  is  more  properly  a part  of  the  general  system  of  financial  control  which 
it  is  proposed  to  vest  in  the  state  comptroller,  who  should  cooperate  with 
the  civil  service  commission,  as  this  commission  is  now  required  to  co-op- 
erate with  the  board  of  adminiet ration  in  the  classification  of  positions  and 
salaries  of  state  employees  under  that  board.”  Adoption  of  this  latter 
proposal  would  serve  to  offset  the  effect  of  their  final  recommendation  that 
the  civil  service  commission  be  left  outside  the  main  executive  departments. 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  even  in  the  absence  of  any  precise  defini- 
tion of  functions  and  organization  such  as  characterized  the  New  York  and  Ohio 
plans,  the  Illinois  ooramission,  committed  as  it  was  to  build  on  existing 
arrangements,  does  recognize:  (1)  Personnel  as  a proprietary  function;  (2) 

The  need  of  centralized  control  in  the  more  flexible  arrangements  by  which  it 

— — — " 

Illinois  report  p.  72. 


. 

. . 


- . 


. 


. 


1 


120 


proposes  to  give  the  governor  greater  discretion  in  control  of  exemptions; 

(3)  The  need  of  a continuous  supervision  of  the  state  service  in  its  suggestion 
of  a permanent  control  from  the  office  of  comptroller;  (4)  Standardization  of 
salaries  and  employment  methods  by  cooperative  arrangements  between  the  organs 
of  control:  departments,  civil  service  commission,  and  the  comptroller's  of- 

fice. In  the  elaborate  functional  analysis  of  the  Taxpayers*  Association, 

70 

personnel  as  a matter  for  administrative  organization  is  not  mentioned. 

The  California  commission,  on  the  other  hand,  provides  for  the  super- 
vision of  organization  and  investigation  of  the  efficiency  of  administration 
of  state  business  and  functions  as  a division  of  activity  in  the  finance  de- 
partment under  the  director  of  receipts  and  supplies.  Under  its  general 
recommendations  it  proposes  “that  the  present  practice  of  setting  salaries 
by  statute,  so  far  as  they  refer  to  employees  and  officers  other  than  heads 
of  departments  and  chief  deputies,  be  discontinued."  Such  a recommendation 
in  effect  provides  for  a standardization  of  salaries  of  all  subordinate  of- 
ficials under  the  final  supervision  of  a board  of  Finance  in  the  finance  de- 
partment* cftarged  with  the  preparation  of  the  budget,  as  well  as  with  the 
duty  of  recommending  legislation  "where  necessary  to  effect  modernization  of 
state  business  methods."  Since  the  directors  of  this  department  are  under  the 
control  of  the  governor  at  whose  pleasure  they  serve,  it  may  be  held  that  the 
California  commission  has  recognized  the  more  recent  general  principles  under- 
lying  personnel  administration  in  state  government. 

The  most  recent  proposal  for  a department  of  personnel  is  that  of  the 
Maryland  commission  in  April,  1921.  by  its  provisions,  the  selection,  appoint- 
ment, and  removal  of  employees  in  the  classified  service  of  the  state,  are 

70  ' " — — — — ‘ 

Taxpayers*  Journal  pp.  20-21. 


. 


t 


' • 


V 


. 


. 


. 


. 


, 


121 


vested  in  a department  of  employment  and  registration  under  a single  director 
appointed  by  the  governor.  Two  divisions  are  specified  in  the  report:  admin- 
istration and  examination.  A unique  provision  is  that  vesting  in  the  division 
of  examinations,  the  additional  duty  of  examining,  licensing,  and  registering 
eighteen  trades  and  professions  at  present  regulated  by  the  state  through  as 
many  boards.  In  explaining  this  novel  correlation,  the  commission  points 
out  the  very  close  relationship  between  the  work  of  conducting  examinations 
for  positions  in  the  classified  service  of  the  state  and  the  examination 
procedure  required  in  connection  with  vocational  licensing.  It  shows  that 

much  of  the  state  organization  and  procedure  can  be  used  in  common  when  the 

81 

two  functions  are  grouped  together* 

A survey,  therefore,  of  the  more  recent  plans  proposed  by  represent- 
ative efficiency  and  economy  commissions  seems  to  confirm  in  the  main  the 
principles  of  functional  classification  set  up  by  the  New  York  Constitution- 
al Commission  in  1915.  In  each  of  the  plans  considered  the  principle  of 
centralized  control  in  functional  groups,  individually  and  collectively, 
the  correlation  and  integration  of  all  proprietary  matters  as  a whole  gen- 
erally prevailed.  In  other  words,  the  oomraiesions,  is  providing  for  the  ad- 
ministration of  finance,  equipment  and  supplies,  and  personnel,  indentified 
this  branch  of  government  with  a purely  business  enterprise  and  adopted  a 
managerial  hierarchy. 

9,  With  respect  to  organization  for  civil  services  which  are  rendered 
directly  to  the  public  by  the  government,  or  the  public  service  functions  of 
the  New  York  classification,  the  desirability  of  central  executive  control 

8®Ohio  report  p*  31 

8*Maryland  report  p.  53. 


* 

t. 


. 


. 


. 


. 


.. 


' - •- 


, 


, 


122 


is  not  so  easily  determined.  There  is  the  policy,  for  example,  of  decen- 
tralizing executive  control  whenever  and  to  the  extent  that  independence  of 
action  in  the  very  nature  of  things  is  advantageous,  i.  e.  where  there  is 
no  interdependence  of  working  relations  and  no  advantage  can  be  gained 
through  subordination  to  a common  executive  though  they  may  be  under  the  same 
legislative  control* 52  Such  a policy  raises  the  question  of:  (1)  The  need  of 
eliciting  the  participation  of  disintered  citizens  serving  on  unpaid  boards 
who  exercise  powers  of  investigation,  advice,  and  publicity.  (2)  The  need 
of  placing  legal  authority  in  a particular  officer  most  likely  to  develop  a 
sense  of  professional  responsibility  and  pride  in  connection  with  the  work  of 
such  office.  (3)  The  U3elessne3s  of  extending  the  power  of  any  officer  be- 
yond the  limits  of  what  that  officer  can  actually  devote  his  time  to.  In 
other  words,  for  certain  functions,  di  f fusion  rather  than  concentration  of 
authority  secures  not  only  a more  efficient  but  more  democratic  administra- 
tion. (4)  The  need  of  continuity  of  policy  in  administrative  departments 
having  work  of  a technical  and  regulation  establishing  character.  Who  shall 
change  with  the  governor  is  one  of  the  serious  problems  in  the  organization 
of  public  service  activities.  In  brief,  there  is  the  need  to  discriminate 
among  those  departments  which  should  be  administered  by  a single  official 
under  the  political  control  of  the  governor  and  those  which  require  several- 
membered  commissions  with  overlapping  terms,  and  those  best  administered  by 
a single  officer  appointed  by  large  unpaid  boards,  and  enjoying  reasonable 
security  of  tenure. 


Such  considerations  as  these  have  given  rise  to  the  widest  conceivable 
variation  in  classification  and  organization  not  only  in  existing  arrange- 


, 

. 


* 


. 

. 

, 

i 


■ 


I ' 


123 


ments  in  state  governments,  but  in  the  reports  of  the  expert  commissions  them- 
selves. As  far  back  as  1911,  the  so-cailed  "Wisconsin  Idea"  was  evolved  by 
a commission  of  experts  from  the  state  government,  and  since  that  time  Wiscon- 
sin has  been  foremost  among  the  states  in  its  advocacy  of  "government  by  com- 
mission." The  idea  explained  means  simply  the  breaking  up  of  the  state  ad- 
ministration into  independent  offices  and  boards  in  hope  of  making  the  differ- 
ent branches  of  state  administration  more  serviceable  to  the  people.  In  the 
Wisconsin  scheme,  each  main  service  branch,  by  act  of  the  legislature,  is 
made  independent  by  being  placed  under  the  management  of  a board  or  commission 
The  members  of  each  public-ssrvice  board  are  appointed  for  long  and  over- 
lapping terms.  The  public  functions  administered  by  each  board  are  supported 
by  continuing  appropriations,  thereby  giving  to  them  what  amounts  to  a state 
endowment.  Thus  established,  each  board  undertakes  to  develop  a more  effi- 
cient service  by  employment  of  staff  experts.  Later,  in  developing  an  offi- 
cial means  for  giving  balance  and  proportion  to  a state  program  a central 
commission  was  created^-the  state  board  of  public  affairs,  to  which  was 
assigned  among  other  things  the  duty  of  preparing  a budget.  In  this  way  the 
experts  devised  for  the  central  supervisory  and  inquisitorial  function  a 
super-board  of  which  the  governor  and  certain  members  of  the  legislature  were 
members.  **3 

In  so  recent  a proposal  as  the  Maryland  plan  of  1921,  the  commission  or 
board  is  utilized  in  each  of  the  eleven  executive  departments.  While  in  no 
case,  is  a board  under  the  Maryland  provisions  vested  with  administrative 
duties,  it  is  maintained  by  the  commission  that  "boards  serve  a useful  pur- 
pose in  situations  where  the  judgment  of  more  than  one  person  is  valuable, 

°Lf.  McCarthy:  "The  Wisconsin  Idea." 


. 


<* 

■ 

... 

• 

. 

« 

, • ft 

1 - • 

. 

9 ' ■ 

* 

« 

• 

■ 

< 

• 

’ 

* 

• ■ 

* 


' 


124 


and  where  the  opinions  of  representatives  of  the  general  public  would  tend 

84 

to  assure  the  government  of  the  soundness  of  a given  proposal."  between 
the  Wisconsin  and  Maryland  proposals  there  is  sufficient  range  for  widest 
variations  in  plans  for  reorganization  with  respect  to  centralized  or  de- 
centralized administration.  For  this  reason,  an  analysis  and  proper  alloca- 
tion of  service  with  reference  to  a centralized  or  decentralized  control  be- 
come of  prime  importance  in  appraising  any  scheme  of  reorganization.  For  a 
basic  grouping  of  public  services  for  administration  one  might  well  begin  as 
in  the  case  of  proprietary  functions,  with  the  classification  of  the  New 
York  constitutional  commission.  According  to  the  Commission  these  fall  into 
eight  major  divisions  as  follows: 

(1)  Agriculture  and  industry. 

(2)  Public  works. 

(3)  Education. 

(4)  State  institutions  for  the  care  of 
delinquents,  defectives,  and  depend- 
ents. 

(5)  Public  health. 

(6)  Industrial  relations, 

(7)  Public  utilities. 

(8)  banking  and  insurance.33 

junctions  military  in  character  are  given  a place  midway  between  the 


. 


; 

* 

, 

. 

( 


; 


125 

proprietary  and  public  service  functions  as  having  problems  of  a special 
nature  not  applicable  to  either  of  the  two  major  divisions.  With  but  nomin- 
al changes,  the  Reconstruction  Commission  of  that  state  in  1919  accepted  the 
foregoing  classification  as  the  basis  for  major  departments  as  follows:  pub- 
lic works;  conservation;  agriculture  and  markets;  labor;  education;  health; 
mental  hygiene;  charities  and  correction;  public  service  commissions;  bank- 
ing and  insurance.  Major  departments  recommended  for  the  proprietary  class- 
ification were:  audit  and  control,  taxation  and  finance,  law,  state,  and 

civil  service.  There  should  be  noted  (1)  The  clean  cut  demarcation  between 
proprietary  and  service  functions  in  the  departmental  organization;  (2)  The 
practical  identity  between  major  groupings  of  the  basic  classification  and 
the  several  departments. 

Under  the  California  plan,  executive  departments  included:  receipts  and 
supplies,  accounts  and  expenditures,  trade  and  corporations,  public  works, 
agriculture,  natural  resources,  labor,  institutions,  education,  health,  social 
service.  The  first  two  named  departments  were  broadly  classified  as  finance 
with  major  divisions,  the  heads  of  which  were  given  a place  in  the  governor's 
cabinet.  This  is  a unique  variation  among  the  recent  plans  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  fiscal  agencies.  An  elective  comptroller  wa3  vested  with  exclusive 
functions  of  auditing,  responsible  directly  to  the  legislature.  Welfare  func- 
tions were  distributed  among  two  departments, institutions  and  social  service. No 
clear  lines  of  demarcation  in  function  were  followed  in  these  two, institutions 
being  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  latter  as  well  as  the  former.  In  general, 
however,  mental  defectives  were  committed  to  the  department  of  institutions, 
while  objects  of  charities  and  corrections  were  allocated  to  the  department 

^Maryland  report  p.  27. 


I 

. 


' 

- 

• 

. 

• 

• 

, 

, 

’ 

• 

. 

4 


. 

. 

. 

. 

126 


of  social  service.  In  explaining  its  groupings,  the  commission  notes:  "The 
coordination  of  agencies  with  allied  functions  in  comprehensive  departments 
will  do  away  with  overlapping  of  duties  and  duplication  of  effort,  and  will 
lessen  the  number  of  units  to  be  supervised,  thereby  making  review  more  ad- 
equate and  supervision  more  real.  There  are  no  factors  which  are  greater 
causes  of  inefficiency  than  decentralized  control  and  inadequate  supervision 
and  review."  ' The  group  having  to  do  with  the  regulation  of  financial  in- 
stitutions was  left  outside  the  main  departments  of  banking,  building  and 
loan  supervision,  and  state  insurance.  Another  group  of  agencies  dealing 
with  professional  standards,  or  the  usual  examining  boards  of  the  professions, 
were  likewise  organized  independently.  In  this  connection  the  commission 
observes:  MThe  evidence  gathered  and  the  experience  of  other  states  have 

convinced  the  committee  that  the  consolidation  of  any  one  of  these  with  either 
of  the  others,  or  the  inclusion  of  one  or  all  in  any  other  departmental  group 
is  impractical."  For  the  same  reason,  the  civil  service  commission,  state 
library,  military  affairs,  industrial  accident  commission,  industrial  wel- 
fare commission,  immigration  and  housing  commission  were  left  autonomous. 

beventeen  functional  departments  make  up  the  recent  Ohio  recommendation 
as  follows:  audit  (independent),  state,  military  affairs,  law,  finance,trade 

and  commerce,  public  works,  agriculture,  health,  industrial  commission,  educa- 
tion, welfare  administration,  board  of  welfare,  civil  service.  An  important 
variation  is  the  provision  for  welfare  administration.  All  administrative 
functions  dealing  with  the  three  classes  of  states'  wards:  mental  defect- 

ives, delinquents,  and  dependents  are  centered  in  the  department  of  welfare 

85New  York  constitution  commission  report  p.  85. 

88New  York  Reconstruction  commission  report  p.  27. 

87 California  report  p.  27. 


> 

► 

, 

. 


. 


. 

t 

. 


' « 

. 

# 

. 


. 

■ 

■ 

. 

' 


127 


administration,  while  to  the  state  board  of  welfare  are  given  the  duties  of 

visitation,  investigation,  and  report,  "for  the  purpose  of  checking  up  on 

the  work  which  is  being  done,  and  to  report  the  fact 3 to  the  director,  the 

88 

legislature,  and  the  public."  It  is  to  have  no  connection  with  the  manage- 
ment of  institutions,  its  chief  function  being  analysis  and  criticism  of  pro- 
grams and  results,  and  constructive  recommendations  as  to  new  policies  and 
programs  which  should  be  undertaken.  A public  utilities  commission  is  left 
independent  outside  the  executive  departments  because  "a  public  utilities 
commission  exercises  both  semi- judicial  and  administrative  functions  and  a 
several-headed  control  is  justified  . • • such  a commission  should  not  be 

QQ 

under  the  control  of  any  other  department ."w* 

The  most  recent  plan  of  departmental  organization,  that  of  Maryland, 
includes  eleven  major  departments  as  follows:  administration,  finance,  law, 

militia,  welfare,  health,  education,  public  works,  commerce,  labor,  employ- 
ment and  registration,  with  the  office  of  state  comptroller  organized  outside 
the  administration.  "The  allocation  of  state  functions  to  major  departments 
should  be  along  natural  and  practical  lines  that  will  bring  together  those 
activities  that  relate  to  the  same  subject  matter  and  that  can  be  handled  by 
the  same  staff"  is  the  statement  of  the  commissions  guiding  principle.  Its 
recommendation  stands  for  perhaps  the  most  careful,  untrammeled,  and  logical 
grouping  of  all  the  plans. 

A comparative  study  of  the  foregoing  representative  recent  plan  shows: 
(1)  Only  nominal  variation  in  the  grouping  of  the  propri- 
etary functions. 


880hio  report  p.  35 
89Ibid.  p.  27. 


. 


* ' 

t 


. 


128 


(2)  The  departments  of  health,  education,  public  worke, 
labor,  commerce,  and  welfare  of  the  service  functions 
common  to  all* 

(3)  variation  in  the  department  of  welfare  in  California 
and  Ohio,  illogical  in  the  former,  and  on  the  basis 
purely  of  administration  and  checking  up  in  the  latter* 

(4)  Public  utilities  outside  a department  in  California  and 
Ohio. 

A similar  study  of  ten  plans  before  1919:  Delaware,  Illinois,  Idaho, 

Iowa,  Massachusetts,  Minnesota,  Nebraska,  New  Jersey,  Oregon,  and  New  York, 
shows  education  as  a distinct  department  in  nine,  health  a department  in 
eight,  public  works  in  seven,  agriculture  in  seven.  Conspicuous  service  func- 
tions like  banking  and  insurance  in  New  York,  natural  resources  in  Califor- 
nia, and  reclamation  in  Idaho  led  to  their  organization  as  distinct,  separate 
departments  in  those  states,  while  in  the  dominantly  agricultural  states  like 
Minnesota,  relatively  negligible  services  of  labor  and  commerce  were  organiz- 
ed under  one  administrative  staff.  Other  variations  were  due  to  a local  sit- 
uation in  which  the  commissions  were  committed  to  utilizing  certain  existing 
statutory  agencies.  In  other  states  constitutional  offices  with  constituent 
functions  left  certain  correlated  functions  to  statutory  offices  or  depart- 
ments. 

In  this  connection,  however,  certain  exceptions  should  be  noted  which 
indicate  even  in  the  more  recent  plans  the  difficulty  of  achieving  a logical 
arrangement  of  departments  with  a special,  exclusive  field  for  each.  Aside 


! , 

, 

■ 4 4*0:;. 


■ 


129 


from  the  considerations  of  local  conditions  like  those  of  reclamation  in 
Idaho  and  of  expediency,  like  those  of  raised  by  constituent  offices  in  Ill- 
inois, there  is  the  problem  of  allocating  to  the  most  appropriate  departments 
certain  functions  on  the  basis  of  the  work  to  be  done.  Take,  for  example, 
the  reasons  advanced  by  the  Ohio  Commission  in  its  recent  report  for  allocat- 
ing the  examining  of  professions  to  the  proposed  department  of  education. 

"The  time  has  come,"  it  says,  "when  the  public's  interests,  that  is  the  inter- 
ests of  those  who  patronize  these  professions  (accountancy,  dentistry,  med- 
icine, nursing,  optometry,  pharmacy,  veterinary,  and  embalming)  should  be 
the  primary  consideration  in  making  up  examinations.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  it  is  suggested  to  abolish  the  present  boards  and  to  recognize  the  sol- 
idarity of  the  state's  interests  and  the  educational  motive  which  dominate 
professional  examinations  by  placing  all  this  work  under  the  direction  of 
the  department  of  education  • • • by  coordinating  this  work  under  the  depart- 
ment of  education  the  public  purpose  of  all  these  professions  would  be  em- 
phasized. No  person  ought  to  be  given  the  state's  permission  to  practice 
medicine  who  does  not  know  the  facts  about  modem  preventive  hygiene.  A 
dentist  should  know  how  teeth  can  be  saved  and  the  social  importance  and 
moral  obligation  of  saving  teeth,  as  well  as  the  mechanical  technique  of 
repairing  them.  The  reasons  for  not  recommending  the  placing  of  these  con- 
solidated services  in  tne  department  of  health  are  that  this  department  must 
secure  the  full  cooperation  of  all  practitioners,  if  it  is  to  be  successful. 
This  full  cooperation  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  if  the  state  de- 
partment of  health  were  mixed  up  with  a factional  discussion  of  proposed  new 
standards  for  admission  into  the  profession,  and  investigating  charges 
against  individual  practitioners,  by  recommending  that  this  examining  work 


1 ‘ 

. 

' 

I 


130 


come  under  the  department  of  education  instead  of  a consolidated  examining 

board,  it  is  hoped  to  secure  all  the  advantages  of  concentration  plus  the 

additional  advantages  of  recognizing  the  state’s  part  in  the  admission  of  new 

practitioners  to  professions  which  it  licenses  as  part  of  its  educational  pro- 

90 

gram  and  aac countability.** 

with  the  principle  of  state  regulation  the  commissions  are  in  hearty 
agreement,  but  here  the  identity  of  conclusions  ends.  In  one  instance,  the 
Oregon  commission  allocated  the  administration  of  th6  function  to  public  health 
Idaho?  in  another,  to  law  enforcement;  and  the  Maryland  commission,  in  still 
another,  in  the  most  recent  report  departmentalizes  it  as  a coordinate  branch 
of  the  department  of  employment  and  registration,  uonsider  their  reasons: 

**The  multiplication  of  independent  boards  for  each  class  of  practitioners  or 
trade  should  be  discouraged,"  notes  the  Oregon  commission.  "In  case  of  the 
health  examining  boards,  this  responsible  state  authority  should  be  the  state 
health  department,  and  a bureau  of  medical  registration  and  licensure  should 
be  created  in  this  department  to  have  charge  of  the  clerical  and  administra- 
tive work  and  the  issuance  of  licenses  now  attended  to  by  the  various  health 
examining  boards.  The  head  of  the  bureau  should  be  a deputy  health  director 
appointed  by  the  director  of  public  health.  A committee  of  three  competent 
members  of  each  of  the  health  professions  should  be  employed  by  such  deputy 
director  to  hold  examinations  whenever  necessary  or  advisable,  just  as  the 

state  insurance  commissioner  employs  actuaries  to  examine  the  affairs  of 

91 

insurance  companies."  Now  consider  this  proposal  of  the  Maryland  Commission: 
"There  is  very  close  relationship  between  the  work  of  conducting  examinations 
for  positions  in  the  classified  service  of  the  state  and  the  examination  pro- 
cedure required  in  connection  with  vocational  licensing,  and  much  of  the  same 


^Oregon  report  p.  SI 


I I 


. 


( 


, 


' 


131 


organization  and  procedure  can  be  used  in  common  if  these  two  functions  were 
grouped  together.  Tne  office  and  clerical  work  is  closely  related  in  ite 
nature  and  a similar  procedure  will  be  required  in  holding  either  civil  serv- 
ice or  vocational  license  examinations  in  various  parts  of  the  state.  A sep- 
arate department  of  registration  can  of  course  be  established,  but  would 

scarcely  seem  to  be  of  equal  importance  with  the  other  major  departments  pro- 

. ..92 
posed." 

In  contrast  to  all  these  proposals  is  that  of  the  California  commission 
which  would  leave  to  function  independently  the  group  of  state  agencies  which 
deals  with  professional  standards  in:  accountancy,  architecture,  medicine, 

dentistry,  optometry,  embalming,  pharmacy,  veterinary  medicine.  Their  rea- 
son given  is  as  follows:  "In  the  opinion  of  the  committee  it  is  seriously 

questionable  whether  or  net  increased  efficiency  in  the  functioning  of  these 

various  boards  or  reduced  expense  in  their  operation  would  be  accomplished 

93 

by  consolidating  all  of  them  in  a single  department."  Other  services, the 
allocation  of  which  varies  in  the  several  recent  reports  are:  (1)  agencies 

concerned  with  the  regulation  of  business— banking,  insurance,  building  and 
loan  supervision,  utilities, -variation  due  to  the  specialization  required 
for  proper  supervision.  Recent  plans  like  those  of  California  and  Ohio  pro- 
vide an  autonomous  agency  for  each  outside  executive  departments,  New  York 
builds  a department  staff  around  each  one  of  them;  while  Maryland  brings 
them  together  into  a single  executive  department  of  commerce  with  integrated 
divisions.  (2)  agencies  for  inspectional  purposes;  (3)  activities  relating 
to  the  dairy  industry,— variation  due  to  the  claims  of  the  health  and  the 
agriculture  departments:;  (4)  educational  agencies— scholastic,  vocational, 

■^Oregon  report  p.  91. 

•‘'Maryland  report  (1921)  p.  53 


' 


1 

■ 


. 

■ ‘ 


* 


. 1 • 


. 

. 


132 


cultural* 

10  An  even  greater  source  of  variation,  finally,  in  the  organization  of  ser- 
vice functions  lies  in  the  form  of  administrative  structure  itself.  In  the 
plans  referred  to,  four  placed  a board  over  the  department  of  education,  and 
two  in  the  same  way  organized  the  department  of  health.  In  at  least  one  plan, 
the  departments  of  agriculture, labor,  health,  commerce  and  labor,  corrections, 
conservation,  public  utilities,  and  natural  resources  were  so  organized.  In 
addition,  boards  of  varying  types  were  recommened  in  a majority  of  plans  for 
at  least  three  of  the  following  departments:  public  works,  labor,  health, 

institutions,  conservation,  agriculture,  education,  trade  and  commerce,  and 
public  works.  The  Taxpayers*  plan  led  with  the  six  boards  it  prescribed  as 
heads  of  departments,  and  New  York  followed  with  five.  Ohio  organized  two 
departments  under  boards,  California  two,  while  Maryland  recommended  a eingle- 
headed  administration  throughout. 

The  boards  utilized  also  vary  in  the  different  plana.  In  general  they 
may  be  classified  under  four  heads:  (1)  Those  composed  of  the  director,  to- 

gether with  deputies  or  division  chiefs  within  the  department.  These  boards 
are  recommended  primarily  for  quasi- judicial  and  quasi-legislative  functions. 
The  Taxpayers'  plan  employs  this  type  exclusively,  and  the  Oregon  plan 
prefers  it  to  all  others  for  this  purpose.  (2)  Advisory  councils  composed 
of  ex  officio  members  of  the  administration.  California,  Ohio,  and  New  York 
plans  employ  these  in  labor,  agriculture,  and  education.  (3)  Those  composed 
of  professionals  or  specially  interested  individuals  appointed  by  the  governor 
with  overlapping  tenures.  Oregon,  California,  and  New  York  recommends  these 
for  trade  and  commerce,  education,  health,  and  labor  respectively.  (4)  Those 

go  1 i i - - ■ -i  . , , . i ■ ■ 1 1 . 

California  report  (1919)  p.  17. 


. 

. 

. 

• 

« 

r 

' 


« 

■ 


' 


. 


( 


. 


. 


' 


133 


composed  of  specially  interested  citizens  to  act  primarily  in  an  advisory 
capacity,  oalifcrnia,  "ew  York,  Maryland,  and  Oregon  utilize  these  quite 
generally  in  such  departments  as  institutions,  agriculture,  public  works,  and 
conservation.  The  reasons  advanced  by  the  Commissions  in  recommending  the 
several  types  of  boards  as  part  of  the  administrative  schemes  have  a partic- 
ular significance  in  the  democratic  point  of  view  they  reveal.  Unlike  the 
administrative  ideal  of  centralized  responsibility  and  efficiency  so  exclu- 
sively adopted  in  the  proprietary  fields,  the  test  here  is  the  democracy  of 
the  administration the  diffusion  of  participation,  and  the  concert  of  minds 
in  forming  the  administrative  policy.  The  California  report  recommends  that 
“provision  be  made  for  the  retention  of  local  unpaid  boards  of  managers  for 
welfare  institutions,  to  serve  as  advisory  and  visiting  boards  and  to  form 

connecting  links  between  the  state  government,  the  institutions,  and  the 

94 

communities  in  which  they  are  located.**  In  the  same  spirit  it  recommends 
“that  the  governor  be  empowered  to  appoint  a local  unpaid  trustee  for  each  of 
the  memorial  properties  placed  under  the  public  works  departments."  The 
flew  York  oommission  provides  that  "in  order  to  maintain  local  or  special  inter- 
est and  support, the  present  boards  or  associations  will  continue  as  boards  of 

96 

trustees  in  the  department  of  conservation."  The  Maryland  report  in  rec- 
ommending unpaid,  advisory  boards  exclusively  for  the  departments  of  welfare, 
health,  and  education  explains:  "In  conjunction  with  the  eleven  executive 

departments  and  the  independent  auditing  office,  it  is  proposed  to  establish 
certain  advisory  boards  or  councils  whose  function  it  would  be  to  advise  ad- 
ministrative officials  and  to  assist  in  the  formulation  of  policies.  Each  of 

otlbid  p.  27. 

'^Ibid  p.  23. 

96Ibid.  p.  22. 


« . ' 
1 


. 


•>  i . 


o 

1 1 I -■  1 ; 

■< 

- 


1 it.  ft,  tfj»'  yUB 


L. 


' 

■ • 

■ * 


134 


these  boards  • . would  serve  a useful  purpose,  however,  in  situations  where 
the  judgment  of  more  than  one  person  is  valuable,  and  where  the  opinions  of 
representatives  of  the  general  public  would  tend  to  assure  the  government  of 
the  soundness  of  a given  proposal.  Positions  on  such  boards  would  be  non- 
remun  erat ive. “ ^ 

Even  the  Ohio  commission  which  reduced  to  rather  negative  principle  the 
results  of  a very  unsatisfactory  experience  with  administrative  boards  in 
that  state,  was  led  to  substitute  an  advisory  board  for  one  which  it  proposes 
to  abolish  ir.  the  department  of  welfare.  "This  board  would  have  no  admin- 
istrative duties  to  perform,"  it  explains,  "but  its  duty  would  be  to  visit 
and  investigate  state  institutions  for  the  purpose  of  checxing  up  on  the  work 

which  is  being  done  by  the  department  of  welfare  administration  and  report 

98 

the  facts  to  the  director,  the  legislature,  and  the  public." 

It  remains  for  the  Oregon  report,  finally,  to  formulate  the  statement 
of  the  human  welfare  note  which  enters  to  modify  the  administration  of  ser- 
vice functions.  "A  managing  board,  or  officer  over  state  charitable  and 
correctional  institutions,"  it  explains,  "is  sometimes  inclined  to  look  mere- 
ly at  the  immediate  financial  aspect  of  the  conduct  of  the  institutions  and 
to  make  petty  economies  at  the  expense  of  the  welfare  of  the  inmates,  while 
possibly  neglecting  to  some  extent  their  proper  care  and  cure.  The  largest 
and  most  important  economies  in  the  management  of  the  institutions  can,  in 
the  long  run,  be  effected  by  a far-sighted  policy  of  scientific  treatment 
and  cure  of  the  inmates,  so  as  to  retore  them  more  quickly  to  normal  member- 
ship in  society  and  thus  to  relieve  the  state  the  burden  of  their  expense. 

^Maryland  report  (1921)  p,  27. 

^Ohio  report  (1920)  p.  36. 


. 


. 


135 


In  order,  therefore,  to  supply  a corrective  influence  to  the  possibly  too 
narrow  financial  and  business  point  of  view  of  the  managing  officer  and  to 
look  after  the  proper  care  and  welfare  of  the  inmates,  it  is  recommended  that 
there  be  created  an  advisory  unpaid  board  of  five  members,  appointed  by  the 
governor,  at  least  one  of  whom  should  be  a woman,  which  should  exercise  pow- 
ers of  inspection,  investigation  and  report  with  reference  to  the  charitable 

99 

and  correctional  institutions.'*  Considerations  of  board  control  in  the 
commissions*  reports,  therefore,  are  significant  in  this  respect:  They  show 

underlying  human  motives  of  democracy  and  welfare  which  must  be  taken  into 
account  in  any  proposal  for  administration  of  service  functions. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a recent  tendency  best  defined  in  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Maryland  report  which  makes  “each  of  these  advisory  boards  an 
integral  part  of  a departmental  organization,  but  without  intending  that  it 
should  have  any  active  part  in  administration."  After  noting  that  of  the 
eighty-one  permanent  state  agencies  in  Maryland,  sixty-six  were  headed  by 
commissions  and  fifteen  by  a single  individual,  the  report  reviews  the  histor- 
ical development  in  which  this  came  about,  with  the  observation  that  "in  re- 
cent years  there  has  been  a disposition  on  the  part  of  the  general  assembly 
to  return  to  the  'one  man*  type  of  administration."^^  continuing,  it  ob- 
serves: “Numerous  factors  enter  into  an  appraisal  of  the  effectiveness  of 

the  work  of  the  various  departments  of  the  state  government,  only  one  of  them 
being  the  type  of  organization  involved.  It  is,  therefore,  impossible  to 
demonstrate  such  a general  assertion  as  that  those  agencies  headed  by  commis- 
sions have  been  less  successful  than  those  headed  by  a single  official.  Never- 


*’lbid  p.  40. 

^^Maryland  report  (1921)  p.  23 


136 


thelees,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  where  effective  administrative  work  has 
been  accomplished  by  boards  or  commissions,  it  has  been  achieved  in  spite  of, 
rather  than  as  a result  of,  that  type  of  organization,  and  that  still  better 
results  would  have  been  attained  if  responsibility  had  been  definitely  cent- 
ered on  a single  individual."  here  the  uommission  sharply  distinguished 
between  the  board  as  a discretionary  and  as  an  administrative  agency.  It  is 
in  the  latter  capacity  that  its  weakness  is  inherent.  Quoting  from  the  report 
we  read:  "The  vocational  examining  boards  furnish  . • illustration  of  the 

failure  of  the  commission  form  as  an  administrative  agency.  Most  of  them 
have  neither  offices  nor  employees,  and  it  is  difficult  for  license  applicants 
to  locate  them.  Many  of  them  keep  no  files  or  records  of  consequence  and 
their  activity  is  generally  proportionate  to  the  amount  of  time  and  interest 
which  their  secretaries  can  devote  to  the  work.  • • While  a board  may  be  nec- 
essary in  holding  examinations,  the  administrative  functions  of  these  agencies 
have  been  woefully  neglected  because  of  this  type  of  organization.”  Whereupon 
the  report  proposes  to  transfer  the  board  to  an  executive  department  where  its 
administrative  work  will  be  executed  by  an  efficient  permanent  staff,  leaving 
the  board  itself  free  for  the  functions  it  was  originally  created  to  perform. 
In  the  words  of  the  Commission:  "The  modern  tendency  toward  a functional 

grouping  of  activities  is  evidenced  by  the  recent  establishment  of  the  state 
employment  commission.  The  function  of  employment,  common  to  all  departments 
and  institutions,  has  been  centralized  with  the  result  that  these  agencies 
are  relieved  of  administrative  detail  in  this  connection  and  are  free  to  per- 
form far  more  effective  work  in  their  own  specialized  fields.  To  point  out 
the  advantages  of  a logical  grouping  and  distribution  of  function  in  an 
organization  is  merely  to  express  in  another  way  the  present-day  tendency 


137 


toward  specialization  in  all  fields  of  human  endeavor. In  reassigning 
functions  to  the  board  of  agriculture,  the  Ohio  commission  in  its  recent 
report  explains  much  to  the  same  effect:  “The  purpose  of  the  large  board 

of  ten  memoers  was  to  secure  representation  of  the  varied  interests  dealt 
with  by  the  department  and  to  bring  to  bear  upon  the  agricultural  problems 
of  the  state  the  advice  and  counsel  of  the  leading  agricultural  and  business 
men  of  the  state.  This  purpose  is  interfered  with  to  some  extent  by  requir- 
ing these  men  to  devote  a considerable  part  of  their  time,  when  in  session, 
to  routine  executive  duties  such  as  the  approval  of  appointments,  promotion, 
and  dismissal  of  employes  concerning  v/hich  the  board  has  little  knowledge, 
little  time, or  opportunity  to  investigate  and  consequently  must  rely  almost 
wholly  upon  the  decision  of  the  secretary.  It  is  obvious  that  an  unpaid 
board  meeting  monthly  can  act  in  an  advisory  capacity  but  cannot  supervise 
and  coordinate  the  work  of  several  departments,  by  the  creation  of  an  advis- 
ory board  the  original  purposes  would  be  served  and  the  department  could  func- 
tion properly  and  effectively  and  assume  the  position  which  rightfully  belongs 

to  it  as  one  of  the  coordinate  major  departments  of  state  government  having  a 

102 

representative  on  the  governor's  cabinet.”  Again,  referring  to  the  welfare 
board  in  maxing  a similar  proposal  for  its  reconstitution,  the  commission  ex- 
plains: “It  has  failed  in  these  services  not  because  it  did  not  want  to  help, 

but  because  it  was  asked  to  do  what  boards  and  commissions  seldom  do,  namely, 
manage  and  administer  as  well  as  legislate.  It  has  been  no  one  member's  duty 
to  look  ahead  for  the  entire  many-sided  problem.  Even  where  one  member  has 
special  knowledge,  he  must  defer  to  three  others  who  lack  his  special  knowl- 
edge but  who  are  compelled  to  go  through  the  form  of  weighing  his  evidence 


101Ibid.  p.  21. 

1020hio  report  (1920)  p.  23 


. 


. 


■ 

. 


* 


. 

t 


■ 

' 


* 


• • 


B i,;  1 11T** 


138 

and  challenging  his  recommendations*  With  such  diffusion  at  the  top,  it  has 

naturally  been  impossible  for  the  state  to  secure  from  trained  subordinates 

the  service  they  could  give  were  efficiency  and  initiative  fostered  and 

103 

compelled  by  an  exacting  head  with  a consistent  cumulative  policy." 

Reduced  to  a working  principle,  therefore,  this  newer  tendency  may  thus 
be  defined: 

(1)  *or  administrative  services,  a strong,  unifying  central 
control  and  direction. 

(2)  jj’or  questions  involving  discretions  and  requiring  delibera- 
tion, a body  of  men. 

The  first  consideration  is  essential  to  the  effectiveness  of  administra- 
tion and  the  second  is  an  antidote  for  bureaucracy*  The  following  tendencies, 
finally,  may  be  said  to  stand  out  from  this  study  of  functional  organization 
of  service  activities  in  the  states  as  proposed  by  the  efficiency  commissions: 

(1)  no  such  general  acceptance  of  a managerial  heirarchy 
as  in  the  case  of  the  so-called  proprietary  functions 
where  considerations  of  efficiency  and  responsibility 
alone  prevailed. 

(2)  A variation  in  the  scope  of  departmental  units  such 
as  labor  and  commerce  in  Minnesota,  reclamation  in 
Idaho,  conservation  and  industries  in  New  Jersey,  and 
banking  in  New  York  in  an  adaption  to  local  or  "texture" 
needs. 

^0^1  bid.  p.  35T 


. 


139 

(3)  A variation  in  the  allocation  of  functions  like  registra” 
tion,  vocational  education,  and  the  dairy  industry  due  to 
the  conflicting  claim  of  the  special  interests  involved, 
such  as  the  department  of  labor's  claim  to  vocational 
training  supervision,  etc. 

(4)  A variety  of  boards  and  commissions  and  of  board  control. 

(6)  The  uniform  utilization  of  the  advisory  boards  from  dem- 
ocratic and  welfare  motivtP. 

(6)  An  unmistakable  tendency  in  the  more  recent  plans  toward 
a further  functional  division  between  discretionary  and 
purely  administrative  duties  in  allocating  service  activ- 
ities to  boards  and  commissions. 

cecause  of  the  presence  of  subtle  human  motives,  in  brief,  service  admin- 
istration even  in  the  reports  of  efficiency  commissions  still  presents  a wide 
range  of  variations  in  functional  grouping  and  organization. 

11  Reduced  to  tendencies  and  principles,  in  conclusion,  this  study  of  some 
ten  thousand  pages  of  the  more  recent  reports  of  efficiency  and  econony  com- 
missions in  the  American  states  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

(1)  The  tendency  in  recent  years  for  relatively  indifferent 
legislative  committees  to  give  way  to  expert  investigators. 

(2)  The  increasingly  uniform  practice  of  efficiency  experts  in 
government  surveys  to  call  into  consultation  professional 
men  as  well  as  officials  where  their  interests  are  involved. 


* 


. 


- 


' 


140 


(3)  The  increasing  practicability  of  the  proposals  of  commis- 
sions representing, as  they  are  coming  more  and  more  to  do, 
the  lay  and  official  as  well  as  the  expert  point  of  view. 

(4)  The  identity  of  principles  by  which  they  evolve  the  new 
status  of  governor  as  the  responsible  effective  head  of 
administration,  particularly  in  the  proprietary  functions. 

(5)  The  identity  of  methods  by  which  they  incorporate  the 
principle  of  managerial  hierarchy  in  the  purely  business 
or  proprietary  activities  of  state  governments. 

(6)  The  marked  conservatism  with  which  they  departmentalize, 
allocate,  and  organize  the  service  or  welfare  activities 
of  states— in  other  words,  their  uniform  responsiveness 
to  the  paramount  considerations  of  democracy,  human  wel- 
fare, and  local  or  "texture”  needs  in  all  service  admin- 
istration. 

Implied  in  the  foregoing  statement  of  tendencies  are  the  more  striking 
proposals  of: 


A ballet  of  two  for  the  executive  department— the  gover- 
nor and  comptroller. 

Department  heads  appointed  by  the  governor  and  directly 
responsible  to  him  without  confirmation  of  the  senate. 

The  creation  of  an  administrative  staff  for  the  governor, 
including  expert  and  secretarial  personnel  outside  the 


* 


. . 


... 

• I I 


- 


main  departments 


An  independent  auditor  outside  the  administration, 
responsible  directly  to  the  legislature,  charged 
exclusively  with  legal  and  operation  audits. 

A department  of  finance  with  special  attention  to 
allocation  of  accounting,  revenue,  and  budget  func- 
tions. 

The  executive  budget  with  all  it  implies  of  absolute 
integration  of  control  within  the  administration, 
participation  in  legislative  hearings,  public  hear- 
ings, item  veto,  and  special  emergency  bills  with 
legislative  responsibility  for  increase  in  the  gover 
nor's  estimates. 

A personnel  department  modelled  on  modern  principles 

A department  of  law  under  the  direct  control  of  the 
governor. 

a governor *8  cabinet  uniformly  adapted  in  size  and 
membership  to  purposes  of  consultation. 

A legislative  council  as  a continuous  critic  of  the 
administration. 

Progressive  separation  of  executive  and  routine  func 
tions  in  internal  organization  of  administrative  de- 


partments 


142 


Utilization  of  unpaid,  advisory  boards  from  democrat- 
ic and  welfare  motives. 

Retention  of  board  control  in  and  out  of  departments 
with  administrative  centralization  of  non- discretionary 
matters. 


. 


f" 


143 


IV- SESSION  LAWS 


In  this  section  devoted  primarily  to  a review  of  recent  legislation, 
a different  method  of  analyzing  the  findings  is  followed. 


Instead  of  a narrative  statement  of  the  findings  after  the  manner  of 
the  preceding  sections,  we  propose  in  this  part  of  the  paper  to  let  the  acts 
in  the  main  speak  for  themselves.  On  the  other  hand,  data  from  the  session 
laws  are  classified  in  the  same  order  observed  in  the  section  dealing  with 
the  reports  of  the  efficiency  and  economy  committees.  In  this  way  reference 
will  be  facilitated,  and  the  significance  of  recent  legislation  in  the  light 
of  expert  recommendations,  more  readily  perceived.  This  order  is  as  follows: 


1-General  purpose  of  the  reorganization  acts  as 
indicated  in  representative  enacting  clauses. 


?,-Policy  with  respect  to  constitutional  officers. 


3-Governor's  control  of  the  administration. 


(1)  Appointment 

(2)  Fixing  salaries  of  subordinates 

(3)  Organization  of  departments 

(4)  Special  provisions  relating  to  the 
organization  of  departments 

(5)  Personnel 

(6)  Qualifications  fixed  by  law 

(7)  Budget 


4- Functional  organization. 

5- Boards  and  Commissions. 


In  this  connection,  referring  again  to  the  discussion  of  the  efficiency 


4 


. 


. 


, 


- 

. 


. 


' 


. 


144 


and  economy  commissions,  those  inevitable  causes  leading  to  reorganization 
should  be  re-emphasized: 

1- The  inevitable  coterminous  expansion  of  population, 
wealth,  and  the  scope  of  government  activity. 

2- The  increasing  complexity  and  inefficiency  of  an 
administrative  system,  hurriedly  and  illogically 
planned. 

3- The  mounting  costs  of  such  an  illogical  system. 

4-  A fiscal  emergency. 

Multiplicity  and  diversity  of  boards  represent  the  first-atage;  a dis- 
integrated, negative  governmental  system  the  second,  — for  the  untrained  law- 
maker is  bound  by  historical  prejudices;  a mounting  state  deficit,  the  third; 
and  a popular  revolt,  the  fourth. 

Recent  legislative  acts  dealing  with  the  organization  of  administration 
represent  all  four  stages.  There  are  those  scattering  creations  of  un- 
correlated agencies  of  the  first  stage;  those  ineffectual  attempts  at  piece- 
meal coordination  of  the  second;  the  legislative  budgets  of  the  third;  and 
the  efficiency  and  economy  resolutions  of  the  fourth.  Any  search  for  signif- 
icant recent  tendencies  in  the  legislative  acts  themselves,  therefore,  log- 
ically begins  where  the  preliminary  inevitable  development s leave  off,  and 
by  this  principle  we  propose  to  be  guided  in  this  part  of  the  paper. 

In  other  words,  legislative  acts  represented  in  these  findings  fall  in- 
to five  classes: 


i 


, 


. 


. 


. 


(1)  Those  effecting  a general  reorganization  of  admin- 
istrative departments:  Nebraska,  Ohio,  Idaho, 

Washington,  Massachusetts* 

(2)  Those  providing  a partial  reorganization:  Missouri, 
Michigan,  California. 

(3)  Those  establishing  isolated  but  well  organized 

departmental  groupings:  Indiana,  Pennsylvania, 

Utah,  Minnesota,  West  Virginia. 

(4)  Those  unclassified  specific  provisions  which  affect 
the  status  of  the  administrative  agencies  in  a 
conspicuous  way* 

(5)  Those  authorizing  the  executive  budget. 


, 


. 


4 


. 


. 


. 


146 

1-General  purposes  as  indicated  in  representative  enacting  clauses: 

"The  supreme  power  of  the  state  is  vested  in  the  governor  who 
is  expressly  charged  with  the  duty  of  seeing  that  the  laws  are  faith- 
fully executed.  In  order  that  he  may  exercise  a portion  of  the  author- 
ity so  vested  and  in  addition  to  the  powers  now  conferred  upon  him  by 
law,  civil  administrative  departments  are  hereby  created,  through  the 
instrumentality  of  which  the  governor  is  authorized  to  exercise  the 
functions  in  this  chapter  assigned  to  each  department.”^ 

”In  order  that  the  governor  may  exercise  the  supreme  executive 

power  of  the  state  vested  in  him  by  the  constitution  and  adequately 

perform  his  constitutional  duty  to  see  that  tho  laws  are  faithfully 

executed,  the  administrative  functions  are  organized  as  provided  in 
2 

this  chapter.” 

"That  in  the  enactment  of  this  law  it  is  hereby  declared  to  be 
the  intent  and  purpose  of  the  federal  assembly  to  effectually  pro- 
vide for  the  concentration  of  authority,  with  reference  to  the 
management,  and  the  co-ordination  of  ths  activities  of  the  several 
agencies  or  branches  of  the  state  government  to  which  this  act  ap- 
plies, to  the  end  that  state  revenues  may  be  conserved  and  a higher 
standard  of  efficiency  obtained  in  the  administration  of  the  laws 
to  which  this  act  refers." 

"The  fact  that  there  are  now  too  many  departments  in  the  state 
government,  and  the  fact  that  the  consolidation  of  the  departments 

};Idahc . Session  laws,  1921,  Ch.  8. 

^Ohio.  Session  laws,  1921,  H.  B.  249. 

3Mi  ssouri,  Session  laws,  1921,  Ch.  5. 


. 

. 


■ 


- ' 


. , .. 


'i 


, 

’ 


. 


■* 

. . 


' 


. > 


, 


147 


herein  mentioned  will  contribute  to  efficiency  and  economy,  creates 

4 

an  emergency  and  an  imperative  public  necessity." 

"An  act  to  • . promote  efficiency,  order,  and  economy  in  the 
administration  of  the  government  of  the  stats."6 

"The  civil  administration  of  the  laws  is  hereby  vested  in  the 
governor.  For  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  governor  in  the  execution 
and  administration  of  the  law,  the  executive  administration  work 
shall  be  divided  into  the  several  departments  enumerated  in  Section 
2 of  this  article."6 

"It  is  the  policy  of  this  state  to  vest  in  the  governor  the 
civil  administration  of  the  laws  of  the  state  and  for  the  purpose 
of  aiding  the  governor  in  the  execution  and  administration  of  the 
laws  and  to  divide  the  executive  and  administrative  work  into  de- 

7 

partments  as  provided  by  law."' 


4 

Texas.  Session  laws,  1921,  Ch.  10. 
^Washington.  Session  laws,  1921. 
^Nebraska.  Session  laws,  1919. 
"California.  Session  laws,  1921,  Ch.  602. 


*. 


148 


2-Policy  with  reapect  to  constitutional  officers: 

State  superintendent  of  public  instruction  made  ex  officio 
director  of  department  of  education;  really  executive  officer 

Q 

of  the  board  of  education  in  charge  of  text  books. 

Resolution  proposing  amendment  to  constitution  for  the 
appointment  of  state  superintendent  of  public  instruction  leav- 
ing term  of  office,  duties,  and  compensation  to  be  prescribed 
by  law.^ 

Commissioner  of  education  of  new  statutory  department  shall 
perform  duties  hitherto  required  by  law  of  the  state  superintend- 
ent, a constitutional  officer.  All  functions  vested  by  law  in 
the  state  superintendent  transferred  to  commissioner  of  education.^ 

All  executive  and  administrative  officers  except  the  governor, 
lieutenant-governor,  treasurer,  and  secretary  of  state  are  made 
subject  to  merger  or  consolidation  by  the  legislature;  this  pro- 
vision in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  number  of  constitutional  of- 
ficers were  actually  increased  in  the  new  constitution.^ 

Constitutional  officers  head  respective  departments  created 
for  them.^2 

Commissioner  of  immigration,  labor,  and  statistics  made  head 
of  the  department  of  the  same  name— a constitutional  office,  ap- 
pointed by  governor  and  senate.  Only  exception  in  Idaho  code  to 

|lbid.  Ch.  502. 

.^Indiana.  Session  laws,  Ch.  296. 
iU:vlinnesota.  Session  laws,  Ch.  334. 


. 


u 


> 


, 


« 


. 


■ 


* 


. 


. 

' 


. 


general  rule  of  appointment  by  governor  alone  for  indefinite 
term. ^ 

Superintendent  of  public  instruction  to  be  appointed  by 
governor  and  senate. ^ 

Educational  work  of  the  state  consolidated  under  state 
superintendent  of  public  instruction  as  director  of  the  depart- 
ment; superintendent  of  public  works  made  director  of  the  de- 

15 

partment  of  public  works. 

Creation  of  an  administrative  board  composed  of  constitu- 
tional officers  and  heads  of  departments  to  correlate  the  whole 

16 

work  of  administration. 

Administrative  committees  of  three  members  each,  composed 
of  elective  state  officers  to  perform  respective  duties:  state 
equalization,  state  finance,  state  highway,  state  capitol,  state 
library,  etc* 1-7 


^Louisiana,  Cont.  Amend.  1921. 
^Massachusetts,  Session  laws,  1919,  Ch.  350. 
JJIdaho,  S.  L.  1919. 

’’^Tennessee,  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  11. 
l50hio.  S.  L.  1921. 

^Michigan.  S.  L.  1921,  No.  389. 

^Washington.  S.  L.  1921. 


• , ' 

» , , ■ s 


150 


3-Governors’  control  of  administration 


(1)  Appointment 


Heads  of  departments 


a- Appointed  by  governor  with  advice  and  consent  of  senate. 

Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
New  York 
Pennsylvania 
Vermont 
Washington 
West  Virginia 

* Approval  of  council,  independent 
elective  body  of  nine  members. 


b-Appointed  by  governor  alone. 

California 

Colorado 

*Idaho 

Indiana 

Montana 

Commissioner  of  immigration,  a 
constitutional  officer  appointed 
by  governor  with  consent  of  sen- 
ate. 


c-Both  methods. 

Minnesota 


Chiefs  of  bureaus  and  divisions 


a- Appointed  by  director  or  head  of  the  department  with 
approval  of  governor. 

California 

Indiana 

Michigan 


151 


Missouri 

Pennsylvania 

Vermont 

•* **  Approval  state  administrative 
board. 


b-Appointed  by  director  alone. 

Colorado 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
New  York 
*0hio 

Washington 

*Chief  of  division  of  banks  ap- 
pointed by  governor. 


c-Appointed  by  governor  alone. 

Idaho 

Nebraska 


Tenure  of  heads  of  departments 


a-Hold  office  during  pleasure  of  governor. 

Cali fornia 

Colorado 

Idaho 

Michigan 

Missouri 

Ohio 

Utah 

b-Specified  term  of  four  years. 

Indiana 

•^Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
■^Pennsylvania 
Vermont 
West  Virginia 

*3-5  years. 

**2  years. 


. 


. 


* 

. 

■ ' 

. 


152 


c-Removal  by  governor  for  cause. 

Indiana 

Tennessee 

Minnesota 


(2)  Fixing  salaries  of  heads  of  departments. 


a-Fixed  by  governor. 


Missouri 

Washington 


b- Fixed  by  law. 

California 

Colorado 

Indiana 

Massachusetts 

Minnesota 

Missouri 

Montana 

Nebraska 

New  York 

Pennsylvania 

Utah 

West  Virginia 


(3)  Organization  of  departments. 


Power  to  create,  abolish,  or  recombine  bureaus  and  divisions. 


a- Cabinet 

Washington 


b-Head  of  department  with  approval  of  governor. 

California 

Colorado 

.'Idaho 

Indiana 

JNebraska 

Pennsylvania* 

Massachusett  s** 


153 


^Approval  advisory  council. 
**Approval  of  governor  and  council. 
.'Limited  to  personnel* 

c-Head  of  department  alone. 

*Idaho 

Minnesota 

♦♦Michigan 

♦With  exceptions. 

♦♦Labor  department  only. 


Power  to  fix  salaries  of  subordinates, 
a- Cabinet . 


Washington 


b-Head  of  department  with  approval  of  governor. 

Indiana 

Idaho 

**Massachu setts 
♦Montana 
Pennsylvania 
**Utah 

♦Approval  board  of  examiners. 

♦* Approval  of  governor  and  council. 


c-H9ad  of  department  alone* 

Minnesota 

♦Ohio 

♦Subject  to  civil  service  probisions. 


d-Governor . 


Nebraska 


. . ' 


. 


. 


. 


154 


(4)  Special  provisions  relating  to  the  organization  of  departments. 

Heads  of  bureaus  may  create  new  bureaus  in  addition 
to  those  prescribed  by  law;  each  officer,  board,  and  com- 
mission having  supervision  and  control  of  a state  depart- 
ment may  employ  a person  to  serve  under  such  officer 
board,  or  commission  in  a confidential  capacity,  and  such 
employment  shall  be  exempt  from  civil  service  laws.^ 

Commissioner  of  labor  in  newly  created  department 

may  appoint  such  heads  of  divisions,  bureaus,  etc.  as 

necessary^  may  transfer  or  abolish,  or  even  consolidate 

19 

such  divisions,  bureaus,  etc. 

Director  of  department  shall  have  authority  to  con- 
solidate any  two  or  more  bureaus  created  in  his  department, 
reduce  the  number  or  create  new  bureaus  therein;  with 

20 

consent  of  governor  may  create  advisory  boards  when  needed. 

The  head  of  each  department,  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  governor  shall  have  power  to  arrange  and  classify  the 
work  of  the  department,  and  to  consolidate,  abolish,  or  create 
divisions  thereof.  So  far  as  consistent  with  the  law  the  head 
of  each  department  may  adopt  such  rules  and  regulations  as  may 
be  necessary  to  govern  the  activities  of  the  department  and 
may  assign  to  each  of  the  officers  and  employees  thereof  such 

■^Massachusetts.  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  350. 

19 New  York  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  50. 

200hio  S.  L.  1921. 


* . ■ ■ ' > 


i>.  V . 


155 


duties  and  labors  as  he  may  see  fit.  And  he  may,  from  time 
to  time  for  the  betterment  of  the  public  service,  reassign 
to  any  and  all  employees  under  the  chief  of  any  division 
such  duties  as  he  may  see  fit;  he  shall  have  the  right  to 
inspect  books  and  records  and  to  hear  complaints,  administer 
oaths,  certify  to  all  official  acts,  and  to  issue  subpoenas 
for  the  attendance  of  witness  and  the  production  of  papers, 
books,  accounts,  documents,  and  testimony  in  any  inquiry, 
investigation,  hearing  or  proceeding  pertinent  or  material 
thereto  to  any  part  of  the  state.  * 

Total  number  of  employees  and  appointees  under  new 
consolidation  act  shall  not  be  larger  than  the  number  of 

appointees  employed  by  the  several  boards  before  consolida- 

A . 22 
tion. 

Members  of  conservation  commission  given  powers  to 
execute  and  serve  warrants  and  processes  issued  by  any 
justice  of  peace  or  any  council  having  jurisdiction  under 
any  provisions  of  the  act  creating  it.  Granted  power  of 
eminent  domain. 


In  all  cases  where  a question  arises  between  depart- 
ments or  officers  or  boards  thereof  as  to  their  respective 
jurisdiction  or  powers,  or  where  departments,  officers,  or 


21Nebraska  S«  L. 
^-Missouri  S.  L. 
■^Indiana,  S.  L. 


1919;  California  S.  L.  1921 
1921,  S.  B.  434. 

1919,  Ch.  238. 


• 

, 

. 

. 

‘ 

, 

K 

t 

‘ 

. 

• • 

■ • ' 

. 

. 


, ‘ • ' ‘'i 


boards  issue  conflicting  orders  or  making  conflicting  rules 
and  regulations,  the  governor  and  council  shall  on  appeal 
of  any  such  department  or  person  affected  thereby,  have 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  question,  and  to  order  any 
such  order,  rule,  or  regulation  amended  or  annulled:  provid- 
ed that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  construed  to 
deprive  any  person  of  the  right  to  pursue  any  other  lawful 
remedy.  The  time  when  such  appeal  may  be  taken  shall  be 
fixed  by  the  governor  and  council.  Governor  shall  have 
power  to  appoint  such  deputies,  assistants,  employees, 
clerical  help  as  shall  be  necessary  or  essential  to  the 
economical  but  efficient  and  proper  enforcement  and  admin- 
istration of  the  laws  of  the  state,  and  shall  at  the  same 
time  fix  the  salaries  of  such  appointees  and  prescribe 
their  duties.  Appointees  may  be  required  to  serve  in  one 
or  more  departments  and  may  be  transferred  from  one  de- 
partment to  another  from  time  to  time;  secretaries  of  de- 
partments shall  devise  a practical  and  working  basis  for 

cooperation  and  coordination  of  work,  eliminating  duplica- 

24 

tion  and  overlapping  functions. 

(5)  Personnel. 

a-Staff  agency. 

The  governor's  cabinet  of  ten  heads  of 
departments  to  systematize  and  unify 
duties  of  the  various  departments  of 


' ;•  lOd 


. 


■ . 


. . 


t • 

. 

■ • 

. 

157 

state  government;  to  classify  subordinate 
officers,  departments,  institutions;  to 
determine  salaries  and  compensation  of 
subordinate  officers  and  employees,  to 
authorize  any  institution,  state  officer 
or  department  of  state  government  to  incur 
liabilities  to  carry  on  their  work  until 
meeting  of  legislature;  department  of  ef- 
ficiency to  make  efficiency  surveys  of  all 
state  departments  and  institutions;  to 
prepare  and  recommend  to  administrative 

board  a system  of  classification,  salaries 

25 

compensation  for  all  subordinate  officers 

The  department  of  finance  to  investigate 
duplication  of  work  of  departments  and  the 
efficiency  of  the  organization,  and  administra- 
tion of  departments,  and  to  formulate  and  put 
into  effect  plans  for  the  better  co-operation 
of  departments,  and  the  coordination  of  work, 
eliminating  duplication  and  overlapping  of 
functions;  director  of  finance  appointed  by 
governor  and  holds  office  at  his  pleasure.'- 

(6)  Qualifications  fixed  by  law. 

^Nebraska,  S.  L.  1919. 

^Washington,  s*  L.  1921. 

26Utah  S.  L.  1921  Ch.  127. 


158 


Director  of  Commerce  and  superintendent  of 
insurance  must  not  have  any  official  connection 
with  an  insurance  company;  chief  of  division  of 
examination  and  licensing  in  department  of  educa- 
tion must  not  be  affiliated  with  any  college  or 
school  of  medicine,  or  of  pharmacy,  dentistry, 
nursing,  optometry,  embalming,  either  as  teacher, 
officer,  stockholder;  superintendent  of  highways 
must  be  civil  engineer  of  at  least  five  years 
experience  in  construction  and  maintenance  of 
highways;  director  of  agriculture  must  be  person 
actively  identified  with  agriculture;  director 

of  health  must  be  physician  skilled  in  sanitary 
27 

science.  Chief  of  division  of  examining  and 
licensing  in  department  of  education  mu3t  not 
be  affiliated  with  schools,  societies,  represent- 
ed by  any  class  of  applicants;  director  of  com- 
merce and  superintendent  of  insurance  must  not 
have  any  official  connection  with  an  insurance 
company. 

Director  of  banking  shall  have  had  at  least 

three  years  practical  experience  in  a general 

28 

banking  business. 

Highway  engineer  must  be  thirty- five  years 

~27 


Ohio  S.  L.  1921 


. 


. 


old;  mu3t  have  had  five  years  practical  exper- 
ience in  making  public  highways;  must  be  a 

graduate  and  licensed  engineer  with  at  least 

29 

ten  year 8 experience. 

Commissioner  of  health  department  must 
hold  degree  of  doctor  of  public  health  or  its 

30 

equivalent;  must  have  had  five  years  experience. 

One  member  of  conservation  commission  must 

be  appointed  by  governor  from  a list  of  persons 

31 

nominated  by  Indiana  Academy  of  Science. 

The  board  of  agriculture  advisers  shall  be 
composed  of  representative  citizens  engaged  in 
various  agricultural  pursuits  throughout  the 
state,  not  excluding  representatives  of  the  agri- 
cultural press  and  of  the  state  agricultural  sta- 
tion; neither  the  commissioner  of  commerce  and 
industry  nor  any  director  in  his  department  shall 
be  the  owner  of  or  financially  interested  in  any 
banking  or  insurance  corporation  subject  to  the 
supervision  of  the  department;  the  commissioner 
of  commerce  and  industry  shall  have  had  at  least 
five  years'  practical  experience  in  the  banking 
business,  or  shall  have  served  for  a like  period 
in  the  banking  department  of  this  or  some  other 

2®Missouri  S.  L.  1921.  S.  B.  434. 


state;  administrative  officers  in  the  department 
of  law  enforcement  shall  hold  a license  or 
certificate  to  exercise  any  of  the  professions, 
trades,  or  occupations  regulated  or  licensed  by 
the  department.  Commissioner  of  public  invest- 
ments 3hall  have  had  at  least  five  gears’  exper- 
ience in  the  banking  or  investment  business; 
the  public  health  adviser  shall  be  a person  ex- 
perienced in  the  practice  of  public  health  and 
sanitation  and  authorized  under  the  laws  of  this 
state  to  practice  medicine  and  surgery;  the 
director  of  highways  shall  be  a civil  engineer 
of  not  less  than  five  years’  experience  in  road 
building;  the  director  of  water  resources  shall 
be  a hydraulic  engineer  with  not  less  than  five 

years'  experience  in  the  practice  of  irrigation 
32 

engineering. 

Superintendent  of  public  safety  shall  be 
at  least  thirty  years  old  and  not  more  than 
fifty-five. 

Commissioner  of  geology  and  forestry  and 
his  deputy  must  be  graduates  of  some  standard 


29Colorado.  S.  L.  1921.  Ch.  136. 
30Michigan,  1921,  No.  146. 

31Indiana,  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  60. 

33 Idaho  S.  L.  1919. 

33West  Virginia  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  100. 


161 


34 

school  of  geology  and  forestry* 

Supervisor  of  highways  at  head  of  division 
of  highways  in  public  works  department  shall  be 
experienced  constructing  highway  engineer;  super- 
visor of  purchasing  must  have  had  practical  exper- 
ience in  commercial  pursuits;  director  of  public 
health  must  be  experienced  physician;  supervisor 
of  fisheries  must  have  practical  knowledge  of 
fish  propagation;  the  state  dietician  shall  be 

35 

a member  of  the  faculty  of  the  state  university. 

Secretary  of  agriculture  shall  be  a graduate 
of  a recognized  veterinary  college  and  shall  have 
been  engaged  in  veterinary  work  for  a period  of 
not  less  than  five  years  after  graduation;  direct- 
or of  bureau  of  plant  industry  shall  be  qualified 
by  scientific  training  and  practical  experience  in 
entomology  and  plant  pathology;  director  of  bureau 
of  chemistry  shall  be  graduate  of  recognized  COl- 

O/r 

lege  and  shall  have  specialized  in  chemistry. 

Commissioner  of  education  appointed  by  state 
board  of  education  shall  possess  educational  attain- 
ment and  breadth  of  experience  in  the  administration 
of  public  education  and  of  finances  pertaining  there- 

^Kentucky.  S.  L.  1218,  Ch.  35. 

^Washington.  S.  L.  1921. 

^Pennsylvania.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  101. 


. 


> 


. 

. 

; 

. - 


< 


162 


to;  commissioner  of  drainage  and  waters  shall 
be  a practical  drainage  engineer  experienced  in 
drainage  and  hydraulic  engineering  of  high 
standing  and  recognized  ability;  state  board  of 
education  must  consist  of  five  representative 
citizens  of  the  state.  ^ 

Principal  vocation  of  at  least  three  members 
of  the  board  of  agriculture  (six  members)  shall 
be  agriculture;  physicians,  pathologists,  and 
psychiatrists  of  the  department  of  mental  diseases 
shall  be  exempt  from  the  civil  service  law,  and 
th6  rules  and  regulations  made  thereunder;  two 
associate  commissioners  in  department  of  labor 
and  industries  shall  be  a representative  of  labor 
and  employers  of  labor  respectively." 

Board  of  health  of  ten  members,  all  of  whom 
shall  be  legally  qualified  practitioners,  includ- 
ing an  osteopath,  homeopath,  eclectic,  and  allo- 
path, chosen  from  lists  of  five  names  for  each 
vacancy,  furnished  by  associations  of  such  schools 
or  systems  as  are  entitled  to  membership.*" 

a-Salaries  of  heads  of  departments. 

Agri  culture 

*3600  Idaho 
4000  Utah 
4500  Minnesota 


. 


✓ 


, 

, 

* 

. 


) . . i K 


163 


5000  Massachusetts  and  Michigan 
*5000  Nebraska 
*6500  Ohio 
6000  Pennslyvania 

*Uniform  for  all  departments. 


Public  health 

4500  Michigan 


Eduation 

5000  Minnesota 
7500  Massachusetts 


Public  works 

7500  Massachusetts 
10000  California 


Conservation 

4000  Indiana 
5000  Michigan 

Finance 

5000  California,  Missouri 
and  Utah 


Public  Welfare 

4000  California 
6000  Massachusetts 
10000  Pennsylvania 


Labor 

3000  Missouri 
4500  Minnesota 
7500  Massachusetts 
8000  New  York 


^Minnesota.  S«  L.  1921  Ch.  334. 
^Massachusett  s.  S.  L.  1S19. 


. 


- 


, 


! 


. 


r . . 


« . 


164 


(7)  Budget* 

A state  budget  commission  composed  of  governor,  attorney- 
general  and  state  auditor;  legislature  will  not  alter  budget 
bills  except  to  strike  out  or  reduce  items  therein,  unless  by 
a vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  elected  in  both  houses; 
neither  house  will  consider  any  other  appropriation  except  an 
emergency  measure  for  emergency  expense  of  legislature  until 
budget  has  been  finally  acted  on  by  both  houses;  additional 

AO 

appropriations  in  separate  bills  of  single  items. 

Bureau  of  budgets  and  accounts  established  in  department 

of  finance,  governor  may  alter  division  at  pleasure.  Director 

41 

appointed  by  governor. 

Governor  may  request  estimates;  must  hold  public  hearings; 
governor  may  revise ,— increase  or  decrease— any  estimate  sub- 
mitted, except  those  of  judiciary  and  general  assembly,  but 
must  indicate  reasons  in  report  to  general  assembly;  standing 
committee  in  each  house  in  open  session  may  require  attendance 
of  responsible  executive  officers;  governor  or  representative 
has  right  to  be  present;  general  assembly  may  increase,  decrease, 
or  eliminate  item^— but  neither  house  shall  consider  further  or 
special  appropriations  except  in  case  of  emergency;  total  budget 
appropriations  may  not  be  increased  in  aggregate  to  a point  where 


Kentucky.  S.  L.  1918,  Ch.  65. 

40 

Alabama.  S.  L.  1919,  No*  31. 
41California.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  6C2. 


165 


they  will  exceed  the  state  revenue  from  all  sources  as  establish- 
ed in  the  budget;  additional  appropriations  must  be  embodied  in 
separate  bills  called  "supplementary  appropriation  bill"  which 
shall  designate  the  source  of  the  money  called  for  by  the  appropria- 
tion; transfer  of  allotments  by  spending  agencies  may  be  made  on 
written  request  to  governor,  state  treasurer,  and  state  auditor, 

two  of  whom  may  approve;  the  "governor  shall  be  chief  budget  of- 

42 

ficer  of  the  state  of  Delaware." 

Budget  bill  to  be  prepared  by  state  examiner  of  state  board 
of  accounts,  an  office  already  in  existence  and  filled  by  appointee 
of  governor;  requests  of  various  departments  to  be  filed  with  him 
from  which  he  compiles  budget  for  submission  to  governor,  contain- 
ing requests  and  his  recommendations  for  each  item;  public  hear- 
ings provided  for  in  open  sessions  of  the  legislature;  no  restric- 

43 

tion  on  legislature's  power  to  revise  items  up  or  down. 

Governor  the  chief  budget  officer  with  assistance  of  the  de- 
partment of  finance;  governor  to  provide  for  public  hearings  and 
shall  require  attendance  of  all  civil  executive  officers;  to  sub- 
mit to  legislature  with  amount  therein  recommended  by  him,  the 
estimated  revenues  from  taxation  and  other  sources,  and  the  es- 
timate of  amount  required  to  be  raised  by  taxation;  to  present  to 
each  presiding  officer  of  the  general  assembly  a budget  bill  with 

42 

Delaware.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  26. 

43 

Indiana.  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  149. 


166 


items  clearly  itemized;  legislative  committees  in  public  hear- 
ings may  summon  civil  executive  officers;  governor  or  represent- 
ative to  have  right  to  sit  at  these  hearings;  legislature  may 
increase  or  decrease  items  in  budget  bill,  but  neither  house  to 
consider  further  or  special  appropriations  except  in  case  of 
emergency,  which  fact  to  be  clearly  stated  in  the  bill  therefor, 
until  budget  bill  finally  acted  on  by  both  houses;  all  bills 
introduced  in  either  house  to  be  itemized  in  accordance  with  the 

A4 

classification  used  in  the  budget;*  budget  bureau  created  in  de- 
partment of  finance. 

Every  appropriation  bill  to  be  either  a ’’Budget  Bill”  or  a 

"Supplementary  Appropriation  Bill;”  compiling  board  authorized 

to  include  recommendations  in  budget,  instead  of  making  it  a 

45 

mere  compilation  of  requests  as  before, 

A depart ment  of  budget  which  in  addition  to  compilation  of 
budget  has  duties  of  former  tax  commissioner  and  has  supervision 
over  purchasing  and  printing;  department  headed  by  a commissioner 
of  budget  appointed  by  the  governor;  two  bureaus:  purchase  and 

taxation;  may  approve  or  disapprove  estimates  but  not  to  alter 
them;  to  submit  estimates  to  governor  with  his  own  estimates  in 
writing;  may  make  recommendations  in  interest  of  economy  and  ef- 

Ag 

ficiency;  governor  to  submit  budget  to  legislature. 

Secretary  of  finance  to  examine  all  department  estimates; 

44Idaho.  S,  L,  1919.  Amend.  S.  L.  1921, 

45Montana.  S,  L.  1921,  Ch.  47. 

46Miseouri.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  434. 


r 

1 i »■ 


. 


167 


to  file  with  governor  his  recommendations  as  to  each  item 
contained  in  the  budget;  governor  may  raise,  lower,  or  reject 
any  requested  appropriation  or  item;  must  give  reasons  there- 
for in  transmitting  budget  to  legislature;  legislature  not 
to  make  appropriation  in  excess  of  the  items  recommended  in 
budget  unless  by  three-fifths  vote  of  each  house  of  legislature; 
items  or  recommendations  therein  contained  may  be  rejected  or 
decreased  in  amount;  governor  may  not  veto  items  increased  by 
a three-fifths  vote,  (constitutional  provision);  close  control 
over  expenditures  provided  for;  department  may  investigate  at 
any  time  as  to  whether  appropriations  are  being  economically 

used;  before  money  becomes  available,  quarterly  estimates  to 

47 

be  approved  by  governor. 

Legislature  may  amend  general  appropriation  bills  by  in- 
creasing items  therein  relating  to  judicial  department;  not 
otherwise  to  alter  or  amend  budget  bill,  except  to  strike  out 
or  reduce  items  therein;  legislature  not  to  enact  any  other 
appropriation  bill  except  on  recommendation  of  governor;  all 
additional  appropriation  bills  to  be  embodied  in  separate  bill, 

48 

limiting  to  some  single  work,  subject,  or  purpose  therein  stated.' 


General  assembly  may  increase  or  decrease  items  in  budget 
bill;  all  appropriation  bills  in  addition  to  budget  bill  must 
be  passed  after  enactment  of  budget  bill,  except  in  emergency, 
and  money  for  additional  bills  must  be  in  treasury  unless  a 


^Nebraska.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  210. 

48 

New  Mexico.  1921.  Constitutional  Amendment, 
49North  Carolina,  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  29. 


Res.  No. 


6. 


t 


; 


* ' 


. 


. 


. „ . 


. 

. • 


special  tax  for  that  purpose  i9  levied  in  bill  making  the 
4 9 

appropriation. 

Budget  board  to  transmit  copies  of  estimates  and  rec- 
ommendations to  secretary  of  state,  who  in  turn  is  to  trans- 
mit it  with  original  estimates  of  requirements  to  governor; 

board  composed  of  governor,  secretary  of  state,  treasurer, 

SO 

auditor-general. 

Budget  to  be  prepared  by  finance  commission  and  depart- 
ment of  efficiency;  department  of  efficiency  empowered  to 
survey  all  public  offices  and  institutions  with  a view  to 
their  more  economical  administration;  to  compile  daily  ex- 
penditure of  these  departments  from  which  the  basic  state- 
ment for  th6  budget  is  to  be  prepared;  budget  is  finally 
referred  to  finance  committee  (formerly  called  board  of 
finance)  composed  of  governor,  treasurer,  and  auditor; 
fifteen  percent  of  total  appropriation  for  department  to 
be  held  as  reserve,  no  part  to  be  expended  without  affirma- 
tive vote  of  administrative  board.51 


500regon.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  22 
Washington.  S.  L.  1921. 


169 


4-Functional  organization 

(1)  Number  of  department s 

Complete  reorganization 

6 ^Nebraska 

8 Ohio 

9 Idaho 

10  Washington 
15  ^Massachusetts 

Partial  reorganization 

3 Missouri 
5 Michigan 

7 California 

^Reorganization  limited  by  number  of  constitutional  bodies 
■^Constitution  provides  that  there  be  not  more  than  twenty 
departments 

(2)  Functional  departments 


Public  works 


California,  Idaho,  Massachusetts 
Nebraska,  Ohio,  Washington 


Conservation  and 
development 


Indiana,  Michigan,  Massachusetts 
Washington 


Agriculture 


California,  Idaho,  Massachusetts 
Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missouri, 
Nebraska,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania, 
Washington 


Finance 


California,  Idaho,  Missouri 
Nebraska,  Ohio,  Utah 


Edu  cation 


California,  Massachusetts,  Min* 
nesota,  Ohio 


Public  Welfare 


California,  Idaho,  Massachusetts 
Michigan,  Nebraska. 


170 


Labor 

Massachusetts,  Minnesota,  Michigan 
Nebraska,  New  York,  Missouri,  Ohio, 
Washington 

Commerce 

Idaho,  Ohio,  Nebraska 

Public  safety 

Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 

Health 

Massachusetts,  Ohio 

Banking 

Indiana,  Pennsylvania 

Business  control 

Washington 

Efficiency 

do 

Taxation  and  examin- 
ation 

do 

Licenses 

do 

Fisheries  and  game 

do 

Immigration,  labor,  end 


statistics 

Idaho 

Law  enforcement 

do 

Public  investments 

do 

Reclamation 

do 

Banking  and  insurance 

Massachusetts 

Civil  service  and 
registration 

do 

I ■ , 


, 


. 


. 


, 


, 1 


171 


Industrial  accidents 

Massachusetts 

Mental  diseases 

do 

Corrections 

do 

Labor  and  industries 

do 

Civil  service 

California 

Institutions 

do 

Bu  dget 

Missouri 

Drainage  and  waters 

Minnesota 

(3)  Departmental  grouping  of  functions  by  states 
Agriculture 


Markets 

California,  Idaho,  Michigan, 
Minnesota,  Pennsylvania 

Plant  industry 

California,  Idaho,  Ohio, 
Pennsylvania 

Dairy  and  livestock 

Massachusetts,  Ohio,  Washington 

Animal  industry 

California,  Idaho,  Ohio,  Penn- 
sylvania 

Foods 

Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  Washington 

Fairs 


Idaho,  Massachusetts,  Ohio 


. 


, 


, 

. 


172 


Statistics 

Minnesota,  Pennsylvania 

Agricultural  chemistry 

California,  Pennsylvania 

Weights  and  measures 

California,  Washington,  Idaho 

Horticulture 

Washington 

Feeds 

do 

Drugs  and  oils 

do 

Fish  and  game 

Ohio 

Plant  pest  control 

Massachusetts 

Ornithology 

do 

Reclamation 

do 

Soil  survey 

do 

To  investigate  fraudulent 
advertisements  pertaining 
to  colonization  and  settle- 
ment Idaho 


Public  works 

Highways 

California,  Idaho,  Massachusetts, 
Ohio,  Washington 

Engineering 

California,  Ohio 

Architecture 

California,  Ohio 

. 


* 


■ 

< 


nHKBHHarai 


173 


Water  rights 

California,  Massachusetts 

Land  settlement 

California,  Massachusetts 

Purchase  real  estate 

Ohio 

Motor  vehicles 

Massachusetts 

Transportation 

Washington 

Public  utilities 
Conservation  and  development 

Washington 

Forestry 

Indiana,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
Washington 

Geology 

Indian^  Michigan,  Washington 

Fish  and  game 

Indiana,  Michigan,  Massachusetts 

Land  and  waters 

Indiana,  Michigan 

Reclamation 

Washington 

Hydraulics 

do 

Entomology 

do 

Engineering 

do 

Animal  industry 
Education 

Massachusetts 

Libraries 

California,  Massachusetts,  Ohio 

.. 


, 


, 


' 


. ' . 


, 


Professional  licensing 


Ohio 


Film  censorship 
Education  of  aliens 
Education  of  blind 
Finance 

General  accounting 
Budget  making 
Purchasing 
Printing 
Motor  vehicles 

Custody  buildings  and  grounds 
Supervision  of  banks 
Supervision  buildings  and  loans 
Public  welfare 

Public  health  adviser 
Aid  and  relief 
Child  guardianship 


do 

Massachusetts 

do 

California,  Ohio 
do 
do 
do 

California 

do 

Missouri 

Missouri 

Idaho 

Massachusetts 

do 


Juvenile  training 


do 


' 


* • 


175 


Lunacy 

Pennsylvania 

Prison  labor 

do 

Charities 

Labor  or  industrial  relations 

do 

Labor  statistics 

California,  Massachusetts,  Min- 
nesota, Ohio 

Safety 

California,  Minnesota,  Washington 

Workmen's  compensation 

Minnesota,  Ohio 

Mediation  and  arbitration 

Minnesota,  Massachusetts 

7/omen  and  children 

do 

Boiler  inspection 

do 

Employment 

do 

Immigration 

California 

Industrial  welfare 

do 

Factory  inspection 

Ohio 

Mines 

Commerce 

Ohio 

Insurance 


Ohio 


176 

Inspector  buildings  and  loans 

Ohio 

Inspector  of 

oils 

do 

Public  utilities 

do 

Banking 

Idaho 

(4)  Comparative  study  of  the  departmental  groupings  of  the  more  important 
functions. 

Service 

De  partment 

States 

Budget 

Finance 

California,  Ohio, 
Nebraska 

Utah, 

Ef  ficiency 

Washington 

Governor 

Idaho 

Administrative 

Board 

Michigan 

^Budget 

Missouri 

Banking 

Commerce 

Idaho,  Ohio 

Finance 

Missouri 

Taxation  and 
Examination 

Washington 

* Banking 

Indiana,  Massachusetts 

Purchasing 

Finance 

California,  Ohio, 

Utah 

Business  control 

Washington 

Administrative 

board 

Michigan 

Budget 

Missouri 

■^Purchasing 

Montana 

. 


. 


, 


. . . 


, 


177 


Dairy  and  livestock 

Agri culture 

California,  Idaho, 
Michigan,  Ohio,  Washing' 
ton 

Public  utilities 

Public  works 

Washington 

Commerce 

Ohio 

^Public  utilities 

Massachusetts 

Highways 

Public  works 

California,  Idaho, 
Massachusetts,  Ohio, 
Washington 

Geological  survey 

^Conservation  and 
development 

Indiana,  Michigan, 
Washington 

Taxation 

Budget 

Indiana 

Finance 

Ohio 

^Taxation  and 
examination 

Massachusetts,  Washing- 
ton 

Forestry 

Conservation  and 
development 

Indiana,  Michigan, 
Washington 

Reclamation 

Conservation 

Washington 

Public  works 

California 

*Reclamation 

Idaho 

Institutions 

Public  welfare 

Michigan,  Pennsylvania 

■^Institutions 

California 

Engineering 

Public  works 

California 

Highways 

Ohio 

Conservation 

Indiana 

Immigration 

Agriculture 

Michigan 

Labor 

Cali fornia 

, 


f 


Examination  and 

Law  enforcement 

Idaho 

regi  stration 

Education 

Ohio,  California 

Civil  service  and 
registration 

Massachusetts 

179 


5-Board9  and  commissions 
(1)  Types 


Boards  composed  of  advisers  outside  department  having 
general  knowledge  of  the  activity,  for  rule  making. 

Local  boards  of  trustees  of  charitable  institutions 

retained  as  advisers  board  of  review  for  quasi- judicial 

functions  relating  to  irrigation  to  be  appointed  by  director 

of  public  works;  industrial  welfare  commission,  commission 

of  immigration  and  housing,  bureau  of  labor  statistics 

combined  in  one  department,  each  autonomous  with  a common 

administrative  staff;  also  licensing  boards  in  department 
53 

of  education. 

Boards  intact  for  quasi- judical  functions,  parts  of 
respective  departments  for  administrative  matters;  commis- 
sions retained  in  departments,  the  head  of  which  acts  as 
secretary.  Advisory  boards  may  be  created  by  department 
heads  with  consent  of  governor. 

Advisory  commission  optional  with  commissioner  of 
banking  and  to  be  appointed  by  him. 

Commissioner  of  labor  shall  appoint  referees  at  sal- 

C.C 

ary  fixed  by  commissioner. 

^Washington  S.  L.  1921. 

53Califcrnia  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  602. 

540hio  S.  L.  1921.  New  York  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  50. 
^Pennsylvania  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  130. 


• ' • . 


. 


. 


. 


■ . 


. 


. 


. 


. 


. . 




. • . 


Directors  of  divisions  in  departments  tc  act  as 

advisory  council  for  head  of  the  department;  director 

of  civil  service  and  director  of  registration  to  act  as 

57 

board  affecting  department  as  a whole. 

Non-salaried  local  board  for  each  of  four  groups 

of  state  institutions  under  the  general  supervision  of 

58 

the  department  of  welfare. 

Board  of  agriculture  advisers  in  department  of  agri- 
culture to  advise  executive  officers  of  department  of 
their  own  request;  to  recommend  on  its  own  initiative, 
policies  and  practices  which  the  executives  duly  consider 

Department  board  composed  of  director  and  division 
chiefs  to  head  and  decide  all  matters  of  sufficient  import- 
ance to  require  their  joint  action.60 

Commissioner  of  department  of  labor  and  industries 
and  chiefs  of  divisions  may  appoint  committees  on  which 
employees  and  employers  shall  be  represented,  to  inves- 
tigate and  recommend  rules  and  regulations,  and  to  change 

existing  rules  and  regulations  within  the  scope  of  powers 

61 

and  duties  of  the  department. 

Advisory  council  to  commissioner  of  conservation  made 
up  of  chiefs  of  three  divisions.62 

66Minnesota.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  81. 

^Massachusetts.  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  350. 

Minnesota.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  163. 


. 


. 


. 


, 


, 

' 


. 


. . - 

. - . 


' 

- 


. . - 


Unpaid  commission  in  department  of  conservation  of 


seven  members;  advisory  council  department  of  health, 

gq 

five  members  appointed  by  governor. 

Unpaid  advisory  board  in  state  highway  department, 
seven  members. ^ 

Unpaid  board  of  agricultural  advisers  in  department 
of  agriculture  of  nine  members  to  recommend  on  its  own 
initiative,  policies  and  practices  which  the  executive 
officers  shall  duly  consider.  It  is  to  investigate  work 
of  department,  and  may  require  information  from  all  of- 
ficers. ^ 

Unpaid  welfare  commission  of  nine  members,  three  to 

be  ex  officio;  commissioner  of  public  welfare,  labor, 

and  health,  the  remaining  six  to  be  appointed  by  the  gov- 
66 

ernor. 

Unpaid  advisory  board  in  department  of  health  to  be 
67 

appointed  by  director. 

Advisory  board  of  six  members  in  department  of  ed- 
ucation appointed  by  the  governor,  two  members  shall  be 
women  and  one  shall  be  appointed  from  among  the  teachers 


Idaho.  S.  L.  1919. 

^Washington.  S.  L.  1921. 

^Massachusetts.  1919.  Ch.  350;  New  York.  S.  L.  1921, 
Ch.  50. 

^Massachusetts.  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  350 
^Michigan.  So  L.  1921,  Ch.  146 
^Colorado. So  L.  1921,  Ch.  136 
65Idaho.  S.  L.  1919. 


. 


. 


, 


* 


. , 


. 


. , 


- , , 

. 


. . 


. 


■ < 

. 

, . 

* 

. . - 


182 


of  the  commonwealth;  unpaid  advisory  council  in  the  de- 

68 

partment  of  education  on  negro  education. 

Department  council  of  labor  made  up  of  one  represent- 
ative from  each  of  the  four  commissions  retained  in  the 
69 

department • 


A tax  commission  of  three  commissioners,  with  complete 
administrative  control  vested  in  the  chairman  appointed  by 
the  governor;  a department  of  labor  consisting  of  a com- 
mission of  three  members  with  administrative  power  vested 
in  the  industrial  commissioner  at  its  head,  appointed  by 


the  governor;  commissioner 
most  matters  pertaining  to 

(2)  Board  Control 

Heads  of  departments 

Education 
Health 
Conservation 
Labor 

Finance 


to  sit  with  the  commission  in 
the  department?® 


Minnesota 
Kentucky,  Ohio 
Indiana 

Michigan,  Minnesota,  New  York, 
California 

California 


^'Pennsylvania. S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  425 

^Ghio.  S*  L.  1921;  Massachusetts.  S.  L.  1919,  Ch.  250. 
^West  Virginia.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  2. 

^California.  S.  L.  1921,  Ch.  602. 

70Michigan.  S.  L.  1921 


• 

■ 

* 

. 

. 

. 

r 


183 


Associated  with  departments 
judicial  functions. 

for  advisory,  rule  making,  or 

Education 

California,  Missouri,  Kentucky, 
Massachusetts,  Ohio,  Tennessee, 
West  Virginia 

Public  welfare 

Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Penn- 
sylvania 

Labor 

California,  Michigan,  Minnesota, 
New  York,  Massachusetts,  Ohio, 
Utah,  Washington 

Commerce 

Ohio 

Public  works 

Ohio,  California 

Finance 

Ohio 

Health 

Ohio,  Michigan 

Agriculture 

Idaho 

Conservation 

Michigan 

Single-head  control  of  departments 


Education 

California,  Massachusetts,  Nebras- 
ka, Ohio  Tennessee 

Health 

Massachusetts,  Ohio,  Washington 

Conservation 

Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Washington 

Public  welfare 

Idaho,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
Nebraska,  Pennsylvania,  California 

Labor 

Massachusetts,  Nebraska,  Washington 

Finance 

Idaho,  Missouri,  Ohio,  Utah 

Agriculture 

California,  Idaho,  Massachusetts, 
Michigan,  Nebraska,  Minnesota,  Ohio, 
Pennsylvania,  Utah,  Washington 

Public  works 


California,  Washington,  Nebraska 


Public  safety 


Michigan 


Commerce 


Nebraska 


185 


V-CONCLUSIONS 

With  the  data  thus  arranged  in  a somewhat  orderly  form,  we  are  now 
ready  to  deal  with  the  question  stated  at  the  outset: 

Is  administrative  reorganization  in  the  American  states  a random  exper- 
imentation or  are  fundamental,  discoverable  processes  at  work  beneath  it 
all?  After  an  analysis  of  some  ten  thousand  pages  of  representative  state 
documents,  one  lays  aside  the  latest  message,  the  latest  efficiency  and  econ- 
omy report,  and  the  latest  session  law  of  the  states  with  a cumulative  find- 
ing re-enforced  by  each  succeeding  page.  There  is  a set  of  causes  molding 
the  processes  of  reorganization— definite  and  irresistible— forces  that 
brought  a representative  government  in  the  beginning,  and  are  now  destined 
to  bring  a more  integrated,  efficient,  responsible  administration  in  a rec- 
ent and  even  more  vital  emergency.  I refer  to  the  fiscal  problem  of  the 
American  commonwealths.  It  is  found  in  the  first  and  the  latest  of  the  gov- 
ernors* messages  of  these  last  two  years,  it  determines  even  the  titles  as 
well  as  the  findings  of  groups  of  expert  investigators,  and  it  reads  like  a 
veritable  new  bill  of  rights  in  the  enacting  paragraphs  of  the  recent  con- 
solidation acts  themselves.  In  other  words  to  make  outgo  fit  income  is  a 
very  old  problem,  but  to  make  income  fit  unparalleled,  but  inevitable  in- 
creases in  outgo,  this  is  a new  and  striking  emergency  confronting  the 
states.  Which  is  to  say,  the  resisting,  irate  taxpayer  has  come  to  court. 
Dynasties  unheedful  of  him  in  the  past,  fell;  King  John  of  England  alert  at 
Runnymede,  gave  him  a people’s  parliament.  It  remains  for  the  American  com- 
monwealths, behind  whom  are  seven  centuries  of  traditions  of  representative 
government  to  purge  that  parliament  of  extravagances  on  demand.  This  final 


\± 


f 

, 


. . 

• 

, 


. . 

I . • 

. 

... , 

. , 

* 

, 

• •' 

' 


186 


consideration  brings  us  to  the  core  of  the  whole  reorganization  movement. 

The  reorganization  movement  began  with  great  increase  of  expense;  that  in- 
crease was  inevitable.  The  earliest  government  we  know  anything  about  set  up 
at  the  people's  expense  instruments  of  their  common  defense;  the  modern 
state  must  license  its  practiVners  and  perform  a hundred  similar  services 
in  a new  kind  of  defense  which  a complex,  more  interdependent  social  struc- 
ture makes  necessary.  As  a result  the  most  striking  fact  of  political 
development  in  the  last  half  century,  and  particularly  the  last  decade  has 
been  this  steady,  inevitable  increase  in  the  government's  activities.  As 
early  as  1904,  a Nebraska  legislator  pointed  out  that  whereas  in  that  state 
seven  administrative  agencies  were  ample  for  all  its  work  in  1875,  over  117 
were  the  objects  of  distinct  appropriations  in  the  finance  bill  he  opposed 
just  twenty-nine  years  later.  But  even  earlier  than  this  in  1897,  the 
president  of  the  state  bar  association  referring  to  these  same  agencies, 
declared:  "While  many  of  these  boards  are  necessary,  yet  the  increase  is 

surprising,  and  indicates  a tendency  to  multiply  the  tax-eaters  at  the 
expense  of  the  taxpayers."  In  other  words,  whereas  the  total  tax  bill  of 
all  the  commonwealths  in  1910  was  300,000,000  in  1920  it  exceeded  700,000,000. 
Or  to  take  the  specific  case  of  Michigan  alone,  the  contemplated  outlay  for 
but  the  one  biennium  of  1920-22  exceeded  the  amount  raised  by  taxation  for 
all  purposes  in  1918.  And  finally,  to  meet  the  unparalleled  fiscal  demands 
of  1920,  there  i3  a system  of  taxation  designed  primarily  for  those  simpler 
needs  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

More  pregnant  than  this  situation,  however,  and  fraught  with  signif- 
icance for  the  reorganization  movement  itself,  is  the  striking  identity  of 
expedients  proposed  for  meeting  it.  Totally  absent  from  the  documents  of 


. 


, 


- 


' 


. • . . 


r ; . 


. • - • I 


. 


~ 


. 


. 


» 


187 


the  governors  or  the  expert  investigators  themselves,  is  a suggestion  of  that 
simplest  alternative--the  curtailment  of  services.  Faced  with  the  grievous 
stringency  to  which  we  have  already  referred,  the  governor  of  Massachusetts 
said  to  the  general  court:  "The  commonwealth  is  doing  a fine  work  in  the  care 
of  the  sick,  the  insane,  the  helpless,  the  feeble-minded,  the  delinquent,  and 
for  the  convenience  and  comfort  of  all.  Her  institutions  command  the  admira- 
tion of  all  observers.  We  must  continue  in  this  well-doing.”  "We  have  no 
proposals  to  make  for  curtailing  the  services  of  California,"  reported  the 
efficiency  commission  o f that  state,  "the  recommendations  submitted  embody 
fundamental  principles  of  government,  which  when  put  into  force,  will  not  on- 
ly make  for  immediate  improvement  in  the  administration  of  the  state’s  affairs, 
but  will  be  the  foundation  upon  which  any  future  expansion  of  the  state's 
activities  may  rest."  Similarly,  there  are  absent  proposals  of  ways  and  means 
for  immediate  increase  of  the  revenues.  Not  what  is  the  state  doing,  but  how, 
became  the  chief  consideration.  Not  academic  discussions  as  to  the  province 
of  government,  but  considerations  of  efficiency  and  economy  in  the  administra- 
tion of  generally  accepted  services  came  to  be  the  one  expedient  proposed, 
strikingly  identical  throughout  the  commonwealths.  In  thi3  emergency  and  gen- 
eral concert  of  opinion  on  ways  of  meeting,  the  efficiency  and  economy  move- 
ment was  born.  The  integrated,  successful  business  corporation  became  the 
radiant  point  of  prestige.  Tested  principles  of  the  managerial  hierarchy 
displaced  historical  prejudices  and  their  corallaries,  checks  and  balances, 
in  the  focus  of  official  attention,  and  reorganization  set  in.  With  the 
advent  of  efficiency  and  economy  experts,  the  second  phase  of  the  reorganiza- 
tion movements  begins.  Spasmodic  attempts  at  consolidation  began  long  before, 
it  is  true,  really  as  far  back  as  1363  when  the  commonwealth  of  Massachusetts 


” : 


. 


, 

. 


. 

1 . . 

. 


- 

- 


. t 

, 


. 

. 


188 

combined  her  charitable  agencies  in  the  interest  of  efficiency,  but  all  such 
attempts  were  hectic,  piecemeal,  and  illogical.  Unable  to  keep  pace  with 
the  unprecedented  accrual  of  activities,  the  best  the  earlier  legislatures 
could  do  was  a makeshift  best— the  creation  of  a new  board  to  administer 
each  new  activity.  Functional  correlation  is  a problem  for  experts,  and  as 
we  have  seen  it  troubles  even  them.  On  the  other  hand,  principles  of  ad- 
ministration are  definite  and  logical.  These  the  investigator  brought  with 
him.  In  the  light  of  these,  as  we  have  seen,  he  went  straight  to  the  root 
of  the  trouble.  "The  resolution  creating  the  Committee,"  reported  the  Ill- 
inois Efficiency  and  Economy  Committee,  "imposed  on  it  two  main  duties:  (l) 
to  create  a more  perfect  system  of  accounting;  and  (2)  to  propose  a general 
reorganization  and  consolidation  of  state  offices,  boards,  and  commissions. 
"After  due  consideration,"  it  significantly  concludes,  "the  Committee  agreed 
that  the  plan  of  administrative  reorganization  should  precede  the  introduc- 
tion of  a comprehensive  system  of  accounting.  The  latter  is  necessarily 
dependent  on  the  system  of  organization."  The  Commission  build6d  greater 
than  even  it,  perhaps,  could  know  • . Simultaneously  with  the  enunciation 
of  such  a principle  in  Illinois,  the  efficiency  advocate  in  every  common- 
wealth where  the  financial  stringency  was  most  sharply  felt,  re-enforced 
it.  The  principle  became  the  opening  wedge  in  a situation  ripe  for  it.  Huge 
deficits,  mounting  debts,  revelations  of  administrative  excesses  and  extrav- 
agance, an  aroused,  aggressive  public  opinion,  and  the  inevitable  effi- 
ciency plank  in  the  party  platforms,  gave  to  a constitutionally  nominal  chief 
executive,  the  mandate  which  for  over  a century  had  been  illogically  denied 
him— a mandate  which  be  it  to  his  credit  he  unhesitatingly  accepted.  The 
governor,  more  generally,  more  emphatically  in  the  last  five  years  than  in 


. 


, * 
, . 

' -~ 

, 


. 


. 


* 


' f t . 


■ « 


. 


( ■ ‘ , : \ v 5* 


189 


the  one  hundred  years  preceding,  became  the  people's  spokesman.  "From  many 
stumps  over  this  state,"  declared  Governor  McRae  of  Aj.kansas,  "I  declared 
for  retrenchment  and  administrative  reform,  making  this  the  paramount  issue 
in  my  race  for  governor,  and  I was  nominated.  Not  one  of  my  eight  opponents, 
so  far  as  I know,  declared  himself  on  these  issues.  Wherever  and  whenever 
the  people  have  had  opportunity  to  register  their  opposition  to  administrative 
extravagance,  they  have  done  so.  By  every  rule  of  representative  government, 
we  are  bound  to  adhere  to  these  demands."  There  was  no  mistaking  the  new  role 
of  the  governor.  In  a score  of  states  where  legislative  importence  was  never 
so  sharply  obvious  as  against  the  background  of  a mounting  state  debt,  it  was 
the  governor  who  rose  with  the  occasion,  and  assumed  virile,  vigorous  charge. 
The  people  had  spoken.  They  demanded  retrenchment.  They  had  turned  to  him. 
The  people  in  their  collective  capacity  were  not  so  concerned  with  the  method; 
they  presumed  to  know  nothing  about  it.  What  they  did  demand  was  action, 
immediate  and  effective,  and  for  it  they  looked  to  the  governor.  In  the 
focus  of  an  intolerant  public  attention,  r6-enforced  by  the  demands  of  the 
governors,  nominal,  and  perfunctory  legislative  "investigating  committees" 
invariably  gave  way  to  the  disinterested,  exhaustive  findings  of  the  experts. 
If  the  legislatures  were  indifferent,  there  was  the  ready  ear  of  the  governor. 
Under  his  influence,  purely  technical  findings  were  merged  with  the  practical 
official  point  of  view.  Sometimes,  a bit  impatient,  either  as  Governor  Groes- 
beck  of  Michigan,  Hart  of  Washington,  or  Mills*  of  New  York,  the  more  tedious 
processes  of  exhaustive  analysis  were  laid  aside  temporarily  for  the  piece- 
meal expedients  they  forced  through.  But  v/hatever  the  expedient  for  the 
moment,  the  consistent,  appreciative  advocate  of  the  efficiency  and  economy 
commissions  was  the  governor.  From  the  first  he  recommended  them,  and  when 
they  were  appointed,  he  championed  them. 


1 


. 


. 

. 


» 


, . 1.  . . 

. 


( 1 


- 


} >1 


’ , . . . ,1 


190 


With  the  advent  of  thG  governor  himself,  therefore,  in  his  actual, 
parliamentary  role,  state  administrative  reorganization  may  be  held  to  have 
entered  its  latest  and  most  significant  phase.  For  in  the  last  analysis, 
always  it  is  the  executive  initiative  and  political  prowess  on  which  depends 
more  and  more  the  ultimate  character  the  administration  is  coming  to  assume. 
Through  his  leadership,  bulky  expert  appraisements  of  administration  and 
recommendations  relating  thereto,  become  the  specific  definitions  of  the 
enacting  clauses  of  administrative  codes  lik6  those  of  Illinois,  Idaho, 
Nebraska,  Ohio,  and  Washington.  The  efficiency  or  expert  personnel  of  the 
investigating  committees,  through  his  influence,  opens  in  this  latest  phase 
of  the  movement  to  scores  of  professional,  lay,  and  official  participants, 
whose  interests  are  involved.  Committee  sessions  expand  into  public  hear- 
ings; paper  reorganization  is  laid  aside  for  the  technical  analysis  of 
pulsing  human  motives.  Above  all,  the  governor  himself  becomes  th6  tangible 
inspiration  of  a status  they  create  for  him,  which  transcends  anything  the 
administrative  department  of  an  American  state  has  yet  known.  There  is  noth- 
ing in  the  managerial  hierarchy  which  commends  itself  to  a commission  seek- 
ing to  harmonize  human  welfare  needs  with  administration  in  a staff  to  assist 
him. 


It  has  been  the  wise  commission  therefore,  but  politically  wiser  gov- 
ernors who  in  these  latter  days  are  coming  more  and  more  to  temper  the  ideal 
of  administrative  efficiency  with  those  broader  considerations  of  democracy 
and  welfare.  There  is  the  need,  for  instance,  of  eliciting  the  participation 
of  disinterested  citizens  serving  on  unpaid  boards,  exercising  powers  of 
investigation,  advice,  and  publicity.  There  is  the  need  of  placing  legal 


1 

. 

' 

. 

. 


.. 


. 


* 

. 


- 


191 


authority  and  responsibility  in  a particular  officer  most  likely  to  develop 
a sense  of  professional  responsibility  and  pride  in  connection  with  the  work 
of  such  an  office.  There  are  those  influential  citizens,  further,  who  doubt 
whether  either  popular  government  or  efficient  government  is  most  likely  to 
be  advanced  by  placing  the  health  or  public  welfare  director  under  the  control 
of  a central  administrative  officer,  or  by  subjecting  unpaid  commissions 
supplied  to  welfare  departments  for  correcting  the  "possibly.  too  narrow 
and  business  point  of  view  of  the  managing  officer"  to  interference  by  still 
other  central  administrative  officers.  In  other  words,  in  the  administration 
of  government  services,  as  distinguished  from  services  for  profits  purely, 
there  is  the  eternal  question  of  diffusion  rather  than  concentration  of 
authority  in  the  interest  of  not  only  a more  efficient  but  a more  democratic 
administration.  When  the  later  day  mixed  efficiency  commissions,  influenced 
by  the  public  hearings  they  came  more  and  more  to  hold,  and  under  the  domin- 
ant leadership  of  the  governor  himself,  cut  the  Gordian  knot  between  the 
managerial  plan  of  the  business  corporation  and  administrative  charts  of 
their  reports,  the  most  significant  discriminating  element  set  in.  There 
was  a sharp  differentiation  between  the  administrative  organization  for  the 
government  in  the  things  it  did,  and  for  the  government  in  getting  itself 
ready  to  do  them.  In  other  words,  planning  the  managerial  hierarchy  for 
proprietary  agencies,  on  the  one  hand  and  thoroughly  diluting  and  democratiz- 
ing that  same  hierarchy  to  serve  human  welfare  needs,  on  the  other,  is  the 
most  significant  tendency  in  recent  state  administrative  reorganization. 

In  the  first  flush  of  expert  investigation,  analysis,  and  recommendation 
in  this  reorganization,  the  prestige  of  the  business  corporation  exerted  a 


, 


, 


, 


' 


f . 

. ' 


' 


102 


powerful  influence  over  the  advocates  of  administrative  reform.  With  an 
impetuosity  a trifle  American,  a clean  sweep  was  made  of  existing  administrat- 
ive agencies.  The  test  of  the  effectiveness  of  a reorganization  in  any  state, 
regardless  of  local  or  texture  problems  came  to  be  th6  number  of  existing 
agencies  abolished  or  consolidated,  and  the  degree  of  integration  of  the  ad- 
ministrative agencies.  It  was  a test  of  form,  not  of  personnel,  a vision  of 
a balanced  pen-j-and-^ink  chart,  not  of  an  adaptation  to  functional  differences. 
Agencies  that  had  served  democratic  needs  for  a hundred  years,  like  the 
aldermanic  government  of  the  cities^were  summarily  dispensed  with  in  many 
instances,  notwith standing  that  English  and  continental  experience  with  those 
same  agencies  serving  similar  needs  ha3  been  a satisfactory  one. 

In  the  significant  calm  after  the  precipitous  efforts  of  the  incipient 
years,  reorganization  goes  steadily  on,  but  it  is  partial  rather  than  complete, 
conservative  rather  than  iconoclastic.  The  fiscal  emergency  is  more  serious 
than  ever,  the  governors  never  more  aggressive,  and  more  efficiency  investiga- 
tions v/ere  never  at  one  time  so  uniformly,  exhaustively  at  work.  But  the 
purposes  seem  to  be  more  discriminating,  the  leadership  more  reflective.  And 
finally,  when  we  have  examined  the  more  recent  laws  as  a whole  and  noted  their 
commendable  significant  provisions,  can  it  not  be  accurately  held  that  they 
show  steady,  convincing  progress  toward  the  desired  status  of  administrative 
agencies  in  the  commonwealth?  It  must  be  so.  All  those  powerful  forces  of 
fiscal  strain  and  vigorous,  practicable  leadership  which  have  worked  revolu- 
tionary changes  in  strongest  governments  of  the  past  have  been  with  us  in  the 
administrative  reorganization  movement— but  with  the  novel  yet  thoroughly 
tested  element  of  expert  investigation,  analysis,  and  recommendation  in  addi- 


* 


* 

* 


t 

. 


> 


• ‘ 


' 


. 

‘ * - •.  ! 


193 


tion. 

There  is  always  the  question  of  standards  and  tests,  however.  Before 
we  appraise  the  recent  tendencies,  we  must  settle  the  question  of  what  we 
want.  If  one  critic  sees  in  chapter  602  of  the  California  laws  of  1921  on- 
ly a "hesitating”  step  toward  reorganisation,  and  another  sees  in  some  of 
its  provisions  conspicuous  achievement,  why, the  definition  of  the  test  applied 
in  both  cases  must  precede  final  judgment  of  the  act.  In  other  words,  if 
administrative  efficiency  without  regatd  to  functions  or  to  the  needs  of 
those  on  whom  it  operates  is  the  thing  desired,  the  California  act  is  less 
than  "hesitating,"  it  is  negligible.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  test 
first  carefully  discriminates  between  that  administration  which  has  to  do 
with  perfecting  the  administrative  staff  itself,  and  that  which  actually 
reaches  the  people  as  a service  function;  second,  if  the  test  demands  of 
the  former,  primarily  a technical  efficiency  through  a hierarchical  organiza- 
tion, but  holds  in  the  latter  to  the  principle  of  democracy  and  adaption  to 
human  needs  as  the  first  requisite,  why,  then,  the  California  provisions  are 
really  notable. 

But  even  then,  such  a test  applied  to  a single  chapter  of  the  session 
laws  of  a single  year  in  a single  state  is  manifestly  inadequate,  either  for 
gauging  the  movement  in  California,  or  the  general  trend  of  tendencies  in 
the  whole  field  of  administrative  reorganization.  It  is  only  when  the  pro- 
visions of  the  act  of  any  one  commonwealth  are  studied  in  the  light  of  test- 
ed practices  in  the  majority  of  them,  that  an  appraisement  really  becomes 
significant.  It  is  only  as  it  sends  into  the  general  stream  of  workable 


. 


, ' 

♦ 


: 

’ 

. < 


, 


. i 

194 


experiences  its  own  individual  contribution  and  draws  from  that  same  stream 
the  tested  experiences  most  adaptable  to  its  own  local  problems  and  needs 
that  the  legislation  of  the  several  states  has  been  weighted  in  the  considera- 
tions which  have  entered  into  this  study.  In  the  light  of  this  larger  test 
not  only  California,  but  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Pennsylvania,  New 
York,  and  Utah  with  their  piecemeal  reorganizations  are  coordinate  in  the 
year  just  closed.  The  administrative  principles  which  may  be  assembled  from 
the  act 8 of  these  states  taken  collectively,  must  confirm  the  claim  that 
coming  from  the  experiences  of  such  states  as  these  there  is  the  inevitable 
new  state  executive,--not  the  traditional  business  executive,  but  the  people's 
leader— dominant , responsive,  flexible— a strategist  and  a humanitarian,  with 
an  administrative  accompaniment  adapted  to  his  purposes. 


. 

' 


* 


. 


. 


, 


195 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1-Booke 

Allen, W.H.  Efficient  democracy.  1907 

Buck, A. E.  Mudget  making  Appleton  1921 

Crennan, Charles  Holloway.  Survey  of  state  executive 
organization.  (Thesis, Ph. D. ) Princeton 

Holcombe, Arthur  N.  State  government  in  the  United  States 
Macmillan  1916 

Mathews, J.M.  Principles  of  American  state  administration 
Appleton  1917 

Cleveland  and  Buck  The  budget  and  responsible 
government.  Macmillan  1920 

Willoughby ,W.F.  Movement  for  budgetary  reforms  in  the 
states.  New  York.  Appleton  1918  (Institute 
for  government  research) 

Weber, Gustavus  A.  Organized  efforts  for  the  improvement 
of  methods  of  administration  in  the  United  States 
Appleton  1919  (Institute  for  government  research) 

Fairlie,J.A.  National  administration  in  the  United 
States.  Macmillan  1915 

2-Pericdicals 

State  af fairs(1919-20)  Political  science  quarterly. 
Record  of  political  events.  September  1920 
Supplement  p.71 

Buck,A.E.  Administrative  consolidation  of  state  depart- 
ments. National  municipal  review.  November  1919 
p.639 

Kelso,  R.W.  Functional  state  service ;how  Massachusetts 

has  consolidated  her  state  government.  Survey .August 
1920.  p.745 


. . 


• • « 

. • , i 

, » 

. . ' 

• 

. 

. 


. . 

, . 


• • « 

. 


196 


Davis, D.W.  How  administrative  consolidation  is  working  in 

Idaho.  National  municipal  review  November  1919  p 615 

Mathews, J.M.  Administrative  reorganization  in  Illinois. 

National  Municipal  review  Supplement  , November  1920  p739 

Fairlio,J.A.  The  executive  in  the  model  state  constitution 
National  municipal  review.  April, 1921  p226 

Douglas,  J.R.  Research  activities  of  departments  of  state 

government  of  California  in  relation  to  the  movement 
for  reorganization.  National  research  council  bulletin 
no.  137  p 289 

Chase,  H.  T.  Kansas  general  manager  plan.  National  Municipal 
Review,  1918.  p384-387 

Crenner,  C.  H.  A survey  of  state  executive  organizations  and 
a plan  of  reorganization.  1916. 

Davis,  D.  W.  How  administrative  reorganization  is  working  in 
Idaho.  National  Municipal  Review.  1919  p615-62Q 

Dodd,  W.  F.  The  consolidation  of  government  organization. 
American  Municipal  Review.  1917  p.  413-414 

Lowden,  F.  0.  Business  Government.  Saturday  Evening  Post. 
1920.  pl65 , 166 ,169 . 

McKelvie,  S.  R.  A responsible  form  of  government.  Nebraska's 
new  civil  administrative  code.  American  Review  of 
Reviews.  1920.  p.295-298 

Moxey,  C.  C.  The  Delaware  Survey.  National  Municipal  Review. 
1919.  p223-225 

Dodd,  W.  F.  Notes  on  State  Administrative  Reorganization. 

American  Political  Science  Review.  August,  1921.  p556 


3- Pamphlet  s 

Bell,  F.  F.  Costs  of  state  government.  Pamphlet.  Legislative 
reference  bureau  1916.  46pp. 

Moley,  Raymond.  State  movement  for  efficiency  and  economy 
bureau  of  Municipal  Research,  New  York.  Bulletin  90, 
October  1917 

Powell,  F.  W.  Recent  movement  for  state  budget  reform  Bureau 
of  Municipal  Research,  New  York  Bulletin  91,  November, 
1917 


• • 


. . 


. . 


• • 


. 


. 

. 


. 


. 


. 


• • 


197 


Reorganization  of  the  government  departments.  Pamphlet. 
American  association  of  engineers,  Chicago. 

August,  1921.  (A  suggestive  plan  for  grouping 
engineering  activities  to  effect  economies  and 
an  answer  to  the  chief  of  engineers  of  the  U.S. 
array. ) 

Tax  association  plan  of  reorganization.  Tax  Payers' 

Journal.  March  13,  1919.  p.3-6 

Waters,  C.  C.  State  Commissions  on  economy  and  efficiency. 
Providence,  R.  I.  E.  L.  Freeman,  1915.  (Rhode 
Island  State  Library,  Legislative  Reference 
Bureau;  Bulletin  No.  7,  1915.) 

Haines,  Charles  Grove.  University  of  Texas  Bulletin.  The 
Movement  for  the  Reorganization  of  State  Admin- 
istration 

Galbrsath,  C.  B.  Report  on  Administrative  Reorganization  in 
Other  States  (than  Ohio). 

Croly,  H.  State  Political  Reorganization.  American  Political 
Science  Association  Proceedings.  1911.  pl22-135 

Massachusetts  report  on  state  administration  and  expenditures 
by  Stone  and  Webster  Construction  Company,  January, 
1922,  House  no.  900 

U'Ren,  W.  S.  State  political  reorganization.  The  American 
Political  Science  Association  Proceedings.  1911. 
pl36-139 

Dodd,  W.  F.  State  Administrative  Reorganization.  Journal  of 
the  American  Bar  Association.  August,  1921.  p6 02 


• ■ 


. 


198 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


4 -St ate  Documents 


Alabama 

Legislative  Investigating  Committee. 

Report  1915. 

Act  to  Create  State  Board  of  Control  andEoonomy,  approved 
February  13,  1919. 

Arkansas 

Proposed  plans  for  administration  reorganization.  D.  Y. 
Thomas  1921. 


California 

Commission  on  Efficiency  and  Economy 
Report  to  governor.  March  12,  1919. 

Colorado 

The  Colorado  tax  commission  and  revenue  system  of  Colorado, 
by  R.  J.  Haig. 

A revision  of  the  highway  law6  of  the  state,  by  A.  N.  John- 
son . 

Special  report  1916. 

Report  on  a survey  of  the  administration  of  public  service, 
functions  relating  to  regulation  and  supervision  of  labor. 
Report  on  a survey  of  the  office  of  auditor  of  state  and 
of  the  office  of  public  examiner. 

Report  on  the  care  of  dependents,  delinquents  and  defectives, 
by  Samuel  W.  Hamilton,  Walter  L.  Tredway,  Alexander  Johnson. 
Report  on  a survey  of  the  state  auditing  board. 

Connecticut 

Commission  on  the  consolidation  of  state  commissions  and  the 
reorganization  of  the  public  health  laws. 

Report,  1915. 

Jelaware 

^egis^gti^0gurvey  cormrdttee,  reports  and  recommendations. 
Idaho 

Administration  Consolidation  Law.  Approved,  February  19,  1919 


Illinois 

Efficiency  and  economy  committee.  Preliminary  report,  June  18, 
1914.  Final  report,  1915. 

The  civil  administrative  code  of  the  state  of  Illinois,  1917. 


Iowa 

Consolidation  report  of  the  efficiency  engineers,  filed  in 
the  secretary  of  state's  office,  March  24,  1914. 

Report  of  Quail  & Parker,  efficiency  engineers,  relating  to 
the  state  department  of  agriculture,  state  fair  management 


' 


. 


- 


. 


. 


<■ 


. 


. 


. 


- 


. 


, 


. . . I 


199 


and  passes. 

Report  providing  for  reorganization  of  state  government  with 
notes  to  bill  introduced. 

Reorganization  Bill.  Senate  file  No.  519.  Senate  Journal  1915. 
Kansas 

Partial  report,  1916.  The  penal,  charitable,  and  other  institu- 
tions of  Kansas.  The  state  education  institutions.  Economy  and 
efficiency  report  of  Senator  J.D.  Joseph,  (Minorjtiy  report,  1916) 
State  Board  of  Administration.  Report  1918. 

Business  manager.  Report  1918. 

Economy  and  efficient  report  of  I.  D.  Joseph,  senate  member  of 
efficienty  and  economy  commission.  76  pages. 

Maryland 

Commission  on  efficiency  and  economy. 

Maryland.  Report  in  re  The  Organization  and  Administration  of 
the  state  government  Part  II.  April  15,  1921.  66  p.  (Griffen- 

hagen  and  associates,  Chicago.) 

Report  of  Dr.  Frank  J.  Goodrow,  chairman  and  member  of  effi- 
ciency and  economy  commission.  By  H.  S.  Chase  & Company  on 
inefficiency  and  extravagance  in  various  departments  and  offices. 
January  17,  1916,  51  p.  '16. 

Massachusetts 

Commission  on  efficiency  and  economy. 

Supervisor  of  administration  report  1916,  1917,  1918. 

Governor  and  Council.  Specification  and  rules  for  the  class- 
ification of  personal  service  of  the  commonwealth  of  Massachusetts, 
1918. 

Act  to  organize  in  departments  the  executive  ansi  administrative 
functions  of  the  commonwealth.  Approved  July  23,  1919. 

Supervisor  of  administration  annual  report  1918  (Pub.  doc.  No. 

119)  24  p.  '19. 

Annual  report  1916  (Pub.  doc.  No.  119)  22  p.  '17. 

Annual  report  1915  (Pub.  doc.  No.  96)  304  p.  '16. 

Minnesota 

Efficiency  and  Economy  Commission.  Preliminary  report  May  25,1914. 
Final  rpport,  November  1914. 

Commission  on  reorganization  of  civil  administration. 

Report  of  commission  on  reorganization  of  civil  administration 
appropriation  by  governor.  Inaugural  message  of  Gov.  Bromquest 
to  legislature  Jamary  1917. 

Nebraska 

Civil  Administrative  Code.  Approved  April  19,  1919. 

New  Jersey 

Economy  and  Efficiency  Commission.  Report  1912,  1914,  1915,  1916, 
1917. 


200 


North  Dakota 

Board  of  Administration.  First  annual  report  for  period 
July  26,  1919-Cctober  31,  1919.  140  p. 

Reconstruction  commission.  Report,  1919. 


New  York 

Report  New  York  Constitutional  Commission  1915 
Reconstruction  commission.  Retrenchment  commission.  Draft 
on  retrenchment  and  reorganization  prepared  for  consideration 
at  public  hearing.  September  24,  1919.  410  pages.  1919. 

Hall  of  Records. 

Reconstruction  committee  draft  of  summary.  September  24,  1919. 
44  pages,  1919.  Hall  of  Records. 

Recommendation  of  sweeping  reorganization  of  state  government. 
1919. 

Ohio 

Joint  committee  on  administrative  reorganization.  Preliminary 
report  1919. 

Report  on  summary  of  recommendations  for  administrative  re- 
organization of  Ohio  state  government  (D. C. Sowers)  1920 

Oregon 

Consolidation  commission.  Report,  1918.  Final  report,  1919. 
Pennsylvania 

Efficiency  and  economy  commission.  Report,  1914. 

Rhode  Island 

Legislative  reference  bureaus.  Facts  concerning  special 
committees  and  commissions  of  Rhode  Island.  1911-1921.  24 

pages,  May  31,  1921. 

Wisconsin 

Report  submitted  to  the  civil  service  commission:  Departmental 
organization  and  efficiency  of  state  employees. i 9 i 8 . 


